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ABSTRACT 
 
Today it is commonplace for the female consumer to be targeted using appropriated 
feminist discourses. This dissertation theorizes commodity feminism, a play on Marx’s 
conception of commodity fetishism, at the intersections of Marx/Marxism, feminist 
theory, and Freud/Freudianism. My method involves exploring a series of relationships 
through reading canonical and contemporary works of political theory and feminist 
theory. These relationships build upon one another in each chapter: the first 
relationship is between women and commodities, and to this relationship I add 
femininity, social control, and subject formation in sequence. In thinking through these 
relationships, I critique a variety of trade and scholarly marketing publications and 
marketing campaigns. 
I argue that the theory of commodity feminism provides a crucial, and as of yet 
unearthed, understanding of the contemporary relationship between women and 
commodities. I define commodity feminism as the commodification of feminist critique 
and praxis. In its cultural sense, commodity feminism is the broad phenomenon in which 
women are encouraged to express their empowerment by purchasing commodities. The 
politics of commodity feminism are both liberal and conservative. Commodity feminism 
is liberal in that it offers a type of resolution (however commodified) to the 
feminism/femininity tension and endorses liberal feminist politics of independence and 
self-determination. However, I argue that the view of society underpinning commodity 
feminism is conservative in that the masses are understood to be a problem in need of 
control. Therefore, commodity feminism, in addition to resolving the 
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feminism/femininity tension by revaluing feminized commodities and the women who 
use them, transforms commodities into a form of social control. In other words, 
commodity feminism makes women entirely unthreatening to the status quo, yet allows 
them to feel like feminists through their consumption of feminized commodities and 
production of femininity. This social control is accomplished in part through the role 
played by commodities and corporations in the production of subjectivity. As this 
dissertation shows, commodity feminism today constitutes several hegemonic 
feminine/feminist subjectivities in the Global North and increasingly the Global South.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Good Girls Consume: Commodity Feminism in Anglo-American Culture and Beyond 
 
They’re making gold out of the good girls like me, 
They’re making dollars out of all our fantasies, 
Making bundles of cash from the trash we think we need, 
Making gold out of the good girls like me.  
—Amy Rigby (1996) 
 
Amy Rigby’s mid-1990s song “The Good Girls,” from the album Diary of a Mod 
Housewife, describes a day in the life of an American good girl. She takes the subway to 
her work in an office. Concerned with maintaining a conventionally feminine 
appearance, she spends her lunch break shopping for clothes. She hopes to find a “ray 
of sunshine in the lining of a thirty-dollar dress.” She cannot, however, afford to spend 
more than thirty dollars on a dress, as “her chances of advancing are ten thousand to 
one.” Her hours of work are long (6−9) and arduous (characterized as “slaving”). She 
describes her work as “double time,” but it is unclear whether her 6−9 hour work day 
includes domestic labour, or if her domestic labour is completed outside these hours. 
She identifies as a feminist, especially when compared to her mother who “stayed at 
home and […] never got paid.” Yet she is aware of the limitations of her liberal feminist 
empowerment and notes with irony: “I’m so tired at night; I think I’ve got it made.” The 
chorus of “The Good Girls,” cited above, is repeated three times. The wording changes 
slightly in each repetition, indicating different commodities bought, sold, and used by 
the good girls: the capitalists making “bundles of cash” also benefit from the “trash that 
we read” and the “tapes and CDs.” I contributed to some of the “bundles of cash” made 
by Rigby’s recording label in purchasing my copy of her Diary of a Mod Housewife CD, as 
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did many other feminists, given that the album has been a popular text in women’s 
studies courses.  
 Beyond her feminism and urban American context, most aspects of the identity 
of the good girl in the song are unspecified: her class (she could be a secretary or a 
lawyer), race, ethnicity, age, sexuality, and whether she has a partner or any children. 
The good girl, therefore, could be many different women. Her feminist understanding is 
largely informed by liberal feminist discourses of independence and self-determination. 
Her feminism is expressed by purchasing feminized commodities (such as clothing and 
cosmetics) with money she earned herself through waged labour. Her feminism is 
depoliticized in that it does little to challenge the position of women. The very term 
good girl implies an idealized form of femininity, in regards to both embodiment and 
behaviour, and these ideals are themselves informed by gendered morality. She keeps a 
tidy household (making her bed “first thing in the morning”) and her “sins” are relatively 
minor (drinking an extra cup of coffee is her “only available sin”). Yet the definition of a 
good girl has shifted over time: to be too good (in other words, too traditionally 
gendered like Rigby’s stay-at-home mother or the women described by Betty Friedan’s 
Feminine Mystique) is no longer a strategy for success. At the same time, although 
clearly a woman, she is described using the diminutive girl, indicating that the 
distinction between the office girls and businessmen of her mother’s time has not yet 
been eradicated.  
The good girl, I contend, is a commodity feminist. In this dissertation, I argue that 
the theory of commodity feminism provides a crucial, and as of yet unearthed, 
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understanding of the contemporary relationship between women and commodities. I 
define commodity feminism, a play on Karl Marx’s conception of commodity fetishism, 
as the commodification of feminist critique and praxis. In its cultural sense, commodity 
feminism is the broad phenomenon in which liberal feminist discourses are 
appropriated for the purpose of selling commodities to women and girls. The politics of 
commodity feminism are both liberal and conservative. Commodity feminism is liberal in 
that it offers a type of resolution (however commodified) to the feminism/femininity 
tension and endorses liberal feminist politics of independence and self-determination. 
However, I argue that the view of society underpinning commodity feminism is 
conservative in that the masses are understood to be a problem in need of control.  
The overarching argument of this dissertation, therefore, is that commodity 
feminism, in addition to resolving the feminism/femininity tension by revaluing 
feminized commodities and the women who use them, transforms commodities into a 
form of social control. In other words, commodity feminism makes women entirely 
unthreatening to the status quo, yet allows them to feel like feminists through their 
consumption of feminized commodities and production of femininity. This social control 
is accomplished in part through the role played by commodities and corporations in the 
production of subjectivity. As the dissertation will show, commodity feminism today 
constitutes several hegemonic feminine/feminist subjectivities in the Global North and 
increasingly in the Global South.  
At a broader level, this dissertation is an inquiry into the good girl, probing the 
status of feminism in Anglo-American culture today. In this sense, Rigby’s song relates to 
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several of the main themes of this dissertation, both through its lyrics and how it has 
been produced and consumed. These themes include processes of commodification, the 
relationship between women and commodities, the relationship between femininity 
and feminized commodities, and the constitution of the female subject under 
contemporary capitalism. The good girl, as described by Rigby, negotiates her gendered 
position through both liberal feminist and masculinist values while purchasing 
commodities along the way. Rigby’s mid-1990s song, then, captures a particular 
historical moment very well: the rapid growth of commodity feminism as a cultural 
phenomenon.  
A. Framework and Method 
As my title Feminism for Sale: Commodity Feminism, Femininity, and Subjectivity 
suggests, I understand commodity feminism to concern the relationship between 
commodities, femininity, and subjectivity. In a similar manner to how commodity 
fetishism imbues commodities with a value that has little to do with the actual physical 
form of the commodity or the material relations through which the commodity was 
produced, commodity feminism has little to do with the actual politics of feminism or 
the material circumstances of women’s lives. Commodity feminism not only distracts 
and distances women from feminist issues, but it also produces particular forms of 
female subjectivity that are necessitated by commodity production and masculinist 
capitalist social relations. I thus aim to theorize processes of commodification through a 
feminist lens that does not assume that capitalism determines culture. Instead, I 
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understand capitalism as shaping culture and therefore social relations, including the 
constitution of subjectivity. As such, contemporary commodity feminism is not only a 
broad cultural phenomenon but also a neoliberal form of subjectivity. Commodity 
feminism relates to hegemonic forms of femininity in that many of the products sold to 
women through commodity feminist language, such as clothing and cosmetics, assist in 
the production of femininity. Indeed, commodity feminism has proven remarkably 
adept at negotiating the tensions between (Anglo-American) feminism and femininity.  
Throughout this dissertation, I also consider the nature of this form of feminism. 
Commodity feminism is feminist only insofar as it does not deconstruct femininity too 
much,1 defines femininity with reference to masculinity, is heteronormative, is middle 
class or at least gives the illusion of class mobility, understands race to primarily 
constitute a different aesthetic,2 and, most importantly, mediates itself through the 
commodity form. With all of these caveats, commodity feminism might seem to scarcely 
resemble any form of feminism. However, commodity feminism is feminist in that it 
claims a legitimate terrain of desire for women. Women have been constructed as 
objects of desire for men in a variety of ways.3 This construction has resulted in the 
denial of women’s own desire unless, in Luce Irigaray’s words, a woman gains pleasure 
“simply from being chosen as an object of consumption or of desire by masculine 
‘subjects’” (1985: 84). Commodity feminism offers women their own pleasure in 
                                                          
1 This would cut into revenue from beauty products, the fashion industry, and other feminized 
commodities. 
2 Understanding race as an aesthetic downplays racism and empties difference of power and social 
relations (Bannerji, 2000: 15−55). 
3 Indeed, according to psychoanalytic theory, the breast is a primordial object of desire (Ragland-Sullivan, 
1986: 22).  
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looking—for example, pleasure in looking at the clothing and cosmetics advertised in 
what Rigby describes as “the trash that we read” (referring to popular women’s 
magazines). Commodity feminism also offers women pleasure in the production of 
femininity; it revalues femininity and feminized commodities, both of which have been 
debased historically and contemporarily in Anglo-American society (Rigby is not unique 
in dismissing the “trash we think we need”). Commodity feminism may do little to enact 
social or political change, but it does empower the desires of certain women: those 
whom it simultaneously normalizes and idealizes. In other words, commodity feminism 
enables women who tend to be white and middle class to participate in the production 
of particular forms of femininity.  
 Overall, my method involves exploring a series of relationships through reading 
canonical and contemporary works of political theory and feminist theory. These 
relationships build upon one another: the first relationship is between women and 
commodities, and to this relationship I add femininity, social control, and subject 
formation in sequence. The primary relationship is discussed in the first chapter; 
subsequent chapters layer on these secondary aspects in order to probe various 
dimensions of commodity feminism. In exploring these relationships, I develop the 
broader themes of this dissertation.  
B. Broader Themes and Approach 
The first and most important theme is origins, that is, origin questions and origin stories. 
The fundamental origin question posed is how exactly feminism became associated with 
consumption. In theoretical terms, this question is explored in two ways. First, it is 
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explored through the often contentious relationship between feminism and femininity. 
In popular Anglo-American feminism, the femininity question has been thought to 
explain a great deal about the position of women. I trace this question back to liberal 
feminist Mary Wollstonecraft (1759−1797), who understood femininity as a problem, 
and overcoming femininity as critical to the emancipation of women. Second, the origin 
question is explored through capitalism under conservatism, that is, a conservative 
theory of democracy in which commodity consumption is treated as a necessary form of 
social control. I trace this theory back to Edward Bernays (1891−1995), a pioneer in 
public relations and nephew of Sigmund Freud. Bernays also originated the first 
commodity feminist campaigns in Anglo-America. In theoretical terms, therefore, I 
locate the origins of commodity feminism in the processes through which the 
feminism/femininity tension is resolved in capitalist terms. This resolution is brought 
about by revaluing feminized commodities and the women who use them while at the 
same time subjugating the consumer-citizen within a Bernaysian political framework. 
Thus, my theoretical treatment of the fundamental origin question illustrates both the 
mass appeal and ascendancy of commodity feminism today. 
 In concrete terms, I explore this origin question through historical trade and 
scholarly marketing publications on women and their changing roles. The rapid growth 
of commodity feminism as a marketing practice and cultural phenomenon in the mid-
1990s, as captured by Rigby’s song, did not occur overnight; rather, it was the result of 
decades of discussion and debate within marketing circles. I explore how marketing 
scholars and practitioners in the 1970s and 1980s debated whether and how marketers 
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should address feminist critiques of their practices (such as the representation of 
women as confined to the home, and/or as sexualized objects for the desiring male 
gaze). In the pursuit of profit for their clients, these scholars and practitioners paid close 
attention to changes in the position of women in Anglo-American societies, and even 
engaged with popular feminist writings such as Betty Friedan and Germaine Greer. As 
such, when the consumer base of more so-called traditional women (that is, women 
married to men and outside the paid labour force) shrank, marketers increased 
commodity feminist marketing techniques. In addition to engaging with the 
fundamental origin question in theoretical and concrete terms, my origins theme is also 
explored through origin stories.  
 The origin stories explored are those of Friedrich Engels and Sigmund Freud. 
Engels’ origin story (in which women are reduced to commodities to be exchanged 
between men) has been highly influential in feminist understandings of the relationship 
between women and commodities. Freud’s origin story (in which a band of brothers feel 
guilty about the Oedipal killing of their father and desire an authoritative father-
substitute) strongly influences his nephew’s conservative thought. I do not endorse the 
origin stories of Engels or Freud; indeed, I contend that both are based on questionable 
historical and anthropological evidence. This is not uncommon: as Joanne Wright 
notes,4 origin story theorists commonly distort history for their own purposes (2004: 
24). However, the origin stories of Engels and Freud are useful for illuminating the 
                                                          
4 My understanding of political origin stories has been influenced by Wright’s book Origin Stories in 
Political thought: Discourses on Gender, Power, and Citizenship (2004). See section A of the concluding 
chapter. 
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power relations from which commodity feminism emerged and within which it 
continues to operate.  
 Related to the first and most important theme of origins are two other broad 
themes: namely, (feminized) commodities and social control and civilizing discourses. On 
the former, I explore how commodity feminism works to contain and direct the 
potentially out-of-control desires and behaviour of individual women and the feminized 
masses. Femininity (both within individual women and within the masses) is associated 
with hysteria, excesses of emotion, and irrationality. In short, femininity is a problem in 
need of control, and the feminized commodities sold by commodity feminist marketers 
are key to that control. On the latter, I explore the links between feminism, 
consumption and civilization. Both historically and today, to consume commodities is to 
consume civilization. Feminism is implicated in the contemporary civilizing mission. 
Commodity feminism brings civilization (that is, commodity culture informed by 
feminism) to the anti-feminist, often racialized masses.  
 As evidenced by the broader themes, I locate my approach to theorizing 
commodity feminism at the intersections of Marx/Marxism, Freud/Freudianism, and 
feminist theory. This dissertation does not involve an extended critique of the 
problematic ways in which Marx/Marxists and Freud/Freudians have treated women. 
There has already been a great deal of ink spilled, for example, on Marx’s privileging of 
production over reproduction, on the actual utility of Engels’ Origin of the Family, 
Private Property and the State for feminist theory, and on Freud’s treatment of 
femininity in general and hysteria in particular. Although I do not avoid feminist 
 10 
critiques of Marx and Freud and their successors, my approach reads these thinkers as 
political theorists. Obviously this approach is far more unusual for Freud than for Marx.5 
However, given that one of the primary concerns of modern political theory is power 
and the justification of authority (Brunner, 1995: xxxiv; Klosko, 1995: xx−xxi), both 
Freud’s earlier work on the self and his later work on civilization can be read as political 
theory.6  
C. Existing Literature on Commodity Feminism  
The existing literature relating to commodity feminism is predominantly located in 
cultural studies, media studies, and women’s studies (or at least women’s studies as it 
intersects with the other two disciplines). There are also some Marxist accounts from 
the social sciences that critique the commodification of dissent more broadly. 
Importantly, none of this literature comes from the discipline of political science. With 
the notable exceptions of Robert Goldman7 and Donna Landry,8 few scholars actually 
                                                          
5 There are some notable exceptions, including José Brunner’s Freud and the Politics of Psychoanalysis 
(1995), Stephen Frosh’s The Politics of Psychoanalytic Theory (1987) and Paul Roazen’s Freud: Political and 
Social Thought (1986). None of these books, however, employ a feminist lens.  
6 Indeed, Freud links the instincts and drives within the self to the instincts and drives within society as a 
whole (Brunner, 1995: xxvii; Freud, 1961: 25, 46−47, 51, 64, 68−69, 81−82, 106−107; Freud, 2003: 76−82).  
7 In a co-written article (1991) and in two chapters of his book Reading Ads Socially (1992), Goldman 
explores how cosmetics and clothing have been sold to women using feminist language of independence 
and self-determination. Goldman focuses on analyzing the representation of woman (and accompanying 
text) in advertisements from late 1980s and early 1990s popular women’s magazines. For Goldman, 
commodity feminism is a pun on commodity fetishism (1992: 131), rather than a term in need of defining 
or theorizing. 
8 Donna Landry, in an article (1992) and in a book co-written with Gerald Maclean (1993), offers a very 
different approach to commodity feminism. She understands commodity feminism as the 
institutionalization of feminist theory in the academy. Landry contends that because “feminist theory” can 
be listed on a curriculum vitae (almost as legitimately as something like “modern political thought”), 
feminism is a valuable commodity in the academic job market (1992: 154). She suggests that Ph.D. 
candidates who identify as feminists (in her early 1990s context) “are likely to have been introduced to it 
in graduate school and to have had little experience of women’s groups [or] activist organizing around 
women’s issues” (1992: 161). Specializing in feminist theory is clearly useful for some academic jobs, and 
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employ the term commodity feminism. There are, however, alternative terms used in 
the literature that encompass at least some aspects of my understanding of commodity 
feminism (Gamman and Marshment, 1988; McRobbie, 1994; McRobbie, 2009; Hollows, 
2000). Other lesser-used terms include power femininity (Lazar, 2006), pro-girl rhetoric 
(Riordan, 2001), capitalist feminism (Hao, 2006), and girl power. Although girl power is 
associated with the late 1990s British female pop group the Spice Girls (whose fan base 
primarily constituted young and teenage girls), the term’s traction in popular culture has 
led many academics to use it to describe a version of commodity feminism that 
specifically targets girls and young women (Fudge, 2006; Karlyn, 2006; Siegel, 2007: 
146).  
Overall, the existing literature relating to commodity feminism can be situated in 
two broad categories: first, feminist critiques of specific manifestations of feminism in 
popular culture that elude a theoretical discussion of the commodity form (primarily 
literature from cultural studies, media studies, and women’s studies); and second, 
theoretical discussions of the commodity form that involve little or no engagement with 
feminist theory (primarily literature from Marxist accounts in the social sciences). The 
existing literature within both of these categories, therefore, does not appreciate the 
scope of the problem under consideration. Additionally and importantly, this literature 
does not theorize the underlying politics of commodity feminism. With that being said, 
my theorization of commodity feminism would not be possible without some of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
there are obviously feminist Ph.D. candidates who have never been involved in any form of feminist 
activism. However, given the widespread commodification of feminism within Anglo-American capitalist 
societies, the use of the term commodity feminism to refer to the (drastically smaller) academic job 
market alone seems misapplied. 
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important insights that emerge from this literature. As such, this section explores the 
strengths and limitations of this literature with respect to the three themes I have 
identified in the previous section: questions of origins, (feminized) commodities and 
social control, and gender, race and civilizing discourses.  
Questions of Origin 
The existing literature on commodity feminism does not interrogate how feminism 
became associated with consumption or any other origin questions. As previously 
noted, I situate the origins of commodity feminism through the femininity question (that 
is, the tension between feminism and femininity) and through capitalism under 
conservatism (that is, a conservative view of society as a whole in which commodity 
consumption is treated as a necessary form of social control). Although questions of 
origin are absent from the existing literature, I am indebted to this literature for 
enabling my own discussion of origins in two ways: first, through treating femininity as a 
serious topic of scholarly inquiry; and second, for not assuming a tension between 
feminism and femininity.   
 Femininity is treated as a serious topic of inquiry through the exploration of 
women’s desire and pleasure in consuming feminized popular culture. In the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, feminists in cultural studies and media studies began to understand 
soap operas, popular women’s magazines, and romantic fiction as cultural texts worthy 
of analysis (Hollows and Moseley, 2006: 6). An early and often-cited book examining 
women’s consumption of popular culture is British feminist Rosalind Coward’s Female 
Desires: How They Are Sought, Bought and Packaged (1985). In this book Coward 
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examines the pleasure women take in consuming a variety of cultural texts including 
soap operas, popular women’s magazines (including fashion, home and garden, 
celebrity gossip tabloids, and food-related publications), English period romances (such 
as Pride and Prejudice), and their mass appeal counterparts (pulp romances). Coward 
describes her approach as “quite deliberately” aiming “at no more than understanding 
how these representations directed at women enmesh with our actual lives” (1985: 15). 
Another example of a book that takes women’s pleasure in popular culture seriously is 
Hilary Radner’s Shopping Around: Feminine Culture and the Pursuit of Pleasure (1995). 
Many of the cultural texts she discusses are identical or similar to Coward’s, including 
fashion, popular women’s magazines, and English period romances (such as Jane Eyre 
and Wuthering Heights) and their mass appeal counterparts (Harlequin romances). As 
such, Shopping Around reads like a newer, American version of Female Desires.9 Radner 
contends that popular culture should be seen as a place where meanings are contested 
and where pleasure is pursued through the production of multiple femininities. Studies 
in the vein of Coward and Radner are useful for thinking about the pleasure women take 
in the consumption of popular culture and production of femininity. More importantly 
for this dissertation, these studies are valuable for reclaiming feminine culture in a 
masculinist society that treats popular culture associated with men (such as professional 
sports) as legitimate, while popular culture associated with women (such as soap 
                                                          
9 Radner expands beyond the scope of Coward’s book by including consideration of women’s pursuit of 
pleasure through cosmetics, television, self-help books, and the fitness videos and books of Jane Fonda. 
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operas) as illegitimate. Although these studies treat femininity as a serious topic of 
inquiry, none of the popular culture texts discussed are (or claim to be) feminist.10  
However, feminists in cultural studies and media studies have also explored 
feminized popular culture that does claim some form of feminism; importantly, this is 
done without assuming feminism and femininity must necessarily be in conflict. Some of 
the most frequently discussed examples are television shows with strong female leads. 
Buffy the Vampire Slayer,11 which focused on a female superhero and her circle of 
primarily female friends, was described late in its run as “the intelligentsia’s favourite 
show” (Pasley, 2003: 254).12 Another favourite television example among feminist 
scholars is Sex and the City.13 This show focused on the lives of four women living in 
Manhattan, and was widely acclaimed for its groundbreaking representations of gender 
and sexuality (Gill, 2008: 37). The scholarly literature on Buffy and Sex and the City (and 
other shows featuring strong female leads) concerns the nature of the feminist politics 
                                                          
10 This raises the question of whether offering women pleasure through popular culture texts that are 
sexist and heteronormative—such as the storylines of soap operas and romance novels—is feminist. 
Generally feminists in cultural studies and media studies, including Coward, Radner, and Hollows, reply in 
the affirmative for several reasons. For example, soap operas allow women to read and take up a range of 
subject positions and identifications. The enduring popularity of the villainess character who uses 
marriage as well as her sexuality to attain power is often read by women as a heroine transgressing 
traditional gendered norms (Coward, 1985: 163−171; Hollows, 2000: 97−98).  
11 Originally a 1992 Hollywood film, Buffy the Vampire Slayer is better known as the American television 
series which ran for seven seasons from 1997−2003. Season 8 was later released in comic book format. 
The creator Joss Whedon has often stated that he found his inspiration in the misogynist sexual politics of 
slasher horror films popular from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s (Pasley, 2003: 255). Whedon envisioned 
a feminist series that subverted and combined the horror, comedy, and drama genres. 
12 Indeed, not only did Buffy spawn countless scholarly articles (including several edited volumes devoted 
exclusively to the show), but academic conferences and university courses devoted to the field of Buffy 
Studies are now well-established. There is even a regularly published online journal, Slayage 
(http://slayageonline.com/), May 18, 2012), and a Whedon Studies Association named after Buffy’s 
creator. The writers of Buffy were quite aware of academic interest in the show, and the show featured 
occasional tongue-in-cheek nods to academia. 
13 Sex and the City was a highly popular American television series (loosely based on a 1997 book by the 
same name) which ran on the HBO network from 1998−2004 and led to a film by the same title in 2008, 
and a sequel to the film in 2010.  
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promoted,14 and interrogates whether these shows “do us a disservice when they do 
not articulate the version of feminism we would most desire to recognize on the small 
screen” (Byers, 2003: 184). Representations of femininity are central to concerns about 
the feminist politics promoted in these shows: for example, while certain aspects of 
hegemonic femininity (white, middle-class, thin) tend to be reproduced, other aspects 
(weak, passive, dependent, exclusively heterosexual) are often rejected. Yet nowhere in 
this literature on feminist popular culture is the suggestion that femininity itself is a 
problem to be overcome; as such, the relationship between femininity and feminism is 
not assumed to be contentious.   
In taking the consumption of feminized popular culture seriously, feminists 
working within cultural studies, media studies and women’s studies have to some extent 
disrupted ideas that femininity is trivial or frivolous. These ideas are deep-seated and 
relate not only to the historic privileging of production (associated with men) over 
consumption (associated with women) but also to misogynist treatments of femininity. 
Indeed, cultural studies theorist Joanne Hollows has remarked upon how quickly 
“consumption can be derided by aligning it with ‘feminine’ qualities and femininity can 
be derided by aligning it with consumption” (2000: 115). As such, this literature is 
important for opening up space to think through the tension between feminism and 
femininity. Yet at the same time, this literature leaves many questions unanswered. 
                                                          
14 For example, the entirety of Lorna Jowett’s 2005 book, Sex and the Slayer, is devoted to delineating 
what she argues is a contradictory mix of “subversive” and “conservative” images of gender and sexuality 
in Buffy. Indeed, such an approach is not limited to Jowett: perhaps the central question posed by this 
literature is whether Buffy the show and Buffy the character are feminist (Pender, 2002: 36).  
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What is the relationship between femininity and the consumption of commodities?15 
How does this relationship relate to the persistent derision of femininity? How did 
consumption get associated with feminism? Does revaluing femininity necessitate 
revaluing (or even celebrating) consumption? The only way to answer these questions is 
to think through the questions of origin relating to commodity feminism as I do in this 
dissertation.  
(Feminized) Commodities and Social Control 
Absent from the existing literature in cultural studies, media studies and women’s 
studies are not only questions of origin but also questions of commodification. Yet 
feminist popular culture is big business. Indeed, during the late 1980s and 1990s, pro-
girl or pro-woman rhetoric exploded in marketing, the corporate media, and popular 
culture generally. For example, strong athletic women wore Nike shoes, women who 
knew they were “worth it” used L’Oréal makeup, and women who required deodorant 
“strong enough for a man” put on Secret. Although there is some analysis relating to the 
material production of culture through the lens of appropriation/co-option, the existing 
literature lacks a thorough interrogation of feminized commodities, commodification 
and social control.  
                                                          
15 Buffy the Vampire Slayer continues to be a lucrative business (despite the show itself having frequent 
storylines critical of contemporary capitalism). For example, there are a plethora of Buffy-related 
commodities including an ongoing comic book series, action figures, video games, trading cards, novels 
and DVD box sets; many of these commodities are labeled limited edition, which according to capitalist 
logic means more valuable. Conventions with steep admission rates regularly held in Canada, the United 
States, Australia, and Europe allow fans the opportunity to meet cast members and purchase even more 
commodities. The storylines of Sex and the City are perhaps the most honest about the role the show 
plays in contemporary capitalism. The feminism represented is a trendy upper middle-class form of 
commodity feminism: the empowerment of women is continually equated with conspicuous consumption 
of feminized commodities, and there is endless fetishization of clothing and shoes from designer labels. 
Indeed, there is even an episode in the final season entitled “A Woman’s Right to Shoes.” 
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 Analysis using this lens tends to start with the understanding that feminism sells. 
Gill notes that the “women are invited to purchase everything from bras to coffee as 
signs of their power and independence” (2008: 36). Critiques tend to concern how this 
form of feminism is both individualized and depoliticized (Riordan, 2001: 281−2; Lazar, 
2006: 505, 510; Siegel, 2007: 125−126). Karlyn notes that “while girl power may be hot, 
feminism is not” (2006: 57). Fudge points out that “a girl might be able to kick some 
undefined ass” under the auspices of commodity feminism, but, “she won’t be 
organizing any self-defense classes or antiviolence workshops for her peers” (2006: 
156). Two additional examples of analysis using this appropriation/co-option lens are 
Samantha King’s Pink Ribbons, Inc.: Breast Cancer and the Politics of Philanthropy (2006) 
and Judith Williamson’s Decoding Advertisements: Ideology and Meaning in Advertising 
(2002).  
 King offers an important critique of breast cancer culture16 by examining the 
plethora of pink ribbon products available today17 and the profitability of breast cancer-
related marketing (or pink-washing) to corporations. In a similar manner to other 
literature using this lens, King contends that the appropriation/co-option of breast 
cancer (and women’s health more broadly) serves to individualize and depoliticize this 
                                                          
16 Although not the first study of this culture, it is the most extensive. Barbara Ehrenreich’s article 
“Welcome to Cancerland: A Mammogram Leads to a Cult of Pink Kitsch” (2001) discusses some of her 
experiences with breast cancer, including her begrudging acquaintance with breast cancer culture. She 
critiques the association of breast cancer activism with purchasing pink ribbon products. All of these 
products are ultrafeminine (including jewelry, cosmetics, and pink clothes) and some are highly 
infantilizing (such as the various breast cancer awareness teddy bears). Ehrenreich notes that “men 
diagnosed with prostate cancer do not receive gifts of Matchbox cars” (2001: 46−47). 
17 These commodities include “breast cancer awareness” teddy bear and a “pink slice” toaster. Perhaps 
one of the most ridiculous pink ribbon commodities, which came out after King’s book was published, is a 
breast cancer awareness gun. The gun has a pink handle (Centre for Media and Democracy, 2009). 
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feminist issue.18 Yet although commodities are everywhere in Pink Ribbons, Inc., they 
are theorized nowhere. Insofar as she acknowledges a relationship between 
commodities and social control, the form of regulation King discusses is a diffuse form of 
power in which capitalism is acknowledged but ultimately deemed extraneous to the 
analysis of how that regulation is accomplished.19 As such, she ultimately ignores the 
important relationship between commodities and social control.  
 Williamson interrogates the appropriation/co-option of feminism by, in her 
words, “simply analyzing what can be seen in advertisements” and investigating 
“signifiers and their systems in ads” (2002: 11, 19). She uses a semiotics approach to 
investigate the mechanisms through which ads create meaning and identity. These 
mechanisms work through the relationship between signifier and signified, and a chain 
of signifiers that constitutes the signifying system (2002: 40–42). In more concrete 
terms, the thirty dollar dress desired by Amy Rigby’s “good girl” is a signifier because she 
does not desire the dress for any utilitarian purpose, such as protection from the 
elements. Rather, the good girl desires the dress for what it signifies, the “freedom” to 
consume provided by her full-time job. The good girl’s desire for the dress has no 
meaning outside the social order or signifying system.20 Williamson’s semiotics 
                                                          
18 King contends that breast cancer is now understood as a “safe,” “apple pie” issue, and as such, has 
become the “darling of corporate America;” however, it took over two decades to construct breast cancer 
as “somehow beyond the realm of politics, conflict, or power relations” (2006: 64, 2, 112). 
19 For example, she suggests neoliberal capitalism equates citizens with consumers, which ascribes the 
breast cancer survivor a neoliberal subject position. However, she never links subjectivity and capitalism 
beyond this suggestion, thus foreclosing the possibility of a deeper analysis. 
20 Although arguably the most well-known author, Williamson is not alone in using semiotics to examine 
the creation of meaning in popular culture. For example, other studies have examined the use of the 
colour pink in advertisements, websites, and magazines, and the shift from commodities signifying 
conservative forms of family values in the 1950s to commodities signifying rebellious non-conformity in 
the twenty-first century (Koller, 2008; Sharpe, 2006).  
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approach does theorize the processes through which people come to invest meanings 
and create identities through commodities, however, it contains no real critique of the 
commodity form itself or the power relations and social control embedded within 
commodity feminism.  
 The existing literature on commodity feminism employing the lens of 
appropriation/co-option is useful in that it acknowledges the material production of 
culture through feminized commodities, and highlights some of the ways in which 
commodity feminism individualizes and depoliticizes feminism. However, this type of 
scholarly discussion forgets that many individualized identities are subordinated to the 
logic of the commodity form and mass produced commodities. As such, this critique of 
appropriation/co-option is insufficient to a more fulsome analysis of commodity 
feminism as it is connected to capitalist social relations. In developing my second theme, 
feminized commodities and social control, I do not ignore processes of commodification. 
Rather, I theorize how commodity feminism works to contain and direct the desires and 
behaviour of individual women and the feminized masses.  
Gender, Race, and Civilizing Discourses 
Although the relationship between commodities, sexism, racism, and so-called 
civilization is long-standing, this has not been theorized particularly well in Marxist 
accounts from the social sciences. A notable exception is Anne McClintock’s excellent 
book Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Context (1995). In this 
book, she uses the term commodity racism to describe how forms of racismpreviously 
available only to the nineteenth century British elitewere made accessible to the 
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masses through the marketing of the commodity (1995: 209). In particular, she centres 
on how the marketers of soap and other cleaning products connected Victorian cleaning 
rituals to the civilizing mission of British imperialism. Yet on the whole, the existing 
literature from these Marxist accounts has the tendency of abstracting gender, race and 
civilizing discourses from commodity feminism. This is not surprising given the 
historically poor treatment of gender and race within Marxism.  
 This abstraction of gender and race is evident in the Marxist tradition of 
critiquing the commodification of dissent. In this tradition, resistance and dissent are 
understood to be commodified almost as quickly as they are created; in other words, it 
is impossible to sustain “counterculture” for very long before it becomes “culture” 
(Jameson, 1991; Frank, 1997; Frank, 1998; Heath and Potter, 2004). For example in the 
1960s, the anti-war movement was quickly reduced to selling peace medallions in 
department stores, and today, the image of Ernesto “Che” Guevara is sold in suburban 
shopping malls to teenagers and young adults who know little to nothing about the 
politics of the Argentinean-born Marxist revolutionary. This group of scholars has 
meticulously documented how a variety of group dissent is commodified, such as 
activists (from anti-war protestors of the 1960s to anti-globalization protestors of the 
late 1990s and 2000s) and “counterculture” musicians (from anti-capitalist punk rock of 
the 1970s to hip hop artists parodying white bourgeois consumption practices of the 
2000s). Yet somehow the gender and race politics within these forms of dissent, as well 
the widespread commodification of feminism, seems to have escaped their notice.  
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 The existing literature employing a Marxist lens is useful for highlighting the 
prevalence of the commodification of dissent in contemporary capitalism. However, 
gender, race and civilizing discourses are almost completely absent. Even for Robert 
Goldman (one of the few Marxist scholars to engage with commodity feminism), 
feminism is commodified simply because all “oppositional” practices are commodified. 
According to this framework, there is little left for Goldman to theorize: various schools 
of feminist theory21 and everything they have to say about gender and race are 
irrelevant. This significant gap is filled in the development of my third theme: gender, 
race, and civilizing discourses. Indeed, I employ McClintock’s work to theorize 
contemporary forms of commodity racism, with a particular focus on skin lightening 
cream, and the relationship between commodity racism and commodity feminism. 
Contemporary marketers of skin lightening cream offer the promise of class mobility to 
South Asian women in a similar manner to how Victorian marketers of soap offered the 
promise of civilization to the British working class. 
Toward a New Theoretical Framework 
I am indebted to the existing literature related to commodity feminism for the following 
reasons: for treating feminine culture and femininity as a serious topic of inquiry (and 
therefore disrupting ideas that feminine culture and femininity are trivial or frivolous), 
                                                          
21 Goldman does not seem familiar with feminist theory whatsoever. If he has any familiarity, he does not 
indicate so in his analysis, other than the odd reference to the “male gaze” and the occasional nod to 
Williamson’s Decoding Advertisements. He does not reference the work of any feminist scholars other 
than Williamson, and does not engage with Williamson’s work with any degree of depth. For example, he 
contends commodity feminism “presents feminism as a style—a semiotic abstraction—composed of 
visual signs that ‘say who you are’” (1992: 133). Goldman’s use of Williamson does not extend beyond 
such brief statements. 
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for critically examining the feminism of feminist popular culture (particularly the 
depoliticized and individualistic nature of this form of feminism), and finally, for 
discussions of the commodification of dissent. All of these interventions inform this 
dissertation; however, much of this literature (with the exception of the Marxist 
accounts) tends to avoid discussion of the commodity form or processes of 
commodification and, as such, does not sufficiently address the material production of 
culture and its relationship to subjectivity. Thus what emerges from this literature 
review is the need to engage with feminist theory while also theorizing the material 
production of culture. The theoretical framework of commodity feminism as put 
forward in this dissertation aims at filling this gap, while simultaneously providing a 
timely account of the rise of this dominant form of feminism. The subsequent section 
details how my three broader themes (origins, commodities and social control, and 
civilizing discourses) are incorporated into the chapters.  
D. Dissertation Outline 
The first chapter, “The Exchange and Commodification of Women: Marxism, Feminism 
and the Commodity Form,” reconsiders the relationship between women and 
commodities. This relationship has traditionally been understood through “the 
exchange of women.” I overview the treatment of this relationship within the traditions 
of Western political theory and feminist theory, with a particular focus on Marx, Engels, 
Emma Goldman, and Gayle Rubin. I contend that in order to better theorize the 
relationship between women and commodities, an exclusive focus on the exchange and 
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commodification of women cannot be maintained. As such, I call for a move from 
theorizing women as the exchanged to women as the exchangers, and from commodity 
fetishism to commodity feminism. This move involves critiquing without abandoning the 
utility of the former categories. Finally, I discuss Rubin’s approach to theorizing the 
exchange and commodification of women (namely, her use of multiple theoretical 
frameworks including Marxism and psychoanalysis) as the basis for my own theorizing of 
the commodification of feminism.  
The second chapter, “Feminized Commodities: The Femininity Question in 
Popular Anglo-American Feminism,” is where I begin the work of theorizing the origins 
of commodity feminism itself. I examine the femininity question in popular Anglo-
American feminism. I demonstrate that Wollstonecraft sets up a tension between 
feminism and femininity (at times using arguments that are misogynist). I contend that 
her legacy has influenced and continues to influence popular feminist understandings of 
the femininity question (including Betty Friedan, Susan Brownmiller, and Naomi Wolf) 
particularly in terms of their treatment of femininity and feminized commodities. I 
suggest that both queer femme and third-wave feminism (for example, works by 
Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards, and contributors to the Canadian collection 
Brazen Femme) directly challenge the assumption that femininity is a problem to be 
overcome, while at the same time allowing for and legitimizing commodity feminism. 
These approaches invite almost any claim to feminist membership (in the name of 
inclusiveness) and perpetuate a feminism = resistance + consumption equation.  
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In the third chapter, “Commodities as Social Control: Capitalism under 
Conservatism in Freudian Theory,” I continue theorizing the origins of commodity 
feminism through re-reading selected texts of Sigmund Freud and Edward Bernays. I 
explore Bernays’ early commodity feminist campaigns in Anglo-America and how he 
rejected the then-dominant approach of marketing to women as housewives. I also 
explore Bernays’ extensive writings on his profession. It is in Bernays’ writings that the 
influence of his uncle Freud can be seen: Bernays was elitist, suspicious of democracy, 
and put his faith in the “intelligent few” in society. Amongst these intelligent few is the 
public relations counsel who helps to preserve stability in society by focusing the 
irrational, pleasure-seeking masses on consumption. I contend that commodity 
feminism is underpinned by capitalism under conservatism, defined as a conservative 
view of society in which commodity consumption is treated as a necessary form of social 
control; this renders women entirely unthreatening to the status quo, yet allows them 
to feel like feminists through their rejection of Wollstonecraftian misogyny and 
consumption of feminized commodities.  
The fourth chapter, “Commodity Feminism as Subjectivity: Cosmetics and 
Corporate-Sponsored Empowerment,” theorizes commodity feminism with a focus on 
the role of the modern corporation in subject formation. I examine the work of anti-
essentialist Marxist theorists as well as Gayatri Spivak, and critique the former for 
ignoring Spivak’s interventions and treating subjectivity in abstraction from gender and 
race. I also explore the commodity feminist campaigns of Unilever as an example of a 
multinational corporation that helps to create subjectivities through their “Fair & 
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Lovely” brand of skin lightening cream in the Global South and “Campaign for Real 
Beauty” in the Global North. I suggest that in selling a feminine subjectivity through 
feminized and racialized commodities, corporations themselves play a crucial role in 
subject formation. I read contemporary commodity feminism as constituting several 
prevalent forms of feminine/feminist subjectivity, forms that are also racialized in 
various ways.  
The dissertation concludes by bringing together the various theoretical 
interventions from each chapter: commodity feminism as a new way into theorizing the 
relationship between women and commodities; as a way of resolving (however 
problematically) the feminism/femininity tension; as being underpinned by a political 
theory of capitalism under conservatism; and finally, as playing a role in 
feminine/feminist subject formation. This concluding chapter also draws together once 
again the broader themes of this dissertation: first, the role of origins in the political 
theory of commodity feminism; second, the (ir)rationality of the feminine consuming 
masses and social control; and finally, the role of commodity feminism as civilizing 
discourse. In contemporary capitalist societies, regardless of whether women identify as 
feminists, commodity feminism is a predominant form of feminism that is practiced. In 
the words of Fejes, “pulling out the American Express Card has replaced the raised fist” 
(2002: 197). The story of how the “good girl” has come to reign supreme will continue to 
be explored throughout this dissertation.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Exchange and Commodification of Women:  
Marxism, Feminism, and the Commodity Form 
 
If commodities could speak, they would say this: our use-value may interest men,  
but it does not belong to us as objects.  
—Karl Marx (1990: 176) 
 
The “exchange of women” is a seductive and powerful concept […] it suggests that  
we look for the locus of women’s oppression within the traffic in women,  
rather than within the traffic in merchandise.  
     —Gayle Rubin (1997: 37) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The exchange of women has been a topic of interest to both feminist and non-feminist 
scholars for over a century. Scholars from a wide variety of disciplines including political 
theory, political economy, anthropology, and history have used the concept to explain 
the position of women—and the very structure of society—in a wide variety of historical 
contexts. The exchange of women is linked to their commodification under capitalist 
social relations. Theorists have located the origin of this exchange in a wide variety of 
contexts, from the advent of civilization (as in Friedrich Engels’ The Origin of the Family, 
Private Property and the State), to pre-state kinship structures (as in Claude Lévi-Strauss’ 
The Elementary Structures of Kinship), to capitalism after the industrial revolution (as in 
Emma Goldman’s “The Traffic in Women”). Regardless of where one chooses to situate 
its origins, however, the commodification of women under capitalism involves a far 
more intensive objectification than that found in earlier forms of exchange (Rubin, 1997: 
37). Indeed, if women are the speaking commodities referenced by Marx in this 
chapter’s epigraph, then he can be read as predicting the objectification of women 
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under contemporary capitalism. However, as Gayle Rubin points out, this focus on the 
exchange or commodification of women does not consider how the exchange or 
commodification of non-human merchandise affects the position of women.  
 When capitalism, along with the social relations it engenders, is understood to 
categorize women as the exchanged and men as the exchangers, the following question 
remains: what happens when women are not only the exchanged but also the 
exchangers? Clearly the institutions of the market, to paraphrase Marx, have not melted 
into air (1985: 83). Instead, some women have found a form of empowerment within 
existing structures, namely freedom to participate in the exchange. Commodity 
feminists, of course, are women thus empowered. Yet commodity feminism cannot 
eclipse the exchange and commodification of women: these two social forces work 
together. As such, understanding women as the exchangers requires an understanding 
of women as the exchanged. 
This chapter sets up the study of commodity feminism by considering the 
question of the exchange and commodification of women. I undertake a historical 
overview of this question within the traditions of political theory and feminist theory, 
focusing on Marx, Engels, Goldman, and Rubin. The chapter proceeds in three additional 
parts. Section 1.2 examines Marx’s discussion of the nature of the commodity form and 
commodity fetishism, and his rather limited discussion of the relationship between 
women and commodities. This section primarily, but not exclusively, focuses on the first 
volume of Capital (1867). Section 1.3 furthers the gender analysis of Marxism by 
exploring Engels’ The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884). It 
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situates Engels as one of the first theorists to open up the possibility that commodities 
might be people—or more specifically, women. Section 1.4 explores two essays titled 
“The Traffic in Women,” the first by Emma Goldman (1910) and the second by Gayle 
Rubin (1975), in order to reveal the similarities and differences between how 
commodification is treated by feminists and how it is treated by Marx and Engels. This 
section also examines Rosemary Hennessy’s critique of Rubin.  
The overarching argument of this chapter is that in order to better theorize the 
relationship between women and commodities, a conceptual focus must be broadened 
beyond the exchange and commodification of women. This focus is totalizing, does not 
allow for resistance, and is ambiguous about the status of women in capitalism (namely 
whether they are commodified as women or as sex, or whether it is their labour power 
that is being commodified). As such, it is important to move from theorizing women as 
the exchanged to women as the exchangers, and from commodity fetishism to 
commodity feminism; such a move involves critiquing without abandoning the utility of 
the former categories. 
1.2 Marx on the Commodity Form, Commodity Fetishism, and Women 
In order to put forth the argument that theorizing the relationship between women and 
commodities requires a broader conceptual focus, it is important to first overview and 
critique Marx’s work on the relationship between the commodity form, commodity 
fetishism, and women. As this section will delineate, although Marx introduces concepts 
that are critical to theorizing the processes of commodification, he unfortunately paid 
 29 
insufficient attention to the relationship between women and work, the ways in which 
the commodity is gendered, and the implications of his gendered language.  
1.2.1 Marx and Commodities 
Before discussing commodity fetishism in greater depth, it is important to return to the 
nature of the commodity form. Marx begins the first volume of Capital by presenting 
the wealth of society, including the labour power (or capacity to work) of its members, 
as “an immense collection of commodities” (1990: 125). He begins with commodities 
not merely because they represent wealth and labour power, but because they 
represent the very things that mediate social relations under capitalism. As Samuel 
Knafo points out, the commodity form 
grounds the way in which people rationalize their experiences in capitalism. 
Hence, the meaning we invest in the world is structured by the way we value 
commodities. This explains why […] the source of necessity in capitalism is the 
process of valuation (2002: 158).  
 
This process of valuation can be explained with Marx’s famous distinction between use-
value and exchange-value. While use-value constitutes merely the utility of the thing 
and has no existence outside its physical properties, exchange-value is abstracted from 
both the utility and the physical properties of the thing (Marx, 1990: 126−128). As Marx 
notes, “no chemist has ever discovered exchange-value either in a pearl or diamond” 
(1990: 177). To put it another way, the use-value of a thing exists in and of itself, while 
the exchange-value exists only in relation to other things and concerns “not an atom of 
matter” (1990: 138).  
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For Marx, commodities are commodities precisely because they possess both 
use-value and exchange-value; in his words, they have a “dual nature” (Marx, 1990: 
138). Without some degree of use-value, the exchange-value of a commodity could not 
possibly be realized. This is how Marx characterizes commodities in the first volume of 
Capital and is the understanding of commodities I adopt in this chapter. At the same 
time, however, Marx argues that use-value is not really value at all, for the elementary 
form of value is realized only through exchange-value (1990: 152). Indeed, in the first 
volume of Capital, he tends to use the terms “exchange-value” and “value” 
interchangeably (Hunt, 2002: 210).  
As a relation between things, exchange-value varies greatly across time and 
location (Marx, 1990: 126) while use-value remains constant. For example, the use-value 
of a coat remains constant in cold climates, since one always requires a coat in winter. 
Or as Marx explains in the second volume of Capital,  
Whether a product is produced as a commodity or not, it is always a material 
form of wealth, a use-value, destined for individual or productive 
consumption. As a commodity, its value exists only ideally in the price, which 
does not affect its actual use-form (1992: 213, emphasis mine).  
 
According to Marx, despite the “dual nature” of commodities, the use-value and 
exchange-value of a commodity do not have any bearing upon one another.  
The disappearance of utility in exchange-value has several implications. McNally 
points out that if commodities were exchanged according to their actual usefulness, 
water would be expensive and diamonds would be cheap (2001: 53).22 For Marx, the 
                                                          
22 H.G. Wells’ 1909 satire on the emergence of modern consumer capitalism, Tono-Bungay, documents 
the rise of a tonic which is marketed as medicine but has no medicinal properties whatsoever and 
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most important implication of the disappearance of utility in exchange-value is the 
disappearance of the useful labour required to produce the commodity. When utility 
disappears in exchange-value, it is not possible to distinguish between different forms of 
labour: all labour is “reduced to the same kind of labour, human labour in the abstract” 
(Marx, 1990: 125). The exchange-value of a commodity, therefore, “represents human 
labour pure and simple, the expenditure of human labour in general” (1990: 135). For 
Marx, the process through which concrete labour becomes more and more abstract is 
the very key to grasping the logic of capital (McNally, 2001: 52).  
The disappearance of utility in exchange-value also means value must be 
determined by something other than utility.23 It is determined by labour power, that is, 
the simple ability to work “possessed in his bodily organism by every ordinary man [sic]” 
(Marx, 1990: 135). More complex forms of labour power count  
only as intensified, or rather multiplied simple labour, so that a smaller 
quantity of complex labour is considered equal to a larger quantity of simple 
labour. Experience shows that this reduction is constantly being made. A 
commodity may be the outcome of the most complicated labour, but through 
its value it is posited as equal to the product of simple labour, hence it 
represents only a specific quantity of simple labour (Marx, 1990: 135).  
 
Labour power as the general expenditure of human labour is therefore embodied in the 
commodity, giving it exchange-value. Yet this labour power is abstract. The logical 
outcome of this process of abstraction is commodity fetishism: although commodities 
arise from “the peculiar social character of the labour which produces them” (1990: 
165), they appear not to be a product of human labour but to exist autonomously. In 
                                                                                                                                                                             
moreover is slightly toxic. The main character complains that what passes as “fair trading” amounts to 
little more than a “damned swindle” (2005: 35).  
23 See Chapter Four for a discussion of the disappearance of use-value in relation to commodity feminism. 
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McClintock’s words, “commodity fetishism flamboyantly exhibits the overvaluation of 
commercial exchange as the fundamental principle of social community” and the 
“fetishized undervaluation,” if not complete erasure, of human labour (1995: 154). 
Commodity fetishism is therefore not only the outcome of this process, it is part of the 
process of abstraction.  
1.2.2 Commodity Fetishism  
Marx never quite finished his discussion of commodity fetishism. It is clear from earlier 
manuscripts of the first volume of Capital that Marx continued to expand his discussion 
until it became its own section;24 namely, the fourth section of the first chapter titled 
“The Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secret.” However, despite the loose ends in 
Marx’s discussion, “the explanatory power of this notion of commodity fetishism has 
endured the many developments in capitalism” since it was first elaborated by Marx 
(Bennett, 2001: 113). Indeed, commodity fetishism has even more explanatory power 
now than it did close to one hundred fifty years ago: contemporary capitalism has seen 
the expansion and intensification of commodification, and all aspects of social and 
cultural life are now affected or mediated by the commodity form.  
A key distinction made by Marx in his discussion of commodity fetishism is 
between the social and the natural. He complains about the way in which political 
economists have made these distinctions by making an analogy with religion. Marx 
contends political economists are like the fathers of the church: just as the political 
                                                          
24 Thanks to David McNally for making this point in the question and answer period of the panel “What 
Can We Still Learn from Marx’s Theory of the Commodity” at the Rethinking Marxism conference on 
October 28, 2006 in Amherst, Massachusetts.  
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economists treat all pre-capitalist institutions such as feudalism as artificial and 
bourgeois institutions as natural, the fathers of the church treat pre-Christian religions 
as artificial (or “inventions of man”) and Christianity as natural (or an “emanation of 
God”) (1990: 175). In a similar move, commodity fetishism involves transforming the 
social into the natural (Marx, 1992: 303). This transformation is central to the process 
through which the commodity simultaneously appears to exist autonomously and not to 
be a product of human labour. For Marx, “the social character of private labour and the 
social relations between the individual workers” are concealed, which makes “those 
relations appear as relations between material objects, instead of revealing them 
plainly” (1990: 168−169). Put differently, human labour concerns social relations and is 
therefore social. Relations between material objects, whether between diamond rings 
and ruby necklaces or between the ocean and the sand, seem to have an autonomous 
existence outside the social and thus become natural.  
Commodity fetishism might thus be described not only as a process through 
which the social is transformed into the natural, but also as a process through which the 
social is transformed into the supernatural. Consider Marx’s description of the 
fetishizing process as wood is transformed into a table:  
The table continues to be wood, an ordinary, sensuous thing. But as soon as it 
emerges as a commodity, it changes into a thing which transcends 
sensuousness. It not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in relation to 
all other commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden 
brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of 
its own free will (1990: 163−164). 
 
Commodity fetishism, therefore, transforms a thing that is sensuous and ordinary into a 
thing that transcends sensuousness and is extraordinary. Marx’s “table with a brain” 
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refers to his argument that commodity fetishism makes objects appear to have a life of 
their own. Additionally, this example highlights Marx’s view that the process of 
commodity fetishism is both magical (that is, “far more wonderful than if it were to 
begin dancing”) and sinister or grotesque.  
Marx makes another analogy with religion that suggests a supernatural element. 
In masking social relations between people, fetishized commodities assume “the 
fantastic form of a relation between things” (Marx, 1990: 165). Marx’s use of the term 
“fantastic” is purposeful, for he goes on to make an analogy between commodity 
fetishism and “the misty realm of religion” (1990: 165). Like commodity fetishism, in 
religion “the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with 
a life of their own” (1990: 165). Yet the “misty realm” of which Marx speaks is a 
reference to a specific set of religious practices, not from his own society but from the 
societies of western Africa.  
Much has been said thus far on the commodity form but little on the fetish. The 
fetish is a construct of the European Enlightenment that claimed to describe the 
religious practices and culture of the African “Other.” The term “fetishisme” was 
originally coined in 1760 by the French philosopher Charles de Brosses to mean 
“primitive religion” (McClintock, 1995: 181); these religions were understood to be 
fetishistic owing to their belief in things having powers beyond their capacity. In 
addition to de Brosses, other thinkers including Rousseau, Kant, Linnaeus and Hegel 
invoked fetishism as “the recurring paradigm for what the Enlightenment was not” 
(McClintock, 1995: 187).  
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Nineteenth-century thinkers, although critical in varying degrees of the 
Enlightenment thinkers who came before them, adopted the Enlightenment fascination 
with the fetish. Anthropologists originally took up the fetish in the nineteenth-century, 
who in turn influenced the work of several thinkers outside the field, including Marx, 
Engels and Freud.25 McClintock argues that these thinkers did not merely take up the 
concept as one among many: rather, the concept of fetishism actually enabled the 
development of the Victorian “sciences of man” (that is, namely, philosophy, Marxism 
and psychoanalysis). In her words:  
Religion (the ordering of time and the transcendent), money (the ordering of 
the economy) and sexuality (the ordering of the body) were arranged around 
the social idea of racial fetishism, displacing what the modern imagination 
could not incorporate onto the invented domain of the primitive. Imperialism 
returned to haunt the enterprise of modernity as its concealed but central 
logic (1995: 181–182).  
 
Therefore, although the “primitive” fetish (as well as racialized fantasies about the 
fetish) originated in the Enlightenment, the fetish became an organizing principle of 
modern thought.26  
By the third volume of Capital, Marx had long moved from examining the 
“mystical” nature of commodities to probing the “mystification of the capitalist mode of 
production” as a whole. This larger mystification he describes as “the bewitched, 
distorted and upside-down world haunted by Monsieur le Capital and Madame la Terre, 
                                                          
25 While fetishism is most developed as a critical concept in the first volume of Capital, Marx originally 
used the term in writings dating back to 1842 (McNally, 2006: 2). Fetishism as a term to describe sexual 
perversions was popularized by Freud with the publication of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality in 
1905; however, fetishism was first brought to the realm of sexuality by Albert Binet with an 1888 
publication (McClintock, 1995: 181, 415).  
26 The “haunting” of contemporary thought by imperial constructions of the fetish is clear; however, the 
implications of this haunting, particularly for Marxist thought, are more ambiguous. See section D of the 
concluding chapter for more on this subject.  
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who are at the same time social characters and mere things” (Marx, 1991: 969). Here 
Marx explicitly associates men with capital (and therefore production, labour, and 
exchange) and women with the earth. Indeed, if the earth is natural, and if commodities 
become natural through the process of commodity fetishism, women too might be 
associated with commodities. At the same time, Marx is not entirely following the 
tradition of masculinist Western thought, whereby men are associated with culture and 
women with nature, as both Monsieur and Madame are social beings who are 
commodified and objectified as things.27  
1.2.3 Marx and Gender 
Overall, references to gender are few and far between in the three volumes of Capital, 
and in Marx’s body of thought as a whole. The references that do exist reflect the 
ambiguity of his discussion of Monsieur and Madame. This subsection will explore 
Marx’s ambiguity in two ways: first, through Marx’s sympathies for the plight of woman 
workers, and secondly and more importantly, through Marx’s comments on the 
gendered commodity. The former is ambiguous in that it could be read as feminist, 
paternalistic, or masculinist. The latter is ambiguous concerning whether people (or 
more specifically, women) can be commodities exchanged between men. 
Marx’s discussion of woman workers is largely located in the first volume of 
Capital. For example, Marx looks at how the death of a twenty-year-old female milliner 
in 1863 highlights the appalling labour conditions of women in the London garment 
                                                          
27 This might be explained by the Marxian dialectic: in a similar manner to Hegel before him, Marx was 
concerned with reinstating the notion of a synthesis between the human and natural worlds. However, 
his reinstatement only goes so far with respect to women, as he remains within the philosophical tradition 
Mary O’Brien refers to as “male-stream thought” (O’Brien, 1979: 102, 100).  
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industry (1990: 364). Marx also explores the high rates of “consumption” (tuberculosis) 
among the workers in the female-dominated lace factories of England. Moreover, he is 
critical of capitalist enterprises that contract-out the finishing and mending of machine-
made lace to women (and often children) homeworkers (1990: 595−596). These and 
other references to women are made in the context of his project in later chapters of 
the first volume of Capital, namely the meticulous documentation of the various effects 
of industrialization on workers, such as disease, shortened life expectancy, and working 
hours. It remains an open question as to whether Marx’s concern with women workers 
indicates a feminist position, a paternalistic protectionist position, or an unintentionally 
gender neutral (and possibly thereby masculinist) position, one in which the situation of 
women just happens to arise in his empirical research.  
Marx also offers some limited commentary on the gendered commodity. The 
young Marx seems to understand both women and their labour power to be 
commodities under capitalism. For example, in “On the Jewish Question” (1843) he 
complains that “even the species-relation itself, the relation between man and woman, 
becomes an object of commerce” in which women are “bartered away” (1978b: 51). In 
this reference, women are commodities exchanged between men. In The Communist 
Manifesto (1848), Marx (with Engels) criticizes “public and private” prostitution, defining 
the latter as “the system of wives in common” that is bourgeois marriage (1985: 101). In 
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this reference, both prostitutes and married women are prostitutes whose labour power 
is commodified.28  
In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx collapses the 
distinction between the male worker and the (married or otherwise) female prostitute: 
for “prostitution is only a specific expression of the general prostitution of the labourer” 
(1978a: 82). This is an important statement as it forms the basis of the classical Marxist 
view on prostitution (Bell, 1998: 139). Moreover, Marx argues “the one who prostitutes 
[others]” is the capitalist (1978a: 82). Marx could be read as making a feminist 
argument, at least insofar as he anticipates feminist understandings of sex work as 
work. Yet Marx eliminates any gendered specificity of women’s experiences of work. 
The varied forms of women’s work—from factory work, contracted home work, sex 
work in (traditional understandings of) prostitution or marriage, to other forms of 
reproductive work outside or within marriage—are all collapsed into the same category 
as male factory workers. And all of these forms of work are collapsed again into sex 
work. As Bell notes, the “employment contract […] is a contract of prostitution rather 
than the prostitution contract being an example of the employment contract” (1998: 
139, emphasis mine). In using the term prostitution to describe both male workers and 
female workers selling their labour power, Marx obscures the situation of many female 
workers who might also sell their bodies. Finally, in collapsing the distinction between 
the male worker and the female prostitute, Marx creates theoretical confusion on the 
question of how the commodity is gendered. In O’Brien’s words, Marx understands 
                                                          
28 This is not an argument that originates with Marx: Owenite socialists were characterizing bourgeois 
marriage as the legalized prostitution of women as early as the 1830s (Taylor, 1993: xv).  
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“male bodies, insofar as they incorporate labour-power, [as] commodities in the labour 
market” yet “in the marital marketplace men are the traders” (1979: 105). This 
theoretical confusion might be productive in that it suggests a link between the 
exchange and commodification of women under capitalist social relations. Women can 
be understood as commodities in two ways: their bodies are exchanged between men 
as commodities, and their labour power is commodified.  
Although the young Marx seems to understand women and their labour power 
to be commodities under capitalism (albeit without a sustained discussion of the topic in 
any of the early texts), his understanding shifts in later texts. By the time he wrote 
Capital, Marx argues that while labour is a commodity under capitalism, people as such 
are not commodities. People are, however, central to his understanding of 
commodities. It has already been established in the previous section that value for Marx 
is a social relation, for commodities only have value in relation to other commodities. 
Moreover, the value of commodities “can only be expressed through the whole range of 
their social relations; consequently the form of their value must possess social validity” 
(Marx, 1990: 159, emphasis mine). The social nature of commodities generally, 
combined with Marx’s discussion of human labour power as embodied in the 
commodity, render people central. Yet they are not commodities.  
Marx repeatedly describes commodities as things. While these things can seem 
to be animated (such as the table example in the previous section), things can still be 
taken to mean inanimate objects with no independent agency. In the later volumes of 
Capital, Marx describes more complex forms of the commodity (such as money in the 
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second volume and interest in the third), yet even his complex commodities can be 
described as things. The examples of commodities he provides in the first volume are 
simpler; for example, he mentions corn, gold, nails, linen, and “wearing apparel.” In his 
discussion of exchange-value, Marx represents commodities and their quantities as 
letters, that is “x commodity A = y commodity B” (1990: 139). Any thing could be A, and 
any other thing could be B; however, Marx prefers his now-famous equation, 20 yards 
of linen = 1 coat.  
Yet in the passage below from the first volume of Capital, Marx reverts to the 
view from his younger days, contradicting his understanding that people cannot be 
commodities from one sentence to the next: 
Commodities cannot themselves go to market and perform exchanges in their 
own right. We must, therefore, have recourse to their guardians, who are the 
possessors of commodities. Commodities are things, and therefore lack the 
power to resist man. If they are unwilling, he can use force; in other words, he 
can take possession of them (1990: 178, emphasis mine). 
 
Here commodities seem to have agency: they have a will over which man may need to 
“use force” in order to “take possession.” One might assume these “unwilling” 
commodities under discussion are animals (for example, cows that must be forced to 
walk to the market), since he is clear in Capital that people cannot be commodities. 
However, in the footnote attached to this passage, Marx rules out cows or any other 
living animal. He lists the “very delicate” items offered for sale in the twelfth-century 
French market as examples of commodities. These items, which he takes from Guillot de 
Paris’ medieval French poem “Dit de Lendit,” include clothing, shoes, leather, 
implements of cultivation, and skins. The final commodity listed is “femmes folles de 
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leur corps,” translated literally as “women crazy of their bodies” or more accurately as 
“wanton women” (1990: 178).  
The language in the above passage and the footnote attached to it reveal 
masculinist assumptions behind Marx’s understanding of commodities. These 
“unwilling” and “very delicate” commodities are clearly women, as the other 
commodities listed do not have agency. The language of women being “delicate” 
suggests women are weak and passive. The language of men “taking possession” of 
women and “using force” suggests women are both objects and willful creatures that 
ought to be put in their place using violence. In commenting on the passage, Ehrbar 
perceives a “juicy illustration” in which “the ‘taking’ consists of sexual and other 
violations” (2005: 461). Ehrbar’s reading is clearly misogynist in understanding the 
“sexual violations” of women to be a “juicy” tidbit rather than sexual assault or rape. 
Indeed, a longstanding rape myth is that unvirtuous women—unvirtuous being defined 
in several ways, including choice of apparel, age, number of sexual partners, and 
involvement in sex work—cannot be raped (MacKinnon, 1989: 175). However, given 
Marx’s language and uncritical use of de Paris’ poem, Marx does not discourage such a 
reading. Regardless of whether or not Marx is endorsing rape, violence against women 
is justified (at least implicitly) in particular circumstances, namely when they transgress 
gendered norms by being either wanton or willful.  
Further evidence of masculinist assumptions behind Marx’s understanding of 
commodities can be found in wanton women being the exception to the rule that 
people are not commodities under capitalism. Marx is upholding the sexism of Western 
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thought in which all men but not all women (as the wanton ones are excluded) can 
stand in for people generally. As such, he can be situated in the tradition of malestream 
political theory that builds sexual inequality into its very foundation (Phillips, 1991: 3). 
This tradition, to invoke Moller Okin’s famous phrase, consists “of writings by men, for 
men, and about men” (1979: 5). Overall, the contradictions within the passage, and the 
contradictions between the footnote and the rest of the text, are revealing as an 
expression of the commodification of women and their bodies under capitalism.  
 This discussion of the quote and the footnote raises larger questions concerning 
the use of language in Marx. In his “Translator’s Preface” to the first volume of Capital, 
Fowkes comments on Marx’s “vivid use of the [German] language and the startling and 
strong images which abound in Capital,” and declares him to be “a master of literary 
German” (1990: 88). Marx’s use of language seems not to be lost in English translations. 
References to the plays of Shakespeare run throughout his body of work. McNally is 
critical of readings that overemphasize Marx’s language of illusion in his discussion of 
commodity fetishism; however, he argues on the whole that language holds more 
theoretical weight in Capital than is often appreciated by Marxist scholars (2011: 115–
116). In McNally’s words, “Marx’s persistent use of metaphors and literary references 
needs to be read, then, not as textual ornamentation, but as integral to the way he 
theorizes” (2006: 2, emphasis mine). McNally understands the ontology of capitalism as 
“literally metaphoric, as constituting a social order in which some things regularly stand 
in for, substitute themselves for, other things” (2006: 1). Marx’s statement, x 
commodity A = y commodity B, therefore, is both an equation and a metaphor. McNally 
 43 
provides non-ontological examples of metaphor as well, such as Marx’s understanding 
of exchange-value as a phantom-like entity and capital as a vampire. He argues Marx’s 
highly detailed descriptions of the effects of industrialization on workers and their 
bodies are not merely illustrative (as many assume): “Marx is doing value theory, not 
embellishing it with extraneous empirical material” (2006: 9). If one accepts Fowkes’ 
argument that Marx used language masterfully and purposefully, and McNally’s 
argument that language is theoretically important, then it follows that Marx’s language 
of force and taking possession of commodities is neither accidental nor haphazard. This 
claim does not alter the ambiguity of Marx’s limited comments about women and 
gender; it is possible to read a great deal of masculinism, including the idea that 
commodities can be women, in Marx’s body of work.  
1.3 (Further) Gendering Marx: Engels on Women 
Written after Marx’s death and originally published in 1884, The Origin of the Family, 
Private Property and the State is drawn from the notes of both Marx and Engels and is 
based on the anthropological work of Lewis H. Morgan in his 1877 book Ancient Society. 
Nineteenth-century anthropology influenced thinking in a variety of areas. For Engels, 
the treatment of Marx’s Capital by German economists was similar to the treatment of 
Morgan’s Ancient Society by English “prehistoric scientists”: both books were 
suppressed for their revolutionary content while at the same time plagiarized 
repeatedly (Engels, 1972: 27). In further praise of Morgan, Engels describes Ancient 
Society as “one of the few epoch-making works of our time,” for Morgan rediscovered 
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the materialist conception of history discovered by Marx before him (1972: 28). In The 
Origin, Engels spends little time discussing commodities and a great deal of time 
discussing women. His focus on pre-capitalist social relations throughout most of the 
book precludes much discussion of the commodity form; most of this discussion is in 
fact confined to the final chapter. Engels does focus on the implications of the advent of 
private property for women and the exchange of women it might necessitate. As such, 
he becomes one of the first theorists to open up the possibility that commodities might 
be people, or more specifically, women.  
Engels’ treatment of the family is a necessary starting point for a closer 
examination of his theorizing of the exchange (and even commodification) of women. In 
highlighting the crucial role of the family as an economic unit in society, Engels claims to 
be one of the first theorists to historicize the family. Indeed, in his preface to the fourth 
edition of The Origin, Engels remarked that discussions of the family were “still 
completely under the influence of the Five Books of Moses.” It was assumed the family 
had experienced no historical development since biblical times, and the patriarchal 
family described in the Five Books was essentially the same (with the exception of 
polygamy) as the bourgeois family of modernity (1972: 32).  
Engels’ aim in The Origins was to take the family out of the realm of the natural 
and into the realm of the economic, social, and political. His approach involved adopting 
Morgan’s division of history into three main epochs, each with a corresponding family 
form: group marriage is the form of family associated with “savagery,” pairing marriage 
with “barbarism,” and monogamy with “civilization.” Group marriage is defined by 
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Engels as a state in which “men live in polygamy and their wives simultaneously in 
polyandry, and their common children are, therefore, regarded as being common to 
them all” (1972: 58). The status of women was high in this original state of humanity. 
Engels complains of the “absurd notions” taken from eighteenth-century enlightenment 
thinkers that in the beginning women were the slaves of men. Instead, he argues that 
“women occupied not only a free but also a highly respected position” (1972: 76). Engels 
contends that since only women could be certain which children were their biological 
offspring, both descent and inheritance went through the female line. These inheritance 
relations are often described as “mother right.”29  
The stage of history most interesting to Engels is the pairing marriage of 
“barbarism,” and the transition from pairing marriage to the monogamous marriage of 
“civilization.” According to Engels, at the time of contact between Europeans and 
Aboriginal peoples, America was the “the classic soil of the pairing family” while the 
European form of the family had developed into permanent monogamy (Engels, 1972: 
81−82). Although both pairing and monogamous marriage involve one man and one 
woman, pairing marriage differs in several significant ways. These differences primarily 
concern the higher position of women in pairing marriage. Pairing marriage involved a 
sexual division of labour: the husband was involved in production (for example, 
obtaining food and the instruments of labour) and the wife in reproduction (for 
example, in household management). However, this division did not imply a lower 
                                                          
29 Engels used the term “right” under protest: liberal legal “rights,” as we know them, were not yet in 
existence at this time. However, he retained the term out of respect for J.J. Bachofen, whom according to 
Engels was the first to make this discovery (Engels, 1972: 69) and whose work was used by both Morgan 
and Engels.  
 46 
status for women, since the communal household of pairing marriage carried over from 
group marriage (1972: 76). It also did not imply the dependence of women on men. In 
the event of separation, the husband took his instruments of labour and women kept 
their household goods and children (1972: 83). The most important difference between 
pairing marriage and monogamy is that the custom of “mother right” existed only in 
pairing marriage.  
While the transition from group marriage to pairing marriage was understood by 
Engels (following Morgan) to be a matter of natural selection, he did not see the 
transition from pairing marriage to monogamy as inevitable or a matter of evolutionary 
theory (1972: 81). He stated that “unless new social forces came into play, there was no 
reason why a new form of family should arise from the single pair” (1972: 81). In 
Europe, these social forces represented the wealth creation generated by changes in 
production allowing for the domestication of animals and the breeding of herds (Engels, 
1972: 82). In North America several thousand years later, these social forces 
represented the arrival of Europeans and mercantilism. The result in both cases was 
similar: as preliminary conceptions of private property were developed (or introduced, 
in the case of North America) and wealth began to increase, the position of men in the 
family became more important than women. Men needed to be sure which children 
belonged to them, and therefore to whom their property ought to devolve (1972: 84). 
Firmly establishing paternity required the overthrow of matriarchal customs of 
inheritance; the strengthened position of men in the family allowed this to occur. This 
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“revolution,” he argues, was “one of the most decisive ever experienced by humanity” 
(1972: 84). 
With the overthrow of mother right, the patriarchal family was established. The 
position of women declined as household management became a private service that 
no longer concerned society as a whole. Moreover, Engels argues that after the man 
took control of the home, “the woman was degraded, enthralled, the slave of the man’s 
lust, a mere instrument for breeding children” (1972: 85).30 Finally, due to the primary 
purpose of monogamous marriage (that is, to establish paternity), women lost the 
sexual freedom they enjoyed under group and pairing marriage forms. A sexual double 
standard arose, and conjugal fidelity became compulsory for women only (1972: 86). 
After the overthrow of mother right, Engels allows women little agency to challenge 
their exchange and circulation among men. It is left to later feminists such as Goldman 
and Rubin to articulate this challenge.  
As Engels makes clear, the questions The Origin raises are central for the final 
determining factor in history is both the production and reproduction of life. This factor 
has two components: first, the production of the “means of subsistence,” namely food, 
shelter, clothing, and the tools required for their production; and second, the 
production of “human beings themselves,” that is, the reproduction of the species. 
Furthermore, both kinds of production determine the social organization of labour and 
the family (Engels, 1972: 27−28). Despite these and other clear articulations, Marxists 
                                                          
30 Here, Engels cites Morgan who argued that the monogamous family not only contains slavery but also 
serfdom, since it was related to agriculture from the beginning (Engels, 1972: 86). He then cites Marx, 
who, commenting upon Morgan, added that “it contains within itself in miniature all the antagonisms 
which later develop on a wide scale within society and its state” (Engels, 1972: 86).  
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have persistently ignored “the production of human beings themselves” in theorizing 
modes of production (Seccombe, 1992: 256).  
As one of the first theorists to locate the oppression of women—or as Engels 
famously wrote, “the world-historic defeat of the female sex” (1972: 85)—in the 
development of capitalism, The Origin is a classic text. Engels corrects some of the 
masculinism of Capital in which production is privileged at the expense of reproduction, 
and social relations are discussed without reference to gender. Moreover, Engels’ book 
continues to influence contemporary work on gender and political economy, in which 
gender is addressed largely through the problematic of reproduction.31 At the same 
time, Engels does not ignore production. As Leacock points out, another influential 
aspect of The Origin follows from a key link established by Engels between production 
and the position of women. In short, the more a society is organized around production 
for use rather than exchange, the higher the position of women (Leacock, 1986: 108).  
While there are numerous problems with Engels’ story of the development of 
monogamous marriage,32 the main concern here is the possibility he opens up of 
                                                          
31 Despite this influence, it is important to note that there is a strong division amongst feminists on the 
actual utility of the text itself. Feminist positions on Engels fall broadly into two categories: those who 
hold up The Origin as a feminist text (such as Eleanor Leacock and Karen Sacks) and those who are more 
critical (such as Juliet Mitchell, Catharine MacKinnon and many of the contributors to the 1987 volume 
Engels Revisited). Feminists in the former group consider Engels’ theory to be generally correct, although 
they will acknowledge his ethnographic errors (Gimenez, 1987: 41). Feminists in the latter group extend 
their critique of Engels beyond ethnographic errors to his larger theoretical framework. They tend to 
suspect it is too convenient “that the material basis of women’s oppression lies in the same institution as 
the material basis of class oppression” (Humphries, 1987: 12). The latter group might suggest the former 
group simply wants to read Engels, and therefore Marx, as feminist. This is problematic for many reasons, 
not the least of which is that Engels never refers to feminist activism or feminist arguments that emerged 
from the women’s movement of his day (Maconachie, 1987: 99). Moreover, women’s interests remain 
subordinated to class analysis throughout Engels’ work (MacKinnon, 1989: 21, 62). 
32 Some scholars contend that although Engels claims to historicize the family, his process is partial at 
best. MacKinnon argues that Engels ends up reifying “woman socially to such an extent that her status 
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theorizing the exchange and commodification of women. As noted from the outset, the 
focus on pre-capitalist social relations in most of the book precludes much discussion of 
the commodity form. The limited discussion of commodities in The Origin does not 
expand much beyond Marx’s discussion in Capital, with two exceptions. First, Engels 
applies Marx’s framework to historical and anthropological examples. This is primarily 
done by tracing the introduction of private property and the advent of the universal 
commodity of money through the rise of the Athenian state (1972: 145−152).  
Second and most importantly for this discussion, Engels opens up the possibility 
that commodities can be people, specifically women. The basic relationship he 
establishes between family forms and modes of production raises this possibility. 
Monogamy is the family form associated with civilization, and in his final chapter, Engels 
links monogamy and civilization with commodity production (1972: 213−214). His 
understanding of commodity production includes not only capitalist modes of 
production but also slavery and feudalism. He describes the advent of commodity 
production as follows:  
It was not long before the great “truth” was discovered that man, too, may be 
a commodity; that human power may be exchanged and utilized by converting 
man into a slave. Men had barely started to engage in exchange when they 
                                                                                                                                                                             
might as well have been considered naturally determined” (1989: 13, emphasis mine). Many nineteenth-
century assumptions about the family and women’s position within the family are left intact. Engels 
assumes, for example, that heterosexuality, heterosexual bonding, and the bond between women and 
children are timeless and universal (Maconachie, 1987: 106; Redclift, 1987: 114). Assuming that women 
have a natural affinity for men and children allows Engels to assume that the sexual division of labour is 
also natural. One example of Engels taking the sexual division of labour as a given is found in his 
discussion of “American Indians.” He writes that the “division of labour was a pure and simple outgrowth 
of nature; it existed only between the two sexes” (1972: 196, emphasis mine). In sum, despite establishing 
links between production and the position of women, in many respects Engels still understands biology to 
be destiny. Feminists have long problematized his assumptions concerning the universality of a sexual 
division of labour.  
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themselves were exchanged. The active became a passive, whether man 
wanted it or not (1972: 214).  
 
For Engels, the advent of civilization and commodity production saw the advent of 
people themselves being commodified. This is consistent with Engels’ previous 
argument concerning the “world historic defeat of the female sex.” This defeat, which 
also occurred at the advent of civilization and commodity production, saw the 
degradation and enslavement of women by men (1972: 85).  
Yet if commodities are people and women are exchanged and commodified by 
men, Engels’ discussion is unclear about an important point: whether people are 
commodities at all stages of civilization or only at specific stages (such as slavery). 
Engels, in a similar manner to Marx before him, is unclear as to whether people as such 
are commodities under capitalism. Engels does argue that after the “world historic 
defeat” the “lowered position of women […] has become gradually embellished and 
dissembled and, in part, clothed in a milder form, but by no means abolished” (1972: 
85). This might be read to suggest that women continue to be exchanged and 
commodified under capitalism, albeit in a less obvious manner. Additionally, following 
from Marx’s argument in “On the Jewish Question” and Marx and Engels’ argument in 
The Communist Manifesto, Engels argues that under capitalism the difference between 
wives and prostitutes is negligible. The wife “differs from the ordinary courtesan only in 
that she does not hire out her body, like a wage worker, on piecework, but sells it into 
slavery once for all” (Engels, 1972: 100). This suggests that women, at least in their roles 
as wives and prostitutes, are exchanged and commodified under capitalism. 
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In sum, Engels opens up the possibility of theorizing women as commodities in 
The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. Despite the many problems 
with the book (including ethnographic errors, inadequate solutions, economism and 
Eurocentric and imperialist assumptions), feminists within the traditions of political 
economy and theory have taken it seriously partly because of this possibility. Feminist 
treatments of the exchange and commodification of women work both within and 
beyond Engels’ framework.  
1.4 The Exchange and Commodification of Women: Goldman and Rubin  
In their articles of the same main title, “The Traffic in Women,” published in 1910 and 
1975 respectively, Emma Goldman and Gayle Rubin examine the commodification of 
women under capitalism. Goldman’s treatment most resembles that of Engels. She does 
not expand beyond the scope of his discussion and retains his focus on prostitution and 
marriage (although does offer a lengthier discussion on prostitutes and wives than 
Engels). Goldman suggests girls are raised to be “sex commodities” for men. However, 
she is unclear about whether women as women are commodities under capitalism; in 
other words, she is unclear about whether it is women’s labour power or their very 
selves that are being commodified. In leaving many questions concerning the gendered 
commodity unresolved, Goldman echoes not only Engels but also Marx. In contrast, 
Rubin complicates the gendered commodity by moving beyond an exclusive focus on 
Engels and Marx. I conclude this section by suggesting that the framework proposed by 
Rubin (to theorize the exchange and commodification of women), has inspired my 
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framework (to theorize the commodification of feminism) in subsequent chapters of this 
dissertation. 
1.4.1 Emma Goldman’s “The Traffic in Women” 
Goldman begins “The Traffic in Women” with a critique of a “superficial investigation” 
conducted by moral reformers and newspaper writers. This investigation concerns the 
supposedly widespread “white slave traffic” which forces innocent women and girls into 
a life of prostitution. Goldman questions why prostitution, the existence of which is 
known by every member of society including most children, should only now have been 
“made such an important issue” (1970: 19). Indeed, in the United States and Canada of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, there were a large number of books, 
pamphlets, and newspaper reports that recounted stories of “white slavery.” According 
to these stories, innocent women and girls were being drugged and were disappearing 
under mysterious circumstances. After kidnapping, they were said to be shipped across 
provincial/state and national borders, sold into prostitution, and held against their will 
as prisoners in brothels (Boritch, 1997: 106−8; Beckman, 1984: 85). Such stories were 
rarely supported with any evidence. By the time Goldman wrote her article, a large-scale 
moral panic about “white slavery” was underway (Boritch, 1997: 106−8). The White 
Slave Traffic Act in the United States, passed by Congress in June 1910, was the result of 
this panic. This Act made it illegal for “any woman or girl” to be transported across state 
borders for commercial or other “immoral” purposes (Beckman, 1984: 85−89).  
Goldman contends the traffic in “white slavery” does not exist, at least not to the 
degree suggested by the moral reformers and media. She describes the crusade as a 
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“toy” which “serves to amuse the people for a little while” and create “a few more fat 
political jobs” (1970: 20). Most problematically, discussions concerning “white slavery” 
serve to obscure the real causes of prostitution (1970: 31). Rather than being caused by 
corrupt “cadets” (that is, procurers of prostitutes), Goldman contends “whether our 
reformers admit it or not, the economic and social inferiority of women is responsible 
for prostitution” (1970: 20). More specifically, prostitution is a direct result of the poor 
wages and exploitative working conditions of women and girls under the “merciless 
Moloch of capitalism” (1970: 20).33 As such, the moral panic over “white slavery” diverts 
the public from the larger social problems created by industrial capitalism.  
Since the moral reformers do not understand the causes of prostitution, 
Goldman contends that they are not able to offer useful solutions. For Goldman, 
solutions are required because prostitutes are victims (1970: 27). Her language of 
victimization—which, interestingly enough, is quite similar to that of the moral 
reformers she is critiquing—suggests that prostitutes have little agency and that 
prostitution is not a legitimate form of work. Her discussion of solutions does offer the 
useful critique that legal and legislative measures criminalize the prostitutes34 and leave 
their male clients free to enjoy their services without fear of criminal charges. Men also 
benefit in that individual male police officers, and the male police force as a whole, 
garner “blood money” from the prostitutes: through bribes to individual officers, and 
                                                          
33 She uses the terms “capitalism,” “industrial system,” and “industrial slavery” interchangeably 
throughout her paper.  
34 The White Slave Traffic Act (although not specifically discussed by Goldman) illustrates her point that 
legal and legislative measures tend to criminalize women. In its early years, the Act was used to prosecute 
women working as prostitutes: although they were supposedly the victims of kidnapping, women were 
prosecuted for “conspiracy” under the Act. Also, women who did not work as prostitutes were prosecuted 
under the Act for travelling with male partners to whom they were not married (Beckman, 1984: 88, 91). 
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through legally-sanctioned fines for the police force as a whole (1970: 27). Moreover, 
laws allowing the police to close down brothels leave prostitutes unprotected and 
“absolutely at the mercy of the graft-greedy police” (1970: 30−31).  
The most important reason the construction of “white slavery” is problematic for 
Goldman is that this traffic is not limited to white women, or even to impoverished 
women. The exaggeration of the extent and conditions of the traffic in “white slaves” 
serves to obscure the extent and conditions of the traffic in all women. While 
prostitution has always existed in some form or another, “it was left to the nineteenth 
century to develop it into a gigantic social institution” (1970: 22). Echoing Marx’s 
collapsing of the prostitute and the wife in his term “public and private” prostitution, 
and Engels’ argument that the difference between the prostitute and the wife is the 
length of the contract, Goldman argues that “it is merely a question of degree whether 
[a woman] sells herself to one man, in or out of marriage, or to many men” (1970: 20). 
For Goldman, whether women are prostitutes in the traditional sense, “economic 
prostitutes” in the factories, or prostitute themselves for a degree of economic security 
within marriage, the condition of being a woman in industrial capitalism is that of a 
prostitute.  
Following from this argument, Goldman seems to suggest that women are 
commodities under capitalism. Girls and women, regardless of the class into which they 
are born, are all raised to be “sex commodities;” ironically, however, they are “kept in 
absolute ignorance of the meaning and importance of sex.” Without this ignorance, 
women would be less willing to form relationships that degrade them “to the position of 
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an object for mere sex gratification” (1970: 24). Her treatment of the wife/prostitute 
comparison is considerably lengthier than that of Marx or Engels. However, her 
discussion of commodification does not expand beyond this comparison, and her 
solution mirrors Engels’ assumption that women will somehow be liberated with the 
end of capitalism. Goldman adds that in addition to the abolition of capitalism, there 
must be a “complete transvaluation of all accepted values—especially the moral ones” 
(1970: 32). Yet she offers no commentary on these values, moral or otherwise, or on 
how they ought to be changed.  
Goldman does expand somewhat on the relationship between gender and 
capitalism in her article “Marriage and Love.” She echoes Marx’s collapsing of the 
distinction between the male worker and the (married or otherwise) female prostitute. 
For Goldman, capitalism does to men what marriage does to women. She contends 
capitalism and marriage are similar not only because they are economic arrangements, 
but also because they are both “paternal” and “parasitic” institutions (1970: 38, 43). 
Capitalism makes a parasite of men and marriage makes a parasite of women. 
Goldman’s collapsing of the distinction between the male worker and the married 
woman suffers from all the same problems discussed with reference to Marx: namely, 
Goldman eliminates any gendered specificity of women’s experiences of work, and 
(most importantly for this discussion) creates theoretical confusion on the question of 
how the commodity is gendered.  
Overall, in both “The Traffic in Women” and “Marriage and Love,” Goldman 
leaves many questions concerning the gendered commodity unresolved. In describing 
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women as sex commodities it is unclear whether women are commodified as women or 
commodified as sex. Alternatively, it might be women’s labour power (and its gendered 
expenditure through reproductive and sex work) that is being commodified. Goldman 
seems to slip between all three positions, echoing the slippages in Marx and Engels’ 
discussions of gender and commodification. It is these slippages in Marx, Engels, and 
Goldman that make Rubin’s interrogation of the political economy of sex so important 
to consider. Rubin complicates the concept of the exchange of women, and in so doing 
suggests a way forward to better understanding the nature of the gendered commodity.  
1.4.2 Rubin’s “The Traffic in Women” 
Rubin acknowledges Goldman’s contribution in giving her paper the same title, “The 
Traffic in Women.” For Rubin, the concept of the exchange of women is paradoxical in 
that it is “so useful yet so difficult” (1997: 38). She examines how the concept has been 
used with reference to the economy (in Marx and Engels), society and culture (in Lévi-
Strauss), and sexuality (in Freud and Lacan), but questions its utility in explaining the 
position of women. She argues for replacing the exchange of women with her now-
famous concept “sex/gender system,” which she defines as “the set of arrangements by 
which a society transforms biological sexuality into products of human activity, and in 
which these transformed sexual needs are satisfied” (1997: 28). The stated purpose of 
her article is to elaborate on this definition, attempting to combine Marxism, 
structuralism and psychoanalytic theory.  
To begin with Rubin’s discussion of the economy, she argues that the difference 
between Marx and Engels is that gender and sex is merely an add-on for Marx, a 
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“historical and moral element.” Yet in Engels, the “relations of sexuality” play as 
important a role as “relations of production” (1997: 31). Rubin is, however, far too 
uncritical of Engels: not only does he import a framework for one realm into another, 
but he does not actually use the term “relations of sexuality.” Reproduction ought to be 
distinguished from sexuality, and Engels does not discuss sexuality whatsoever except to 
assume everyone is heterosexual. In his discussion of reproduction, he assumes women 
have a natural affinity for children and the sexual division of labour is therefore natural. 
The criticisms of Engels that Rubin does offer are problematic as well. She argues that 
“women are oppressed in societies which can by no stretch of the imagination be 
described as capitalist” (1997: 30). However, Engels discusses the advent of civilization 
as constituting the “world-historic defeat” of women, not of capitalism.  
In Rubin’s discussion of society and culture, she examines the exchange of 
women with reference to the work of theorists of pre-state kinship structures, 
particularly Claude Lévi-Strauss. She focuses on two aspects of Lévi-Strauss’ The 
Elementary Structures of Kinship, the gift and the incest taboo, which she argues 
together constitute his ideas about the exchange of women (1997: 35). In sum, Lévi-
Strauss understands the gift to be the universal means of social commerce, with women 
being the most precious of gifts, and the incest taboo to be means of ensuring gifts were 
exchanged between families and groups (1997: 36). In this section of her article, Rubin 
offers some resolution to the ambiguities in Marx, Engels, and Goldman between 
women being commodified as women, women being commodified as sex, or women’s 
labour power being commodified. Rubin argues: 
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It is certainly not difficult to find ethnographic and historical examples of 
trafficking in women. Women are given in marriage, taken in battle, 
exchanged for favours, sent as tribute, traded, bought, and sold. Far from 
being confined to the “primitive” world, these practices seem only to become 
more pronounced and commercialized in more “civilized” societies. Men are 
of course also trafficked—but as slaves, hustlers, athletic stars, serfs, or as 
some other catastrophic social status, rather than as men. Women are 
transacted as slaves, serfs, and prostitutes, but also simply as women. As if 
men have been sexual subjects—exchangers—and women sexual semi-
objects—gifts—for much of human history, then many customs, clichés, and 
personality traits seem to make a great deal of sense (among others, the 
curious custom by which a father gives away the bride) (1997: 37−38).  
 
For Rubin, women are exchanged in all three ways, including as women. They are also 
more likely to be exchanged than men. And like Goldman, Rubin is clear that capitalism 
intensifies the exchange of women.35  
In Rubin’s discussion of sexuality, she examines the exchange of women with 
reference to the work of Freud and Lacan. She incorporates psychoanalytic theory into 
structuralist approaches to the exchange of women in order to “explain the mechanisms 
by which children are engraved with the conventions of sex and gender” (1997: 42). 
Rubin’s critical reading of Freud and Lacan allows her to problematize the notion that 
heterosexuality is natural and eternal. Rubin does not read a sexual division of labour 
back into history; indeed, she links the sexual division of labour to heterosexuality, and a 
passive female sexuality to the exchange of women (1997: 40−42).  
In theorizing the sex/gender system, Rubin attempts to combine Marxism, 
structuralism, and psychoanalytic theory. However, Rosemary Hennessy demonstrates 
effectively that Rubin does not do this very well, arguing that weaknesses in Rubin’s 
synthesis are particularly evident when it comes to incorporating Marxism (Hennessy, 
                                                          
35 Engels was unclear on this point.  
 59 
2000: 180). Indeed, although Rubin starts with Marx and Engels, the focus of her 
analysis of the sex/gender system is a comparison between psychoanalytic theory and 
structuralism. Furthermore, Hennessy contends that Rubin does not provide enough 
discussion of the commodity form:  
Certainly, no analysis can attend to every facet of social life at the same time. 
But in “The Traffic in Women” forgetting for a while about sexuality’s relation 
to commodity production translates into forgetting it entirely, as kinship 
becomes the sole lens for examining the oppression of women (Hennessy, 
2000: 181).  
 
Moreover, Hennessy points out that Rubin ignores how ideologies of racism have 
structured kinship structures, labour, and sexuality (2000: 184). Finally, Hennessy 
critiques Rubin for abandoning historical materialism in the 1980s (2000: 185). Overall, 
Hennessy considers Rubin’s “The Traffic in Women” an important early attempt to 
theorize (however poorly) the relationship between sexual identity and capitalism. 
I would both extend Hennessy’s critique and (partially) defend Rubin’s analysis. 
By way of adding to the critique, Rubin shares the problems Hennessy outlines with 
regards to Engels. For example, both Engels’ and Rubin’s almost exclusive focus on pre-
capitalist societies avoids much discussion of the commodity form. Also, both Engels and 
Rubin do not take a critical view of the construction of race. However, in defence of 
Rubin, her article (as the subtitle indicates) consists of “Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ 
of Sex,” thus acknowledging Rubin’s partial reading. Indeed, Rubin ends with a call for a 
Marxian analysis of sex/gender systems, and for someone to write a new version of The 
Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State that recognizes the “mutual 
interdependence of sexuality, economics and politics” (1997: 55, 58). Hennessy herself 
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echoes Rubin’s call for a “systemic link between a sex-gender system and other material 
aspects of social life” (2000: 193).  
I wish to examine commodity feminism in a parallel way to how Rubin examines 
the exchange and commodification of women by bringing different theoretical 
frameworks to bear on the question. Rubin’s use of Marx, Marxism, Freud, and 
Freudianism to theorize the exchange and commodification of women is reflective of my 
use of these traditions in subsequent chapters of this dissertation.36 Rubin 
acknowledges the need for this type of inquiry in the statement cited in the epigraph to 
this chapter. Similarly, Hennessy argues that although the “two domains of capital’s 
history—the sexual desires of the body and the economic needs of consumers and 
producers on the market—are persistently considered altogether distinctive,” they 
should be put back together (2000: 196−197). Theorizing commodity feminism as a 
relationship between commodities, femininity, and subjectivity furthers this project. My 
project is inspired by Rubin but is cognizant of Hennessy’s critique of “The Traffic in 
Women” (especially Rubin’s uncritical view of race and insufficient Marxian analysis) in 
approaching commodity feminism.  
1.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the precursor to commodity feminism, which I locate in 
Marxist and feminist discussions of the relationship between commodities and women. I 
have examined Marx’s discussion of the nature of the commodity form and commodity 
                                                          
36 I do not use every theoretical framework employed by Rubin; most notably, I drop her discussion of the 
structuralism of Lévi-Strauss. Pre-capitalist kinship societies are of little interest to my discussion of 
processes of commodification in capitalist societies.  
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fetishism in relation to women, Engels’ discussion of the exchange of women, and how 
the frameworks of Marx and Engels relate to those of Goldman and Rubin. In theorizing 
the relationship between commodities and women, the focus on the exchange or 
commodification of women brings with it important limitations. In addition to 
theoretical confusion about its origins, it can be totalizing. How does one resist a 
phenomenon that originates with the beginning of civilization (according to Engels) or 
even the advent of industrial capitalism (according to Goldman)?37 Additionally, there is 
ambiguity about the status of women in capitalism: if women are commodified, are they 
commodified as women or as sex? Or is it their labour power that is being commodified? 
Marx, Engels, and Goldman are all unclear on these points. Rubin suggests it is all three 
but does not theorize these connections very well.  
The notion of commodity feminism suggests that women are not always 
commodities exchanged between men, but that they are exchangers and fetishizers of 
commodities in their own right. As such, the commodification of women and the 
commodification of feminism work together in the contemporary context. This 
observation is the platform for the chapters to follow.  
An incipient understanding of commodity feminism can be found in Emma 
Goldman’s writing on women’s fetishes. She contends that women are more inclined to 
fetish worshipping than men; for example, they have “been the greatest supporters of 
all deities since time immemorial” (1970: 51). In addition to religion, Goldman discusses 
                                                          
37 The traditional Marxist response to Goldman’s postulate would be to liberate women by overthrowing 
capitalism. Such a solution is overly simplistic and suspiciously convenient; moreover, as Mitchell points 
out, neither Marx “nor his successors ever tried seriously to envisage the implications of this for socialism, 
or even for a structural analysis of women’s oppression” (1966: 23). 
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war and the home as examples of fetishes that disproportionately impact women, yet 
paradoxically count women among their most enthusiastic supporters (1970: 51−2). She 
contends that the modern fetish of women is universal suffrage. Regardless of the 
accuracy of her characterization of women’s greater inclination to fetish worshipping, 
Goldman’s argument is illuminating for her very characterization of feminist praxis as 
fetish. A fetish in its original sense (before Marx and Freud took hold of the term) is 
something believed to have powers beyond its capacity. Indeed, in the early twentieth 
century United States in which Goldman was writing, feminist activism had become 
almost entirely preoccupied with the single issue of suffrage (Tong, 1998: 22). As 
Goldman predicted, the fetish of the first-wave of feminism did not contain the 
emancipatory power it promised.  
Feminism has not ceased to be fetishized since Goldman’s time. If the fetish of 
first-wave feminism was suffrage, the fetish of third-wave feminism might be 
commodity feminism. Like the fetish of the first-wave feminists, our modern fetish 
serves to sanitize the radical critique it appropriates. Subsequent chapters explore 
several examples of fetishistic practices associated with women including makeup and 
other cosmetics, cigarette smoking, and fashion. Mitchell contends that a “responsible 
revolutionary attitude” is one that refuses to fetishize any dimension of the situation of 
women (1966: 34). If the situation of many women today involves a form of feminist 
critique or praxis, to be responsible, women must refuse the fetishization of feminism. 
For Goldman, there is nothing more dangerous to the status quo than the “dissection of 
a fetish” (1970: 61).  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Feminized Commodities: The Femininity Question  
in Popular Anglo-American Feminism 
  
These numerous and essential articles [of dress] are advertised in so ridiculous a style, that the 
rapid sale of them is a very severe reflection on the understanding of those females who 
encourage it. 
—Mary Wollstonecraft (1990c: 32) 
 
It is an act of misogyny to try and disassociate oneself from things that are “female” simply 
because you don’t like what that “femaleness” means to you and others. 
—Allyson Mitchell (2002: 105) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Historically women have been encouraged to buy commodities, from corsets to rouge to 
vacuums, for two predominant reasons: to produce particular forms of femininity for 
the desiring gaze of men, or to better perform their role as heterosexual housewives 
and mothers. Feminists have long been critical of these approaches to the sale of 
commodities. These approaches changed slowly over the course of the twentieth 
century, with the transformation picking up pace in the final decades (Goldman et al., 
1991; Goldman, 1992). Today, commodity feminism has reached ascendancy. It is far 
more common for the marketing of commodities to women to use appropriated liberal 
feminist discourses of independence and self-determination than to use the more 
traditional discourses of appealing to men or of becoming a better wife.  
The ascendancy of commodity feminism has been lampooned by the satirical 
magazine The Onion. The title of a 2003 article, “Women Now Empowered by Everything 
a Woman Does,” announces a fundamental shift in feminism. While once based on 
social critique and political action, feminism is now based on a politics that understands 
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women as being empowered by virtually everything they do. According to the article, 
much of what women do is consume feminized commodities. The article cites a spoof 
feminist academic who contends that shopping for shoes and clothes can now be 
understood as a “bold feminist statement”:  
Shopping for shoes has emerged as a powerful means by which women assert 
their autonomy […] Owning and wearing dozens of pairs of shoes is a 
compelling way for a woman to announce that she is strong and independent, 
and can shoe herself without the help of a man. She’s saying, “Look out, male-
dominated world, here comes me and my shoes” (The Onion, 2003).38 
 
The spoof academic (whose institutional affiliation is the historically radical Oberlin 
College) goes on to suggest that beyond shoes and clothing, there are endless 
commodities that can empower women.39 Indeed, “from what she eats for breakfast to 
the way she cleans her home, today’s woman lives in a state of near-constant 
empowerment” (The Onion, 2003). Satire tends to occur only when a social 
phenomenon has become widespread enough to make the humour comprehensible to a 
large audience. As such, The Onion’s satirical take on commodity feminism is itself 
indicative of its ascendancy. Yet the following question remains: how did commodity 
feminism reach ascendancy in advertising, the corporate media, and popular culture?  
Understanding this ascendancy requires understanding the origins of commodity 
feminism. This chapter theorizes these origins through the femininity question, that is, 
the problem femininity has posed to popular Anglo-American feminism. The femininity 
                                                          
38 Rosalind Gill suggests the intended target of the shoe discussion is Sex and the City (2008: 37). Indeed, 
as mentioned in the introduction, there was an episode in the final season entitled “A Woman’s Right to 
Shoes.”  
39 For example, shopping for food can also be read as a feminist trend. Energy bars fortified with nutrients 
“for women” are completely “unlike traditional, phallocentric energy bars.” Indeed, “pioneers like 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony could never have imagined that female empowerment 
would one day come in bar form” (The Onion, 2003).  
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question, in a similar manner to the exchange and commodification of women, has been 
thought to explain a great deal about the position of women. One of the earliest 
articulations of this question in Anglo-American feminism can be found in the work of 
Mary Wollstonecraft (1759−1797). Notably, Wollstonecraft sets up tension between 
feminism and femininity using arguments that are at times misogynist. Her treatment of 
femininity writ large, the commodities required to produce femininity, and the women 
who use these commodities, has influenced popular feminist understandings of the 
femininity question until very recently.  
In this chapter, I put forward an explanation of the ascendancy of commodity 
feminism through a discussion of third wave feminism, in particular, the relationship of 
third wave feminism to the femininity question. While the third wave has been credited 
for being more inclusive (particularly of race, sexuality, and gender identity), it has also 
been critiqued for not addressing issues of class and for inviting “in the name of 
inclusiveness, practically any claims to feminist membership, [rendering it] easy for 
external constituents to co-opt third-wave vocabulary as part of its effort to depoliticize 
feminist gains” (Kinser, 2008: 141, 142). I argue here that the solution to the tension 
between feminism and femininity offered by the third wave is one that is easily 
commodified and in fact works to legitimize commodity feminism.  
In a manner similar to that of third wave feminism, I discuss how commodity 
feminism also offers a certain kind of resolution to the feminism/femininity tension. I 
show how this apparent resolution lies in revaluing feminized commodities and the 
women who use them, both of which have been denigrated since Wollstonecraft. Under 
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commodity feminism, women are seen as entirely unthreatening to the status quo, yet 
they are able to feel like feminists through their rejection of Wollstonecraftian feminist 
misogyny, consumption of feminized commodities, and production of femininity. While 
commodity feminism does not empower women, it does empower the desires of certain 
women whom it simultaneously normalizes and idealizes (that is, women who tend to 
be white, able-bodied, and middle class) to participate in the production of particular 
forms of femininity.  
This chapter is organized into six sections. Section 2.2 defines my use of the term 
misogyny with reference to the work of Julia Serano and Allyson Mitchell; section 2.3 
explores the treatment of femininity in the work of Mary Wollstonecraft, including 
Thoughts on the Education of Daughters (1786), A Vindication of the Rights of Men 
(1790), and A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792). The next three sections 
(2.3−2.5) examine how Wollstonecraft’s legacy of feminist misogyny has influenced the 
treatment of the femininity question (including the commodities required in the 
production of femininity) in twentieth-century popular socialist and liberal feminisms, 
with a particular focus on Joseph Hansen, Evelyn Reed, and Mary-Alice Waters’ edited 
volume Cosmetics, Fashions and the Exploitation of Women (1954), Betty Friedan’s The 
Feminine Mystique (1963), Susan Brownmiller’s Femininity (1984), and Naomi Wolf’s The 
Beauty Myth (1990). Lastly, section 2.6 examines third wave feminist interventions that 
directly challenge the assumption that femininity is a problem to be overcome, and that 
suggest a possible solution to the feminism/femininity tension. This section primarily 
focuses on Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richard’s Manifesta: Young Women, 
 67 
Feminism and the Future (2000) and Chloë Brushwood Rose and Anna Camilleri’s edited 
volume Brazen Femme: Queering Femininity (2002). 
As the title of my chapter indicates, this is not an intervention into feminist 
theory, but an intervention into popular feminist writing on femininity. All of these texts 
constitute popular feminism:40 they are well-known (at least in their time) outside 
academia, written in an accessible style, and for the most part written by non-
academics.41 In addition, the primary purpose of these texts is to engage with the 
femininity question. The approach to sources consulted in this chapter is thus strategic, 
recognizing that commodity feminism is not in competition with the highly theoretical 
texts of feminists such as Luce Irigaray or Judith Butler. After all, commodity feminism is 
a form of marketing to women. Women familiar with the arguments of Irigaray or Butler 
constitute a tiny percentage of North American consumers; from a marketing 
perspective, they are irrelevant. However, commodity feminism is competing with the 
more accessible texts of popular feminists such as Betty Friedan and Naomi Wolf. 
Regardless of whether or not women have actually read The Feminine Mystique or The 
Beauty Myth, most are certainly familiar with some of the more basic arguments these 
books offer. For example, arguments concerning housework (that it is repetitive, dull, 
and women do most of it) and the beauty industry (that making women feel insecure is 
profitable for business) are a pervasive part of contemporary Anglo-American culture.  
                                                          
40 Although Wollstonecraft is clearly a canonized thinker in Western feminist thought, as a polemical 
writer whose work was tremendously influential in her time, she can also be read as a popular feminist 
writer. Moreover, several of Wollstonecraft’s popular feminist successors (including Friedan and 
Brownmiller) situate their work with respect to hers. 
41 A few of the contributors to the Cosmetics and Brazen Femme collections are academics. However, the 
writing in both collections is highly accessible and the intended audience is not exclusively academic.  
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2.2 Misogyny and Femininity 
The usual definition of misogyny is woman hating. However, feminists have used the 
term to refer to behaviours, practices and social contexts that are deeply hostile to 
women (Card, 2002). Indeed, in the next section, I understand Wollstonecraft’s 
particular form of misogyny as not a hatred of women per se, but a deep hostility 
toward almost everything associated with women.42 This includes behaviours, gendered 
roles, bodily aesthetics, consumption, and feminized commodities; in short, femininity 
and the commodities required in its production. In a general sense (that is, beyond 
Wollstonecraft), I define misogyny as a hatred or deep hostility toward women and/or 
femininity. My definition engages with and modifies the understandings of misogyny put 
forth by Julia Serano in Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman on Sexism and the 
Scapegoating of Femininity and Allyson Mitchell, who is cited in the epigraph to this 
chapter, in Brazen Femme.  
                                                          
42 By women, I mean the privileged women of the upper class (or “ladies”) that were eminently familiar to 
Wollstonecraft; these are the women with whom she was primarily preoccupied. Wollstonecraft’s own 
class position was somewhat ambiguous. She was born into the English landed gentry—that is, a class of 
landowners without titles who could live off their rental income—on her father’s side (Falco, 1996: 2; 
Todd, 2000). Wollstonecraft’s father became wealthy after her paternal grandfather died when she was 5; 
as such, her family often associated with members of the gentry. However, Wollstonecraft’s father 
ultimately squandered his inheritance, and the class position of her family consistently declined 
(Altenbernd Johnson, 2000: 2; Todd, 2000: 3−11, 37). Her father was also an alcoholic who was abusive to 
his wife and children (Godwin, 1967: 9−12; Falco, 1996: 2, Altenbernd Johnson, 2000: 2; Todd, 2000: 5). 
To support herself and members of her family, Wollstonecraft was eventually forced to work in a variety 
of positions deemed appropriate for impoverished “ladies” including: lady’s companion, running a school 
for girls, and governess (Godwin, 1967: 37; Todd, 2000: 27, 28, 55−58, 79). Thus within the British class 
system of her time, Wollstonecraft was not exactly a “lady”; however, the jobs she held were not 
considered servant positions or appropriate for the working class. Wollstonecraft eventually made her 
living (albeit while struggling with debt) by writing (Todd, 2000: 138, 141−142, 157). Later in her life she 
had servants herself; indeed, in his Memoirs of his late wife, William Godwin praised Wollstonecraft’s 
behaviour towards “her inferiors in station [and] age,” particularly her kindness to “her servants” and 
children (1967: 33).   
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Serano’s understanding of misogyny is more well-developed than Mitchell’s. 
Serano differentiates between old and new forms of misogyny and implicates 
feminism43 in the persistence of misogyny’s newer form. She contends that “much of 
what has historically been called misogyny—a hatred of women—has clearly gone 
underground, disguising itself as the less reprehensible derision of femininity” (2007: 
340). Although I agree with Serano that both the hatred of women and the derision of 
femininity constitute misogyny, the latter form of misogyny (as the next section on 
Wollstonecraft will demonstrate) is hardly new.44 Serano’s discussion of misogyny 
relates to my own in that she critiques feminism for its treatment of the femininity 
question. Moreover, she suggests that misogynist understandings of femininity have 
persisted in part because feminists have either neglected femininity or have actively 
                                                          
43 Serano implicates two feminist trends in the persistence of misogyny: unilateral feminism and 
deconstructive feminism. She categorizes feminisms according to these “trends” to “illustrate two major 
tendencies in feminist perspectives on femininity”; she suggests she does not wish “to erase the 
significant differences that distinguished the individual branches of feminism” or to “ignore other 
branches of feminism that fall outside these trends” (Serano, 2007: 330). For Serano, unilateral feminists 
understood femininity as “an artificial, man-made ploy designed to hold women back from reaching their 
full potential” and consist largely of liberal, radical, and cultural feminists from the 1960s and 1970s. The 
specific unilateral feminists she mentions are Betty Friedan, Mary Daly, and Germaine Greer (Serano, 
2007: 331, 332−334). On the other hand, deconstructive feminism “only empowers and embraces queer 
expressions of femininity, while straight expressions of femininity are typically portrayed as reinforcing a 
sexist binary system” (Serano, 2007: 336−337). The only deconstructive feminist she mentions by name is 
Judith Butler.  
44 In fairness to Serano, the purpose of her study is not to undergo a history of misogynist treatments of 
femininity but rather to examine the scapegoating of people who express femininity in contemporary 
American culture (primarily trans women but also cisgendered women and feminine men). She contends 
that misogyny in the contemporary context “focuses more on maligning femininity than femaleness [and] 
can be found everywhere” (Serano, 2007: 340). In theorizing femininity through her experiences as a trans 
woman, Serano contends that trans women are “ridiculed and dismissed not merely because we 
‘transgress binary gender norms,’ as many transgender activists and gender theorists have proposed, but 
rather because we ‘choose’ to be women rather than men. The fact that we identify and live as women, 
despite being born male and having inherited male privilege, challenges those in our society who wish to 
glorify maleness and masculinity, as well as those who frame the struggles faced by other women and 
queers solely in terms of male and heterosexual privilege” (2007: 4). As such, she views many of her 
experiences that others (in the feminist and/or queer communities) might label transphobia as trans-
misogyny or simply misogyny (2007: 5−6, 236).  
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participated in putting forth the view that femininity is incompatible with feminism 
(2007: 340, 320). As femininity has been feminism’s “Achilles’ heel,” Serano issues a call 
to put “the feminine back into feminism” (2007: 340, 320).  
Mitchell’s claim that rejecting femininity based on its misogynist construction 
requires restriction. Without restriction it could be read to suggest that any critique of 
femininity is vulnerable to a charge of misogyny. There must be space available for 
critiques of femininity; for example, critiques such as those offered by Lisa Duggan and 
Kathleen McHugh in their contribution to Brazen Femme:  
In the dominant myth of gender, white men work to support their delicate, 
morally superior feminine white women. The feminine white woman is offered 
“respect” only in relation to those excluded from the sacred domestic and its 
“protections”—the slave, the mammy, the whore, the jezebel, the wage slave, 
the servant, the hussy, the dyke, the welfare queen. “Femininity” here is the 
price paid for a paltry and debasing power. This femininity embodies, pays the 
symbolic taxes of a mythology based on denial of class and race—a mythology 
that takes no responsibility for its privilege, its hierarchies, its parasitic relation 
to other’s labor and sweat. This myth’s enshrining of a saccharine sincerity in 
the midst of so much deception curdles the spirit and strangles affirmation 
and power in the throats of all who embrace and believe in the “morality” and 
“sweetness” of the feminine (2002: 168).  
 
Clearly there must be space to critique the issues Duggan and McHugh mention: the 
ways in which hegemonic femininities privilege whiteness, heteronormativity, and 
dependency, and endorse racism, slut-shaming, homophobia, and classism. Other 
contributors to Brazen Femme offer other important critiques of hegemonic femininity, 
including its stifling conformity (“as a demand placed on female bodies”) and the 
middle-class consumption involved (“picket fences, station wagons, or diamond rings”) 
(Brushwood Rose and Camilleri, 2002: 13; Ruth, 2002: 17).  
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In sum, I am restricting Mitchell’s understanding of misogyny because feminist 
critiques of femininity serve important functions and are not necessarily misogynist. But 
this does not take away from the fact that feminist critiques can and at times do contain 
an underlying Wollstonecraftian feminist misogyny. In other words, rejecting femininity 
simply because of the ways it has been constructed may be an act of misogyny (as 
Mitchell claims) or it may not. Either way, as Serano points out, when an individual 
woman eschews “femininity in her appearance and actions, she cannot escape the fact 
that other people will project feminine assumptions and expectations upon her simply 
because they associate femininity with femaleness” (2007: 341). As such, anti-feminine 
sentiment (in feminist, queer, and other communities) must be challenged, and it must 
be acknowledged “that feminine expression exists of its own accord and brings its own 
rewards to those who naturally gravitate towards it” (Serano, 2007: 343). This chapter 
will develop this understanding of misogyny as informed by Serano and Mitchell. 
2.3 Wollstonecraft’s Liberal Feminist Misogyny 
Femininity has been understood as a problem for Anglo-American feminism in general 
and for many feminists in particular. As such, there has been a great deal written on the 
femininity question. In a similar manner to most conventional histories of feminist 
thought in the Anglo-American world, I begin with Mary Wollstonecraft.45 She is 
                                                          
45 This is not to suggest that Wollstonecraft is author of the first Anglo-American feminist text. Barbara 
Taylor notes that since the seventeenth century, “liberal advocates of constitutional government [were 
arguing] that the power of men within families, like that of kings within nations, should be exercised only 
with the consent of the ruled” (1993: 3). Moreover, Wollstonecraft was hardly the lone feminist voice of 
her time. In the late eighteenth century, “there was a steady stream of writing on women’s position” by 
teachers, parliamentary reformers, novelists, journalists, and poets. These “dissident intellectuals” formed 
communities in most large towns across Britain (1993). Yet this does not take away from the point that 
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contemptuous of all or most of the women from the upper class for embracing 
femininity, which she associates with irrationality, weakness, excessive emotions, 
foolishness, frivolity, and childlike behaviour. She sets up a tension between feminism 
and femininity, is harsh in her critique of femininity as an artificial construct that 
prevents women from exercising their reason, and uses arguments that areat 
timesmisogynist.46 Wollstonecraft’s legacy of feminist misogyny47 has haunted the 
subsequent development of popular Anglo-American feminism.  
Wollstonecraft’s critique of femininity and her larger project of women’s 
emancipation is informed by her liberalism and, related to that liberalism, her belief in 
the Cartesian subject, that is, a subject defined by rational thought. The Cartesian 
subject is dualistic in that the body is separated from the mind, or as Wollstonecraft 
articulates it, “there is no sex in souls” (Jaggar, 1983: 40; Brown, 2006: 61−62, 64−65). A 
clear danger of adopting the Cartesian subject is masculinism, given that disembodied, 
abstract subjects have tended to allow men to stand in for people in the history of 
Western thought. Yet Wollstonecraft’s Cartesianism underpins not merely masculinism 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Wollstonecraft is understood to have written the founding text of modern feminism with A Vindication of 
the Rights of Woman. As such, her influence (both generally and with specific reference to her 
understanding of femininity) has been considerable.  
46 Wollstonecraft associated femininity with these traits in the context of theorizing constraints imposed 
on women through her nascent theory of gender-role socialization and her critique of the education of 
(non-working class) girls and women. See sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 2.3.3. 
47 This term feminist misogyny was originally coined by Susan Gubar in 1994. Gubar uses the term to 
suggest a dialectical relationship between feminism and misogyny. Although I am indebted to Gubar for 
coining the term, my understanding of the term and focus both differ. I do not understand feminism and 
misogyny to be in a dialectical relationship; indeed, even Gubar acknowledges that although “there can be 
(need be) no feminism without misogyny,” at the same time “feminism historically has not been the 
condition for misogyny’s existence” (1994: 462). Like Gubar, I do focus on Wollstonecraft’s use of 
misogynist language in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. However, I expand beyond Gubar’s focus to 
include discussion of other Wollstonecraft texts as well as considering the relationship between 
femininity, commodities, and capitalism in Wollstonecraft’s work and subsequent popular feminist texts.  
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but also her feminist misogyny: she is feminist in the way she fights for women to be 
included in the category of the rights-bearing (abstract disembodied Cartesian) subject, 
but misogynist in her assessment of women who inevitably remain gendered subjects. 
2.3.1 Wollstonecraft’s Liberal Feminism 
Before making this argument, it is important to first provide an overview 
Wollstonecraft’s liberal politics. I characterize Wollstonecraft as an Enlightenment 
thinker and liberal feminist with occasional radical tendencies to nonconformity.48 She 
may be characterized as such due to her adoption of the Cartesian subject of the 
Enlightenment, and because of the liberal politics that follow from that subject. On the 
former, Wollstonecraft’s view that there is “no sex in souls” is similar to other 
Enlightenment thinkers such as Poullain de la Barre. Following Descartes, de la Barre 
declared in 1673 that the “mind has no sex.” The unsexed nature of the mind and the 
soul means women and men share the same moral nature; as such, they ought to share 
the same moral status and rights (Brown, 2006: 62). Wollstonecraft’s liberal politics are 
evident in her arguments for women’s education, for the ability of women to reason 
given a proper education, and for the inclusion of women in public life (Ferguson, 1999: 
427; Brown, 2006: 62). She can also be characterized as a liberal feminist, at least in part 
based on her engagement with male political theorists. In Thoughts on the Education of 
Daughters, she takes up the theories of John Locke on children as individuals. In A 
Vindication of the Rights of Men, she critiques the conservatism of Edmund Burke in 
                                                          
48 In characterizing Wollstonecraft as such I am following conventional histories of Anglo-American 
feminist thought. 
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Reflections on the Revolution in France. And finally in A Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman, her most famous text, she lambastes the proposals of Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
in Émile for a gender-segregated education in which boys would be taught to reason and 
girls taught to please. Therefore, in taking up Locke’s individualism, in critiquing Burke’s 
conservatism and Rousseau’s gender-segregated education, and in expressing a general 
optimism about progress through education, Wollstonecraft is definitively a product of 
Enlightenment thinking and liberalism. 
Although Wollstonecraft ought to be characterized as a liberal feminist, both her 
liberalism and her feminism are limited. This is especially the case in matters of 
education. Her liberalism does not extend to the working class: she argues that all 
children ought to be educated in the same manner, but only from age five to nine. After 
that, working-class children ought to be “removed to other schools” (1990: 107). Her 
feminism does not extend to the working class either: only middle-class children (or in 
her words, “young people of superior abilities, or fortune”) should be given the same 
education. This education would consist of “the dead and living languages, the elements 
of science, and […] the study of history and politics, which would not exclude polite 
literature” (1990b: 108). Working-class children should retain the gender-segregated 
education that Wollstonecraft is so critical of Rousseau for advocating: boys would be 
educated in the “mechanical trades,” and girls would be taught “plain-work, mantua-
making [and] millinery” (or in other words, basic sewing as well as more specialized 
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sewing such as gown making and hat making) (1990b: 108).49 Wollstonecraft’s liberalism 
and feminism also do not extend to women and men of colour: despite over eighty 
references to slavery in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, in almost all of these 
references she is referring to the slavery of white English women. Wollstonecraft was 
well aware of the abolitionist movement but largely took up its language to apply to 
these women (Ferguson, 1992: 92, 87). Wollstonecraft’s class-based education 
recommendations, lack of concern for the equality of men and women of the working 
class, and her strange references to white English women’s slavery all point to the 
limitations of both her liberalism and her feminism.50  
Despite these limitations, some feminists suggest that Wollstonecraft is radical in 
that she proposes an embryonic form of socialism in her critiques of class society and 
private property (Ferguson, 1999: 427−429). For example, Barbara Taylor argues that 
“the scope of her project took her right to the limit of the bourgeois-democratic outlook 
and occasionally a little way past it” (1993: 6). Susan Ferguson argues that such readings 
go too far, contending that Wollstonecraft’s feminism is firmly class-based and her 
critiques of property are of aristocratic forms of property (1999: 432). Indeed, in A 
Vindication of the Rights of Men, Wollstonecraft endorses private property as long as 
the holdings are not too large. She contends that it is the “barbarous feudal” institution 
                                                          
49 Here the liberation of middle-class women from sewing is at the expense of working-class women. 
Wollstonecraft also argues “against the custom of confining [middle-class] girls to their needle” (1990b: 
108), but someone clearly needs to do the sewing.  
50 Wollstonecraft is not only unconcerned with the plight of the working class, but at times seems to 
understand the working class to pose a threat. For example, in Thoughts on the Education of Daughters, 
she warns mothers (of the middle class) to breast-feed their own children; otherwise, babies will be fed by 
“ignorant nurses” with “their stomachs overloaded with improper food, which turns acid” (1990c: 28). 
Therefore, both literally and figuratively, Wollstonecraft understands the acid of the working class to pose 
a threat to the middle class.  
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of property to which she objects, as it “enables the elder son to overpower talents and 
depress virtue” (1990a: 71). She also argues for the enclosure of common land for 
private use (1990a: 81). For Ferguson, Wollstonecraft is not a liberal reformer, nor does 
she have a wider socialist vision. She is, rather, a “social radical,” which Ferguson defines 
as someone whose “radical politics […] disrupts status quo notions of governance and 
authority.” As such, Wollstonecraft is not overly critical of capitalism but is part of a 
“liberal-democratic politics of resistance in the late-eighteenth-century Britain” (1999: 
433).  
2.3.2 Wollstonecraft on Gender and Femininity 
Although I agree with Ferguson that Wollstonecraft is not radical in her discussion of 
class or property, Wollstonecraft does display some degree of radicalism in her 
understanding of both gender and femininity. Regarding the former, she contends that 
there are two possible explanations for the condition of women (by “women,” 
Wollstonecraft means white middle-class women):51 “either nature has made a great 
difference between [men and women], or that the civilization which has hitherto taken 
place in the world has been very partial.” She goes on to argue the latter, that the 
position of women is not natural but the result of socialization and is “a false system of 
education” (1990b: 85). She pleads to men to allow for conditions in which women’s 
“faculties have room to unfold, and their virtues to gain strength, and then determine 
where the whole sex must stand in the intellectual scale” (1990b: 91). In doing so, she 
                                                          
51 References to women and femininity henceforth in this discussion of Wollstonecraft shall be to white 
middle-class women and the hegemonic forms of femininity they embody.  
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offers a nascent theory of gender-role socialization: women’s intelligence and 
capabilities will only be discovered with radical changes to society. Her radicalism can 
also be situated in her more specific critique of femininity. She is particularly concerned 
with three predominant forms of femininity: the mother, the coquette and the lady. 
However, only in the latter two forms does she exhibit her radicalism. She does 
understand the mother to be socially constructed52 and wants to rethink this form of 
femininity. She argues for what I would describe as rational mothering femininity: 
women ought to be educated not so they may enter professions,53 but so that they will 
be better (that is, more rational) mothers. For Wollstonecraft, “motherhood informed 
by reason is and must be the essence of emancipation” (Ferguson, 1999: 445). Indeed, 
the only form of femininity of which she seems to approve is this rational mothering 
femininity.  
 Wollstonecraft understands the coquette and the lady (like the mother) to be 
socially constructed. Although she never defines the difference between the coquette 
and lady forms of femininity, the lady seems to be a somewhat less flirtatious and more 
refined version of the coquette. Wollstonecraft does not want to rethink but completely 
eradicate these hegemonic forms of femininity. Indeed, this can be situated in the 
context of her concerns—shared with Rousseau—of how the socialization process 
                                                          
52 Although Wollstonecraft argues “the suckling of a child […] excites the warmest glow of tenderness,” 
she is clear that this “maternal tenderness arises quite as much from habit as instinct” (1990c: 28). Also, 
while she views parenting as a “natural impulse” and “natural parental affection” as the “first source of 
civilization” (1990a: 69, 70), she also understands that giving women the primary responsibility for 
childrearing is not natural but social.  
53 As Ferguson notes, for Wollstonecraft “women who work outside the home are likely to be single or at 
least childless, and of ‘exceptional talent’” (1999: 444). 
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creates artificial and false human beings. Yet what she likes in Rousseau does not get 
applied to women. Wollstonecraft famously responds, for example, to Rousseau’s 
argument that women are natural coquettes (and whose education must be constructed 
with the purpose of refining this tendency) with ridicule. She contends that his 
argument is “so unphilosophical, that such a sagacious observer as Rousseau would not 
have adopted it, if he has not been accustomed to make reason give way to his desire 
for singularity, and truth to a favourite paradox.” In short, his argument represents 
nothing short of “absurdity” (1990b: 93).  
2.3.3 Wollstonecraft’s Feminist Misogyny 
Conventional histories of feminist theory have long celebrated Wollstonecraft’s critique 
of Rousseau’s naturalization of femininity. However, Wollstonecraft’s critiques of 
hegemonic forms of femininity and the women embodying them are often overlooked. 
Her characterization of both is implicitlyand at times explicitlymisogynist. 
Wollstonecraft’s harsh critiques of Rousseau’s gender politics might have contributed to 
a lack of interrogation of certain aspects of her own gender politics, namely its 
misogynist aspects.  
Wollstonecraft’s misogyny is particularly evident in her treatment of the 
coquette and the lady. They are “weak and wretched,” “artificial,” and “almost sunk 
below the standard of rational creatures” (1990b: 85, 91; 1990c: 30). Wollstonecraft 
also ridicules their faces:  
A made-up face may strike visitors, but will certainly disgust domestic friends. 
And one obvious interference is drawn, truth is not expected to govern the 
inhabitant of so artificial a form. The false life with which rouge animates the 
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eyes, is not of the most delicate kind; nor does a women’s dressing herself in a 
way to attract languishing glances, give us the most advantageous opinion of 
the purity of her mind (1990c: 32). 
  
The woman who wears makeup, therefore, is not only weak, artificial, and irrational but 
also disgusting, untruthful, seeking attention from men and possibly unchaste. The 
woman who follows fashion (as the quote cited in the epigraph to this chapter suggests) 
is similarly irrational, foolishly buying clothing no matter how ridiculous the style, simply 
because she is told to by advertisements (1990c: 32).  
Since coquettes and ladies tend to get married, Wollstonecraft puts much of the 
blame for unhappy marriages and families on women in general and their desire for 
feminized commodities in particular. She blames women in her statement that 
“affection in the marriage state can only be founded on respect” and poses the 
rhetorical question, “are these weak beings respectable?” (1990a: 70). Moreover, she 
claims the coquette and the lady become neglectful mothers (1990a: 70).  
Wollstonecraft blames women’s desires for feminized commodities in the 
following statement: 
My very soul has often sickened at observing the sly tricks practised by women 
to gain some foolish thing on which their foolish hearts were set. Not allowed 
to dispose of money, or call any thing their own, they learn to turn to the 
market penny; or, should a husband offend, by staying from home, or give rise 
to some emotions of jealousy—a new gown, or any pretty bawble [sic], 
smoothes Juno’s angry brow (1990b: 108). 
 
In other words, wives are not only manipulative, jealous, and foolish, but they can also 
be placated with a mere bauble. This passage is an interesting study in the workings of 
Wollstonecraft’s feminist misogyny. On the one hand, she is making a feminist argument 
against being duped by a bauble (or what Marx would call commodity fetishism) as it 
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induces women to participate in a system that does not advantage them. On the other 
hand, Wollstonecraft can be situated in the misogynist tradition that not only blames 
women for bad marriages and the plight of children but also castigates women for their 
frivolous desires and disparages female consumption.  
Female consumption is a problem for Wollstonecraft in that it is the chief pursuit 
of the coquette and the lady, insofar as they have any pursuits at all. In Wollstonecraft’s 
words, to be a lady “is simply to have nothing to do, but listlessly to go they scarcely 
care where, for they cannot tell what” (1990b: 103). She pleads desperately for “the fine 
lady [to] become a rational woman,” because “refinement inevitably lessens respect for 
virtue” (1990a: 78). Yet despite their idle lifestyle and lack of virtue, women “all want to 
be ladies” (1990b: 103, emphasis mine). Moreover, the lady possesses “few traits […] 
which dignify human nature” and “though she lives many years she is still a child in 
understanding, and of so little use to society, that her death would scarcely be 
observed” (1990c: 39). Wollstonecraft’s description of women as lacking virtue, her 
comparison of ladies to children, and her argument that the very existence of a lady 
does not matter once again situates her in the misogynist tradition of western thought. 
Yet the lady’s existence did matter, if not to Wollstonecraft then to the expanding 
capitalist economy of her time, in which female consumption played an increasingly 
important role. 
In the eighteenth century, the centres of commodity production in Europe were 
undergoing a shift from the household to the market. This shift in production entailed a 
shift in productive labour—that is the labour that generated income upon which a 
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family could live. Instead of being undergone by both men and women in the household, 
productive labour became primarily the realm of men in the public workplace. Women 
continued to undertake non-productive labour in the household, but because that 
labour did not contribute to household income, it was devalued (Tong, 1998: 12; 
Hennessy, 2000: 98−99). As such, the economic and social position of European women 
was in decline. In addition, a new consumer culture was emerging in which women were 
“recruited as the ideal and consummate consumers” (Hennessy, 2000: 99). Despite the 
declining position of women, their consumption played an increasingly important role in 
managing capitalist overproduction (Hennessy, 2000: 99). Indeed, married women of 
the upper class had little to do except consume, as they had servants to do the non-
productive labour that was required inside the household (Tong, 1998: 12). Since 
Wollstonecraft is not critical of capitalism, her critique of women’s frivolity is misogynist 
in that she does not find capitalist consumption itself problematic. For Wollstonecraft, 
consumption only becomes a problem when it is done by women or involves pretty 
baubles and other feminized commodities purchased for women. Men consume as well, 
yet their desires are not constructed as “frivolous” (Coward, 1985; Serano, 2007: 327).  
Wollstonecraft’s misogyny is evident not only in her treatment of women’s 
consumption and other behaviour, but also in her use of language. Gubar summarizes 
the language Wollstonecraft uses to argue for the eradication of all forms of femininity 
(except rational mothering femininity): 
Repeatedly and disconcertingly, Wollstonecraft associates the feminine with 
weakness, childishness, deceitfulness, cunning, superficiality, an overvaluation 
of love, frivolity, dilettantism, irrationality, flattery, servility, prostitution, 
coquetry, sentimentality, ignorance, indolence, intolerance, slavish 
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conformity, fickle passion, despotism, bigotry, and a “spaniel-like affection” 
(1994: 456). 
  
To add to Gubar’s list, Wollstonecraft also repeatedly describes femininity as “artificial” 
or “false” (Wollstonecraft, 1990b: 85, 88, 89, 93; Wollstonecraft, 1990c: 30, 32; 
Ferguson, 1999: 434). The language Wollstonecraft uses to describe femininity is not 
new. Indeed, there is a long Western tradition that associates femininity with artificiality 
and duplicity (Tseëlon, 1995: 2−6, 33−37, 77; Serano, 2007: 320−330).54 Serano argues 
that using language such as this to describe femininity—regardless of whether or not 
the author or speaker is feminist—is “blatantly misogynistic.” Indeed, (Western) 
understandings of femininity as “artificial,” “contrived,” and “frivolous” are “precisely 
what allows masculinity to always come off as ‘natural,’ ‘practical,’ and ‘uncomplicated’” 
(Serano, 2007: 313, 339).  
 Serano’s comparison of the language used to describe femininity and masculinity 
is also useful in thinking through the long-term effects of Wollstonecraft’s language. 
Serano contends: 
Those feminists who single out women’s dress shoes, clothing, and hairstyles 
to artificialize necessarily leave unchallenged the notion that their masculine 
counterparts are “natural” and “practical.” This is the same male-centered 
approach that allows the appearances and behaviors of men who wish to 
charm or impress others to seem “authentic” while the reciprocal traits 
expressed by women are dismissed as “feminine wiles.” Femininity is 
portrayed as a trick or ruse so that masculinity invariably seems sincere by 
comparison. For this reason, there are few intellectual tasks easier than 
artificializing feminine gender expression, because male-centrism purposefully 
sets up femininity as masculinity’s “straw man” or its scapegoat (2007: 
339−340). 
 
                                                          
54 For example, Efrat Tseëlon has traced these representations of femininity back to Medusa and the 
Sirens of ancient Greece, and Lilith and Eve of the Judeo-Christian tradition (1995: 33−37). 
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Utilizing Serano to critique Wollstonecraft requires two caveats. First, as previously 
mentioned, Serano’s 2007 book is dealing with femininity in the contemporary 
American context. As such, it is important to avoid judging Wollstonecraft by early 
twenty-first century feminist standards.55 Second, Wollstonecraft does not leave all 
forms of masculinity entirely unchallenged.56 With that being said, I am less concerned 
with applying Serano to Wollstonecraft as I am thinking through the long-term effects of 
Wollstonecraft’s language (that is, on the construction of the femininity question in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries).57 Wollstonecraft’s constant association of 
femininity with primarily negative traits (weak, artificial, irrational, deceitful, cunning, 
bigoted, and frivolous) means that masculinity becomes associated with primarily 
positive traits (strong, natural, rational, honest, upfront, open-minded, and serious). 
 Wollstonecraft’s use of language in the titles of her two Vindication books is also 
telling. The titles are similar with the important exception that the earlier book is 
vindicating the rights of men in the plural, and the later book is vindicating the rights of 
woman in the singular. Her appeals for the rights of men and woman are ultimately 
appeals to men. For Wollstonecraft, it is difficult to claim the rights of women (in the 
plural) and speak to women (as a group) because most are failed Cartesian subjects: 
                                                          
55 Indeed, as Andrew Elfenbein points out, definitions of masculinity and femininity in the eighteenth 
century were not fixed and often contested (2002: 222−229). Elfenbein suggests that Wollstonecraft both 
questioned gendered norms while recognizing “the need to ground her argument in firm gender 
distinctions and sexual roles” (2002: 243). 
56 For example, Wollstonecraft is critical of the masculinity of military men, particularly soldiers. She 
complains that like women, soldiers are given an incomplete and superficial education. Both women and 
soldiers are “sent into the world before their minds have been stored with knowledge or fortified by 
principles” (Wollstonecraft, 1990b: 89). At the same time, Wollstonecraft refrains from abusing soldier 
masculinity (or any other form of masculinity). As such, to invoke Serano’s phrase, she leaves femininity as 
masculinity’s Other (2007: 339).  
57 See section 2.3.4. 
 84 
when the mind is associated with masculine rationality, and the body with femininity, 
women are a lost cause. Wollstonecraft believes such women will not only be hostile to 
her arguments, but incapable of even understanding them: 
My own sex, I hope, will excuse me, if I treat them like rational creatures, 
instead of flattering their fascinating graces, and viewing them as if they were 
in a state of perpetual childhood, unable to stand alone. I earnestly wish to 
point out in what true dignity and human happiness consists—I wish to 
persuade women to endeavour to acquire strength, both of mind and body, 
and to convince them that the soft phrases, susceptibility of heart, delicacy of 
sentiment, and refinement of taste, are almost synonymous with epithets of 
weakness, and that those beings who are only the objects of pity and that kind 
of love, which has been termed its sister, will soon become objects of 
contempt (1990b: 86). 
  
Wollstonecraft’s sentiment might be understandable in that not all women are 
feminists, and there are always women antagonistic to feminist arguments. Yet her 
response to this hostility toward feminism is, ironically, more misogyny: women are 
hostile to their liberation because they are childlike, overly emotional, and weak. 
Although she states that women “will soon become objects of contempt,” they are 
already such objects for Wollstonecraft. Wollstonecraft’s nascent theory of gender-role 
socialization does not soften her misogyny. Gubar points out that although 
Wollstonecraft “sets out to liberate society from a hated subject constructed to be 
subservient […] [that] animosity can spill over into antipathy of those human beings 
most constrained by that construction” (1994: 457). Moreover, Wollstonecraft’s 
misogyny spills over from socially constructed difference to secondary sex 
characteristics: for example, her contempt of women’s “soft phrases” is contempt for 
the voices of women which tend to project less than those of men. Wollstonecraft’s 
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Cartesian separation of the mind from the body renders most women contemptuous 
creatures whose irrationality is linked to their disgusting, feminine bodies.  
 By vindicating the rights of men (in the plural) and woman (in the singular), 
Wollstonecraft has been read to suggest that the woman whose rights she is vindicating 
is herself. Gubar suggests that rarely does Wollstonecraft “present herself as a woman 
speaking to women” (1999: 457). Indeed, unusually for a polemical writer, 
Wollstonecraft rarely discusses women as we, preferring instead they; she writes as if 
they are separate from her, the woman whose rights she is vindicating. Similarly, Taylor 
argues that “Wollstonecraft never saw herself as part of a collective feminist revolt” and 
“the idea of a feminist alliance among women seems never to have occurred to her” 
(2003: 238). The arguments of Gubar and Taylor can be contrasted with Macdonald and 
Scherf, who contend that Wollstonecraft uses woman to stand in for women (in A 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman) and men to stand in for all human beings (in A 
Vindication of the Rights of Men) (1997: 11, 15). Indeed, they cite a letter from 
Wollstonecraft to Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand Périgord in which she insists: “I plead 
for my sex—not for myself” (1997: 11). In my reading, if Wollstonecraft is claiming rights 
for more than just herself, she is claiming them for a “small number of distinguished 
women” (1990b: 91). These distinguished women she allows to exist are exceptional: 
they would not only be able to understand but would also be sympathetic to her 
arguments. Yet the question of whom Wollstonecraft is claiming rights—herself, a 
“small number of distinguished women” or all (non-working class58) women—is almost 
                                                          
58 See section 2.3.1. 
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beside the point, as her overall misogyny is not softened. Misogyny does not necessarily 
determine one’s attitude toward particular women. As such, the implications of 
Wollstonecraft’s distinguished women are similar to those of the proverbial black 
friends: the misogyny or racism of the discussion is not attenuated by referencing 
particular women or black friends who do not fit the mould.  
 In Thoughts on the Education of Daughters, A Vindication of the Rights of Men, 
and A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft discusses the forms of 
femininity embodied by white women of the upper class and sets up a tension between 
feminism and femininity. With the exception of rational mothering femininity, which is 
closer to her Cartesian ideal, there is no form of femininity of which she approves. Her 
disapproval of femininity, combined with her understanding of femininity as artificial 
and socially constructed, leads her to disparage all or most women of the upper class. In 
other words, because femininity is neither natural nor good, Wollstonecraft treats 
women who produce femininity and consume the feminized commodities required in its 
production as objects of scorn. Yet despite her disparagement, she is not critical of 
consumption or capitalism more generally, only consumption undertaken by women 
and commodities associated with women. Wollstonecraft’s critiques of women’s 
consumption, in addition to her critiques of women’s non-consumptive behaviour, and 
the language she uses to describe femininity, are all misogynist. Wollstonecraft remains 
a feminist—albeit a misogynist one—and her Cartesianism underpins this tension. Her 
belief in the Cartesian subject allows her to make (feminist) arguments for the rights of 
women, yet this belief is also her (misogynist) undoing. If the rights of women, like the 
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rights of men, are premised on the abstract, disembodied subject, then the subject 
abstracted from its body need not have a body at all (Jaggar, 1983: 186; Brown, 2006: 
65−66). The inability to transcend femininity becomes an inability to transcend the body 
and a failure to achieve the Cartesian ideal. Overall, Wollstonecraft’s treatment of 
femininity suggests that at the basis of the Anglo-American feminist tradition is a 
profoundly misogynist thinker.  
2.3.4 Wollstonecraft’s Legacy of Feminist Misogyny 
Wollstonecraft’s legacy haunts the femininity question in popular Anglo-American 
feminism. There has been a great deal written on the femininity question and, as such, 
any overview must by necessity be highly selective. The texts I turn to next treat the 
question of femininity with a degree of seriousness, represent different time periods 
and schools of thought, and most importantly, have been highly influential (within the 
communities they represent if not wider Anglo-American society): namely, those of 
Evelyn Reed, Mary-Alice Waters and other socialist feminists involved in a 1954 debate 
on cosmetics and fashion; Betty Friedan’s 1963 liberal feminist book The Feminine 
Mystique; Susan Brownmiller’s 1984 liberal feminist book Femininity; Naomi Wolf’s 1990 
liberal feminist book, The Beauty Myth, that begins to straddle the divide between late 
twentieth-century liberal feminism and early third wave feminism; Jennifer 
Baumgardner and Amy Richard’s well-known third wave feminist treatise Manifesta: 
Young Women, Feminism and the Future (2000); and finally, the contributors to the 
2002 queer third wave feminist collection Brazen Femme: Queering Femininity.  
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Sections 2.4 to 2.6 will demonstrate the conceptual break between the earlier 
socialist and liberal feminist treatments of the femininity question and third wave 
treatments. There are several similarities in the ways in which the socialist and liberal 
feminists (with the occasional exception of Wolf) treat the femininity question. The 
similarities include the assumption of a tension between feminism and femininity, an 
understanding of femininity as artificial, and a derision of hegemonic forms of 
femininity. In other words, they share Wollstonecraftian feminist misogyny to varying 
degrees. Moreover, because femininity is artificial, women—or at least feminist 
women—are enjoined to overcome it. The conceptual break that third wave feminism 
represents concerns the treatment of feminized commodities: socialist and liberal 
feminists deride feminized commodities, and third wave feminists engage in an almost 
entirely uncritical celebration of them. In addition, many third wave feminists critique 
the idea that femininity is incompatible with feminism and, as such, disrupt misogynist 
understandings of femininity. The focus of the next section is the various positions on 
the femininity question held by contributors to a 1950s American socialist debate.  
2.4 Socialist Feminist Interventions of the 1950s 
The 1950s debate concerned the marketing of cosmetics and fashions to women and 
occurred among members of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) in the United States. The 
debate is often called the Bustelo Controversy as it was precipitated by an article 
published by Joseph Hansen writing under the pen name Jack Bustelo (Waters, 1993: 21; 
Cuddy-Keane, 1994: 126). Hansen published his controversial article, “Sagging Cosmetic 
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Lines Try a Face Lift,” in the Militant, a weekly newspaper reflecting the views of the 
party. In his article, Hansen contends that the cosmetics industry exploits women by 
tricking them into buying foolish and useless products. The debate raged in the pages of 
the Militant and the Discussion Bulletin (the party’s internal publication) from July to 
October of 1954. A leading figure in the party until his death in 1979, Hansen intervened 
twice more in the debate he triggered. Letters and articles contributing to the debate 
are collected in the 1986 volume Cosmetics, Fashions and the Exploitation of Women, of 
which Hansen and Evelyn Reed, although both long deceased, are listed as editors along 
with Mary-Alice Waters. The volume included some additional academic commentary 
on the debate, notably by Reed, a party member and socialist feminist anthropologist.  
Despite the often acrimonious tone of the debate, the contributors shared 
similar views on the role of cosmetic and fashion marketers in the production of 
hegemonic forms of femininity: femininity is something that must continually be given 
time and work to produce. As such, they share Wollstonecraft’s understanding of 
femininity as artificial and link femininity to capitalist commodities. However, as 
socialists, all of the contributors put a much heavier emphasis than Wollstonecraft on 
the role of capitalism in the production of this artificial femininity. Unlike 
Wollstonecraft, they problematize capitalist consumption itself. Reed’s argument 
typifies the general view of the contributors:  
The fashion world became a capitalist gold mine with virtually unlimited 
possibilities […] Natural beauty became more and more displaced by artificial 
beauty; namely, fashion beauty. And that is how the myth arose that beauty is 
identical with fashion and that all women have identical fashion needs 
because they all have identical beauty needs (1993: 63−65). 
 
 90 
In other words, in a similar manner to Marx’s early argument that the capitalist mode of 
production alienates people from their species-being, cosmetic and fashion production 
alienates women from their “natural beauty.” The contributors also share the view that 
“fashion beauty” (or what I have called hegemonic femininity) is determined, in whole 
or in part, by the ruling class (Bustelo/Hansen, 1993a: 35; Manning, 1993: 32; Patrick, 
1993: 42; Waters, 1993: 4).59 Some are wary of class reductionism and reluctant to 
exclusively focus on the ruling class, situating hegemonic femininity within masculinist 
valuations of women for their youth (McGowan, 1993: 48−49; Morgan, 1993: 51). The 
final view the contributors share is that in order to sell commodities, marketers 
persistently manipulate women to instill a sense of insecurity about their production of 
hegemonic femininity.  
Despite their shared views on the role of marketing in the production of 
hegemonic femininity, the contributors differ in their evaluations of the women who 
buy what the marketers advertise. Two opposing positions can be identified on this 
issue: first is the misogynist position represented by Hansen and Reed (both leaders of 
the SWP), and second is the position of the rest of the commentators reacting to the 
former’s misogyny (largely rank-and-file female members of the SWP). The debate 
concerns whether socialist women in particular, and working-class women as a whole, 
should consume cosmetics and fashion and participate in the construction of hegemonic 
femininity (in Reed’s words “fashion beauty”). The first position suggests that women 
                                                          
59 For example, Reed, citing an article in the New York Times, suggests that “Christian Dior, the famous 
couturier of the rich, whose styles are copied for the poor, had the power to raise the [length of the] skirts 
of fifty million American women overnight, or lower them, or both” (1993: 66).  
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participating in hegemonic femininity are foolish, frivolous, improper socialists, or some 
combination thereof. In the article that precipitated the debate, Hansen facetiously 
pleads: “Please, girls, don’t let a cutback on the job mean a cutback on cosmetics. If you 
take a layoff, don’t layoff the lipstick. Remember, to keep up prosperity, keep up your 
makeup” (1993b: 31). Reed complains that even socialist women who should know 
better “have fallen into the trap of bourgeois propaganda” and “even worse, as the 
vanguard of women, they are leading the mass of women into this fashion rat race and 
into upholding and perpetuating these profiteers, exploiters, and scoundrels” (1993: 
67). Hansen was criticized for depicting “women as mere ignorant dupes of the capitalist 
hucksters” (McGowan, 1993: 48). These commentators hold that Hansen’s derision is 
misplaced: women do need to keep up their makeup, not only to keep up their 
prosperity, but in some cases to quite literally survive. In other words, economic survival 
for women is dependent on adhering to the norms of femininity. Women are not foolish 
or frivolous but make rational decisions to purchase cosmetics and fashions (Baker, 
1993: 39; Patrick, 1993: 41). For example, Morgan notes that employers (in her 1950s 
context) regularly advertise for office help for women “under twenty-five,” and thus 
women use cosmetics and fashion to maintain the image of youthfulness (1993: 51). In 
addition, women gain economic security through marriage. Men are conditioned by 
capitalist society to respond to hegemonic femininity “often without even knowing what 
[they] are responding to” (Morgan, 1993: 52). Women therefore consume cosmetics 
and fashion not only to find and keep jobs, but to find and keep husbands, given the 
economic survival jobs and husbands represent. In sum, while the first group of 
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commentators considers working-class women who embrace hegemonic femininity to 
be foolish dupes, the second considers them to be rational survivors.  
Related to the evaluation of socialist women consuming cosmetics and fashion is 
a larger debate about the value of hegemonic femininity itself. Hansen and others 
holding his position despise hegemonic femininity since it is determined by the ruling 
class. As Hansen argues, 
Most of the customs and norms of capitalist society are ridiculous and even 
vicious, including the customs and norms of wealthy bourgeois women. As for 
so-called ordinary women, whether housewives or workers, I think they are 
beautiful, no matter how toil worn or seasoned in experience, for they are the 
ones who will be in the forefront of the struggle to build a new and better 
world (1993a: 35−36). 
 
Moreover, Hansen predicts that in the future (presumably after the socialist revolution) 
the femininity of “toil worn” working-class women “will be admired […] the way we 
admire the hardy, ax-swinging pioneer woman of America” (1993a: 36). Reed argues 
hegemonic femininity epitomizes the uselessness of the ruling class as a whole. She 
argues that this form is characterized by “flabby, lily-white hands with long red 
fingernails.” These hands that never work signify these women’s “empty, vapid, parasitic 
existence.” For Reed, people who do not work are “less than the potato in the ground 
and [do] not deserve the gift of humanity” (1993: 70). While some independently 
wealthy men also do not work—and could, theoretically, be included in Reed’s potato 
analogy—because they are less likely to have long red fingernails, the primary target of 
her ridicule remains hegemonic femininity. In addition, idle married women have 
historically been a sign of their husbands’ class position.  
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Hansen’s critics put more value on hegemonic femininity. They understand the 
pursuit of femininity as freedom, with the caveat that under capitalism, freedom tends 
to exist for the ruling class at the expense of the working class. Given the association of 
femininity with youthfulness and leisure, femininity is a freedom ruling class women are 
able to pursue and working-class women want to pursue. Or in other words, “the 
wealthy are beautiful because the workers are wretched” (Manning, 1993: 33). Yet 
Hansen’s critics come to the defence of socialist and working-class women who desire 
femininity despite the fact that femininity is a symbol of class society. For example, 
McGowan laments that “once the fresh bloom of youth is gone,” the working-class 
woman joins “the ranks of the drab millions, cheated of a good part of life’s thrill” (1993: 
49). Manning argues that the woman factory worker cannot be blamed for wanting to 
“rise above the sweaty grind of the shop, which distorts [her body], and breaks down 
[her] spirit with fatigue and hopelessness,” and the working-class housewife cannot be 
blamed for wanting to “break away from the monotony and dull routine of trying to 
manage on a worker’s wages” in which she has “no time to take care of herself” and no 
money for “good clothes” (1993: 32). In sum, Hansen and Reed’s position depicts 
hegemonic femininity as a hated symbol of class oppression, while their critics depicts it 
as a coveted symbol of freedom, however problematic this freedom may be.  
In their characterizations of hegemonic femininity, Hansen and Reed embrace a 
misogynist virgin/whore dichotomy. The virtuous and industrious (virginal) working-class 
woman is set up against the vicious and idle (whorish) ruling class woman. As such, they 
gender the early Marx’s conception of class conflict: the proletariat/bourgeois conflict is 
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re-conceptualized as an us/them dichotomy in which the “toil worn” working-class 
women guard our morality and mark the boundaries that separate us from them. While 
their re-conceptualization might be understood as subversive insofar as it reverses 
traditional virgin/whore dichotomies—in which the morality of the women of the 
working class is under suspicion—it still maintains the dichotomy itself. The 
characterization of the women belonging to them is misogynist; indeed, Reed’s 
discussion of their vapid existence as being worth less than a potato is reminiscent of 
Wollstonecraft’s discussion of the lady’s lack of virtue and of her existence not 
mattering. Yet the characterization of the women belonging to us is also misogynist. 
One of the many problems with the virgin/whore dichotomy, both generally and in 
Hansen and Reed’s specific articulation, is that the virgin is set up on a pedestal where 
her perfection is impossible to achieve. Indeed, this is recognized by one of the 
contributors to the other side of the debate. Morgan critiques Hansen’s characterization 
of ideal working-class femininity, and suggests he “may be able to retain a warmth and 
affection toward the working-class woman who has had too little rest and too much 
anxiety and worry” but points out that “she herself and her husband and her friends will 
not find this consideration too useful” (1993: 53). As such, the working-class woman 
who rejects hegemonic codes of femininity has problems with society at large, and the 
working-class woman who embraces these codes has problems with socialists such as 
Hansen. Morgan phrases it more bluntly: she is “damned if she does and damned if she 
doesn’t” (1993: 53). Therefore, the crux of the problem for working-class women is how 
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femininity is situated in the dichotomy: any (working-class) women who attempts or 
even desires to embrace hegemonic codes of femininity will fall off her pedestal.  
Hansen and Reed’s views on the femininity question can also be read as 
misogynist because femininity is being scapegoated. For Serano, misogyny often 
involves the scapegoating of femininity (2007: 14); she contends that femininity is 
scapegoated to allow the normalcy, naturalness, and hegemony of masculinity to be 
maintained. This is accomplished by constantly projecting inferior meanings onto 
femininity, particularly in social, political, and economic contexts in which masculinity 
requires bolstering (Serano, 2007: 18−19, 339−340). Indeed, Mary-Alice Waters reads 
the Bustelo Controversy of 1954 as an “expression of the struggle to maintain a 
proletarian party and Marxist program throughout the cold war and anticommunist 
witch-hunt of the early 1950s” (1993: 4). The Red Scare was at its peak at the time of 
the controversy: American communists Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were executed the 
year before, and membership in the Socialist Workers Party and other organizations on 
the left were declining. A few months before the Bustelo Controversy, there was a split 
in the SWP that led to the departure of twenty percent of its membership. There was 
tremendous pressure on the remaining members not to betray the socialist cause 
(Waters, 1993: 3−6, 21−25).  
Following Serano’s understanding of scapegoating, femininity became a 
scapegoat for the leaders of the SWP because the male-dominated party was in crisis. 
Rank-and-file female party members, who identified as garment workers, factory 
workers, secretaries, and working-class housewives, defended femininity against the 
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attacks of party leaders Hansen and Reed.60 In addition to defending femininity, they 
were also critical of the language employed by Hansen in particular. McGowan suggests 
that he is “both offensive and presumptuous in tone, and false in content and 
implications” and moreover has a “pompous disregard for the aspirations of modern 
women” (McGowan, 1993: 45).61 Others accuse Hansen of ridiculing women for their 
production of hegemonic femininity (J., 1993: 37; Manning, 1993: 32; Morgan, 1993: 52, 
54). Morgan accuses Hansen of ridiculing hegemonic femininity and the women who 
strive to emulate it for “cheap humor which makes a butt out of an easy victim” (1993: 
54). Moreover, she contends this is a “sideline issue” at best: even if socialist and 
working-class women boycotted all cosmetics it would not help to “build a labor party or 
lessen Jim Crow or halt the war drive” (Morgan, 1993: 54). Femininity, then, is 
simultaneously derided and scapegoated by a masculinist organization in trouble.  
Although the detractors react against Hansen and Reed’s explicit misogyny, they 
do not challenge the misogynist premise of the debate. The premise is that femininity is 
a problem to be overcome because it is artificial and involves capitalist consumption. 
The detractors address the consumption aspect: they explain why women must adhere 
to the norms of hegemonic femininity (economic security for women is dependent on 
such adherence) as well as why they want to adhere to these norms (cosmetics and 
fashion offer a particular problematic fantasy about freedom for women whose 
                                                          
60 There was a clear status and class differentiation between the women defending femininity and those 
defending Hansen and Reed. In addition to Hansen and Reed both being leading figures in the party at the 
time, Hansen was a journalist and editor of the publication in which the debate was published, while Reed 
was an academic.  
61 Interestingly, McGowan left the Socialist Workers Party a short time after the Bustelo Controversy 
(Waters, 1993: 24). 
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exploitation is marked on their tired and overworked bodies).62 Yet at the same time 
they never address the artificiality aspect. As noted in section 2.3, Serano understands 
the linking of femininity to artificiality as misogynist in that it does nothing to 
interrogate masculinity. This is not to suggest that Hansen and Reed’s detractors were 
misogynist as such, but rather that they can be implicated in the failure of popular forms 
of feminism to challenge the idea that femininity is artificial and incompatible with 
feminist and other social justice struggles.63 The fundamental point of contention for 
these socialist feminists is not whether hegemonic femininity should be overcome, but 
whether it can be overcome within the constraints of capitalist society. As such, 
although they effectively challenge Hansen and Reed’s overt misogyny, they do not 
challenge the idea that femininity is artificial and a problem to be overcome. 
The records of this 1954 debate among members of the SWP and later academic 
interventions into the debate offer a good representation of mid-twentieth century 
socialist feminist understandings of the femininity question. Their approach to 
femininity incorporates class, thereby going beyond Wollstonecraft’s work, which 
focuses exclusively on middle-class forms of femininity, but follows Wollstonecraft in 
not incorporating race or sexuality. The most important similarity between 
Wollstonecraft and all of these mid-twentieth century socialist feminists is their shared 
view that femininity is an artificial construct and a problem to be overcome. However, 
                                                          
62 This is not to suggest that critiquing femininity based on how it is caught up in capitalist consumption is 
necessarily misogynist. As noted in section 2.2, there must be space to critique issues such as classism, 
which works to render hegemonic femininity more accessible to some people due to their increased 
ability to purchase feminized commodities.  
63 See section 2.2. 
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the explicit misogyny of SWP leaders Hansen and Reed renders them more similar to 
Wollstonecraft than the rank-and-file female participants in the debate.  
2.5 Liberal Feminist Interventions, 1960s−1990s  
There is a clear Wollstonecraftian influence in popular liberal feminist interventions on 
the femininity question in the twentieth century. This section explores Betty Friedan’s 
The Feminine Mystique (1963), Susan Brownmiller’s Femininity (1984), and Naomi Wolf’s 
The Beauty Myth (1990). Like Wollstonecraft, all three women focus on privileged white 
women of their own class. Friedan not only equates femininity with white, middle-class, 
university educated, married housewives, but seems entirely unaware of the existence 
of other forms of femininity or other types of women (Reed, 1964: 1; Elshtain, 1993: 
251; Tong, 1998: 26). Brownmiller and Wolf demonstrate awareness of difference, but 
their discussions of women of colour, working-class women, and queer women are 
infrequent and brief.64 In addition, like Wollstonecraft, all three women understand 
                                                          
64 This is perhaps most surprising in Wolf, given the feminist work that had been done by women of colour 
in the 1980s. She begins her book with a discussion of “the affluent, educated, liberated women of the 
First World [… who] do not feel as free as they want to” (Wolf, 1997: 9). Her subsequent alternation 
between language of “women,” “Western women,” and “middle-class women”—combined with sparse 
references to women of colour—renders her work similar to her predecessors in this regard. On most 
occasions, Wolf’s book reads as if “women” are white middle-class women, and “racism” concerns men of 
colour. For example, when discussing the “PBQ” or “Professional Beauty Quotient” that is almost 
mandatory for women to succeed professionally, she contends: “Though the PBQ ranks women in a 
similar biological caste system, female identity is not yet recognized to be remotely as legitimate as racial 
identity (faintly though it is recognized). It is inconceivable to the dominant culture that it should respect 
as a political allegiance, as deep as any ethnic or racial pride, a woman’s determination to show her 
loyalty—in the face of a beauty myth as powerful as myths about white supremacy—to her age, her 
shape, her self, her life” (Wolf, 1997: 55−56). Wolf does not go on to consider women affected by both 
the beauty myth and white supremacy, in the workplace or elsewhere. But there is one exception. Very 
late in the book, during an extended critique of the “Surgical Age” that has recast “freedom from the 
beauty myth as a disease,” she critiques eyelid surgery on Asian women and nose surgery on black and 
Asian women (1997: 226, 264−265). However, despite devoting nearly fifty pages to the topic of surgery, 
she only devotes one paragraph discussing surgery performed on women of colour.  
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hegemonic femininity to be entirely artificial. This stems from their shared liberal 
feminism: as Elshtain notes, liberal feminists understand “the central defining human 
characteristic [to be] the presumption of an almost boundless adaptability” to the point 
that people are assumed to be shaped at will, not unlike “Play-Doh” (1993: 240). 
However, Friedan and Brownmiller share more in common with Wollstonecraft than 
Wolf: Friedan and Brownmiller argue that femininity is a problem to be overcome, as is 
the consumption of feminized commodities, although consumption and capitalism more 
generally are not. Wolf does not argue that femininity as such needs to be overcome, 
but rather that the all-consuming beauty myth needs to be relaxed. Moreover, Wolf 
concludes her book with a third wave defence of women’s use of feminized 
commodities. In straddling the line between liberal and third wave feminism, Wolf 
avoids traces of Wollstonecraftian feminist misogyny present in the work of Friedan and 
Brownmiller.  
2.5.1 Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique (1963) 
For Friedan, femininity is understood to be something false, an artificial overlay—or in 
her words, a mystique. She defines the feminine mystique as the view that “the highest 
value and the only commitment for women is the fulfillment of their femininity” (1983: 
43). The mystique is infantilizing and keeps women in a passive, childlike state; indeed, it 
is not uncommon to see mothers “as infantile as their children” (1983: 295). Feminine 
women make bad mothers and produce maladjusted children (1983: 288, 295, 
325−326). Friedan’s critique of femininity involves homophobia and slut-shaming 
through blaming “parasitic” mothering on “ominous” developments such as the 
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“homosexuality that is spreading like a murky smog over the American scene”65 as well 
as promiscuity among young women (1983: 276). In equating femininity with passivity, 
childishness, and bad mothering, Friedan’s understanding is very Wollstonecraftian. 
Friedan also makes arguments similar to Wollstonecraft’s contention that feminine 
women are of little use to society and that their very existence does not matter. Friedan 
contends femininity is a “lower level of living” that is antithetical to self−actualization 
and human growth (1983: 314−322). Moreover, femininity has little value, “no purpose” 
and as such is “a kind of suicide” (1983: 314, 336).  
Friedan places much of the blame for the feminine mystique on the education of 
women and girls, which is also reminiscent of Wollstonecraft. Friedan complains that at 
elite American universities (such as Vassar) women are groomed for little more than 
getting married. As such, “the very aim” of women’s education at universities is not 
intellectual growth but “sexual adjustment” (1983: 172). Their education is not intended 
to develop critical thinking skills and is not for “serious use” in professional occupations 
but rather aims at “dilettantism or passive appreciation” (1983: 366). This is similar to 
Wollstonecraft’s complaint that rather than instilling in women the ability to reason, 
they were educated in the art of pleasing through the pursuit of “accomplishments” 
such as learning to play the piano or to speak foreign languages. Friedan sets up an 
oppositional relationship between femininity and education geared to intellectual 
                                                          
65 Friedan approvingly cites Freud in her argument that mothers are to blame for their son’s 
homosexuality (1983: 275). She contends that “the boy smothered by such parasitical mother-love is kept 
from growing up, not only sexually, but in all ways. Homosexuals often lack the maturity to finish school 
and make sustained professional commitments […] The shallow unreality, immaturity, promiscuity, lack of 
lasting human satisfaction that characterize the homosexual’s sex life usually characterize all his life and 
interests” (1983: 276).  
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growth: femininity results from the lack of such an education, and education destroys 
femininity (1983: 172, 308). Friedan argues that her liberal feminist predecessors, 
including Wollstonecraft herself and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, were able to make their 
feminist arguments only because they were allowed an education geared to intellectual 
growth (1983: 93). Friedan credits her predecessors for pressing for women’s access to 
higher education and political participation, as well as particular forms of discrimination 
in law (1983: 61). Yet despite such gains, the feminine mystique came to “fasten itself 
on a whole nation in a few short years” (1983: 68). Given how quickly it took hold in the 
post-war era, the feminine mystique may be false, but it is also incredibly powerful.  
Friedan expands beyond a Wollstonecraftian analysis in placing some of the 
blame for the strength of the feminine mystique on corporate interests. She establishes 
connections between femininity, the consumption it necessitates, and the changing 
economic circumstances of her time. She contends that American women are “a target 
and a victim of the sexual sell” and equates consumption with victimization (1983: 205, 
208). Moreover,  
in all the talk of femininity and woman’s role, one forgets that the real 
business of America is business. But the perpetuation of housewifery, the 
growth of the feminine mystique, makes sense (and dollars) when one realizes 
that women are the chief customers of American business. Somehow, 
somewhere, someone must have figured out that women will buy more things 
if they are kept in the underused, nameless-yearning, energy-to-get-rid-of 
state of being housewives (1983: 206−207). 
 
Friedan assumes a direct relationship between the women’s role as housewives and 
high levels of consumption in the post-war era. Friedan claims women “wield seventy-
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five per cent of the purchasing power in America” (1983: 208).66 She argues that 
businessmen on Madison Avenue or Wall Street have a strategic interest in keeping 
women in the home; indeed, if all women “get to be scientists and such, they won’t 
have time to shop” (1983: 207).67 She contends that although there was no “economic 
conspiracy directed against women,” this relationship between the number of 
housewives and levels of consumption is an economic necessity: a decline in the number 
of housewives would mean a decline in national consumption (1983: 207−208). Despite 
identifying important connections between the feminine mystique and corporate 
interests, Friedan underestimates the ability of marketers to adjust to the changing roles 
of women. The ascendance of commodity feminism today demonstrates that there is 
not necessarily a relationship between high numbers of housewives and high levels of 
consumption.  
Friedan’s work is not explicitly misogynist—in the manner of Wollstonecraft, 
Hansen and Reed—in that her deep hostility is, for the most part, not directed at 
women or femininity as such. It is largely directed at the corporations, advertisers, 
media, and other institutions that manipulate and coerce women into femininity 
                                                          
66 Friedan does not elaborate or cite any sources for that statistic.  
67 Friedan references a 1945 marketing study in the United States, which examined three categories of 
female consumers: “The True Housewife Type,” “The Career Woman,” and “The Balanced Homemaker.” 
The study concluded that the “true housewife” did not consume enough; she preferred to do work herself 
instead of relying on “time-saving” kitchen appliances and other commodities. The “career woman” or 
“would-be career woman” was “unhealthy,” in fact far worse than the true housewife; although she used 
appliances, she did not believe that the woman’s place was in the home and was “too critical” of 
advertising directed at women. The ideal category was the “balanced homemaker” who had time to shop, 
embraced appliances and feminized commodities, and was not overly critical (Friedan, 1983: 209−211). 
The solution was to use marketing to educate women on the desirability of belonging to the “balanced 
homemaker” group (Friedan, 1983: 210).  
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(Serano, 2007: 331).68 On certain occasions Friedan does stray into more explicit 
Wollstonecraftian misogyny, such as when she blames foolish women for the plight of 
their children. However, generally she does not treat the feminine mystique as 
something for which women can be blamed; she treats it as something that confuses 
and clouds the judgment of improperly educated women. However, her framework 
contains traces of Wollstonecraftian feminist misogyny in that she understands 
hegemonic femininity as artificial, as a problem to be overcome, and by suggesting that 
consuming feminized commodities is a problem, even though consumption and 
capitalism more generally are not. Serano contends that Friedan “helped reinforce a 
notion that would appear repeatedly throughout [popular Anglo-American] feminism—
that femininity (or at least certain aspects of it) is an artificial, man-made ploy designed 
to hold women back from reaching their full potential” (2007: 331). In short, Friedan 
endorses a Wollstonecraftian tension between feminism and femininity. 
2.5.2 Susan Brownmiller’s Femininity (1983)  
Wollstonecraftian understandings of femininity continued into 1980s liberal feminism. 
In Femininity, Brownmiller employs liberal feminist arguments for the liberation of 
women, such as ambition being the opposite of hegemonic femininity, and the usual 
liberal feminist arguments for the inclusion of women in public life and the nurturing of 
                                                          
68 Oddly, her solution to the “problem” of femininity focuses entirely on education; as such, she ultimately 
ignores the corporate interests she so meticulously documents. Friedan glorifies education as the one and 
only path that will save women from the feminine mystique (Elshtain, 1993: 252). Thus, although her 
analysis of the problem strays beyond Wollstonecraft, her solution is nearly identical. Like Wollstonecraft, 
Friedan cannot come to any other conclusion because she does not understand consumption and 
capitalism as such to be a problem; it is the consumption of feminized commodities required for the 
production of femininity that is the problem. 
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women’s ability to reason (1984: 221−231). She also employs radical feminist arguments 
for women’s nonconformity. Brownmiller’s definition of women, however, is limited in 
that it does not include transwomen,69 and her arguments for gender nonconformity 
only extends to cisgendered women. Also in a similar manner to Wollstonecraft, 
Brownmiller understands femininity to be artificial and irrational. The stated purpose of 
her book is “not to propose a new definition of femininity” but rather to “explore its 
origins and the reasons for its perseverance, in the effort to illuminate the restrictions 
on free choice” (1984: 235). Yet there is little actual discussion of origins, neither the 
origin of women’s subordination (in the way it was framed by those theorizing the 
exchange of women in the last chapter), nor the origin of femininity. There is also no 
discussion of the “reasons for its perseverance,” such as the profitability of feminized 
commodities for capitalists. Indeed, although feminized commodities are everywhere in 
Brownmiller’s book, there are theorized nowhere; she does not establish any 
relationship between femininity and commodity production.70 Her main argument is 
simply that women’s subordination and femininity are intrinsically interconnected. 
Femininity is a problem for Brownmiller not only because it restricts “free choice,” but 
because at its best, it is uncomfortable or annoying, and at its worst, it is physically 
painful (1984: 81, 35).  
                                                          
69 Brownmiller is quite transphobic; for example, she accuses a transwoman tennis player of undergoing 
sex-reassignment surgery just so she can play against other women and win (1984: 196).  
70 She does points out that “neighborhood beauty parlors are such an entrenched part of city life that it is 
hard to believe that they did not exist before the twentieth century” (1984: 75), yet does nothing with this 
observation.  
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Brownmiller organizes her book around chapters that each considers a particular 
aspect of femininity, including body, hair, clothes, voice, skin, movement, and emotion. 
Femininity is understood to be firmly embodied—it concerns the female body and how 
it looks, sounds and is adorned and manipulated—and how this embodiment 
discourages reason. Her book has a confessional tone. For example, in her chapter 
entitled “Hair,” she admits to dying her hair to cover her premature graying, despite the 
fact that she knows perfectly well it is a “shameful concession to all the wrong values” 
(1984: 57). In the “Clothes” chapter, she confesses that “on bad days” she misses 
wearing skirts and criticizes her feminist friends who have gone back to wearing them as 
indulgent and frivolous (1984: 80−81). In the “Skin” chapter, she is embarrassed to 
reveal that she was so concerned she was growing hair on her face that she went to an 
electrologist; she was relieved to find out that what she feared was stubble was in fact a 
mole (1984: 129). In the “Movement” chapter, she admits to practicing how to raise her 
eyebrow for hours in front of a mirror (1984: 171). Femininity contains countless 
examples of Brownmiller confessing how she has not overcome femininity to the degree 
to which she ought.  
Brownmiller aligns herself with Wollstonecraft in her failure to overcome 
femininity. She reports that the eighteenth-century writer and politician Horace Walpole 
once described Wollstonecraft as a “hyena in petticoats” which had the effect of 
“slandering her femininity and the movement for women’s rights in one wicked phrase” 
(1984: 31). Rather than critique Walpole’s misogyny, she assumes feminine apparel is 
incompatible with feminist politics. She suggests that “part of the reason many people 
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find old photographs of parading ‘suffragettes’ so funny is that their elaborate dresses 
seem at odds with marching in unison down the street” (1984: 101). Just as 
Wollstonecraft ought to have given up her petticoats and the suffragettes ought to have 
given up their elaborate dresses, Brownmiller ought to give up her hair dye. She does 
sympathize with her predecessors and her contemporaries who embrace femininity in 
suggesting that although femininity is fundamentally incompatible with feminist politics, 
it continues to be very difficult to overcome.  
In a similar manner to Friedan, Brownmiller’s framework contains traces of 
Wollstonecraftian misogyny. Brownmiller is critical of the explicit misogyny of those who 
use “the expensively dressed woman as the hated symbol of selfish disregard for the ills 
of the world” (1984: 100). This is clearly a strategy used by Wollstonecraft in her critique 
of the lady and by Hansen and Reed in their critiques of ruling class femininity.71 Yet 
despite this critique, Brownmiller repeatedly suggests that women (including herself) 
who embrace hegemonic femininity are immature, weak-willed, and bad feminists. 
Serano reads such women quite differently. Indeed, in a society in which men are 
thought to be better than women, and masculinity better than femininity, she reads the 
choice to embrace hegemonic femininity as threatening to masculinist norms (Serano, 
2007: 15−18). Moreover, Serano suggests that  
it takes guts, determination, and fearlessness for those of us who are feminine 
to lift ourselves up out of the inferior meanings that are constantly being 
projected onto us […] In a world where masculinity is respected and femininity 
is regularly dismissed, it takes an enormous amount of strength and 
                                                          
71 Brownmiller is referring specifically to the new left of the 1960s and the “religious moralists” before 
them (1984: 100). 
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confidence for any person, whether female- or male-bodied, to embrace their 
feminine self (2007: 18−19). 
 
As such, when Brownmiller chastises herself and other women for their weakness, 
immaturity and anti-feminism, she ought to re-think femininity as representing strength, 
maturity, and feminism. The traces of Wollstonecraftian misogyny, therefore, can be 
found in Brownmiller’s tension between feminism and femininity, her assumption that 
femininity is always and necessarily a problem, and her blaming of women as the source 
of that problem.  
2.5.3 Naomi Wolf’s The Beauty Myth (1990)  
In The Beauty Myth, Wolf repeatedly compares Friedan’s work with her own. Wolf’s 
overarching thesis is as follows: after women “released themselves from the feminine 
mystique of domesticity, the beauty myth took over its lost ground, expanding as it 
waned to carry on its work of social control” (1997: 10). In other words, with the 
successes of second wave feminism, the formerly isolated and bored white middle-class 
housewives became engaged and challenged professional working women. This resulted 
in the beauty myth replacing the feminine mystique as a form of backlash against 
feminism.72 This backlash is directed against women’s bodies; indeed, once “the 
feminine mystique evaporated, all that was left was the body” (1997: 67). As such, 
instead of enjoying their professional success, (white middle-class) women are kept 
                                                          
72 Wolf argues: “For every feminist action there is an equal and opposite beauty myth reaction. In the 
1980s, it was evident that as women became more important, beauty too became more important. The 
closer women come to power, the more physical self-consciousness and sacrifice are asked of them. 
‘Beauty’ becomes the condition for a woman to take the next step. You are now too rich. Therefore, you 
cannot be too thin” (1997: 28). As noted in the introduction to this section (2.5), Wolf’s focus is on 
privileged white women of her own class.  
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“self-hating, ever-failing, hungry, and sexually insecure state of being aspiring 
‘beauties’” (1997: 66). For Wolf, this late 1980s/early 1990s form of hegemonic 
femininity is just as oppressive to women as the 1950s/early 1960s form Friedan was 
describing (1997: 11, 15−16, 64−69, 168−170, 200).  
Wolf explores the operation of the beauty myth in different sectors of American 
society. This includes the workplace in which the “professional beauty qualification” has 
been institutionalized as a condition for women’s hiring and promotion, popular 
women’s magazines, in which the housework of Friedan’s time has been replaced with 
“beauty work,” misogynist music videos on MTV, and cosmetic surgeons of the “Surgical 
Age” who treat healthy women as bodies in need of surgical intervention (Wolf, 1997: 
27, 64−66, 162−167, 226−260). She looks at the effect of the beauty myth on girls and 
women, including girls and young women who are anorexic and bulimic, and 
professional women who have to spend up to a third of their salary to maintain the 
“professional beauty qualification” (Wolf, 1997: 179−217, 52). Just as Friedan inspired a 
second wave of feminism and the rejection of the feminine mystique, Wolf aims to 
inspire a third wave of feminism and the relaxing of the beauty myth.73  
Wolf’s The Beauty Myth straddles the divide between liberal feminist and third 
wave feminist approaches to the femininity question. The liberal feminist influence is 
indicative in Wolf’s focus on white, middle-class women, her assumption that 
hegemonic femininity (or the beauty myth) is entirely artificial (1997: 12−14), as well as 
her repeated comparisons between her own work and Friedan’s. However, unlike 
                                                          
73 Indeed, in a new introduction to the 1997 edition, Wolf suggests that her book inspired both “a 
renewed conversation about beauty” and “a renewed conversation about feminism” (1997: 5). 
 109 
Wollstonecraft, Friedan, and Brownmiller—Wolf’s liberal feminist predecessors—she 
does not argue that femininity as such needs to be overcome. Indeed, in her concluding 
chapter “Beyond the Beauty Myth,” Wolf argues that women can “wear lipstick without 
feeling guilty” because “the questions to ask are not about women’s faces and bodies 
but about the power relations of the situation” (1997: 271, 280). Also unlike 
Wollstonecraft and Brownmiller, Wolf does not blame women for using feminized 
commodities or for adopting hegemonic femininity. Indeed, she contends that “blame is 
what fuels the beauty myth; to take it apart, let us refuse forever to blame ourselves 
and other women for what it, in its great strength, has tried to do” (1997: 275). 
Ultimately, the problem with the beauty myth is women’s lack of choice (1997: 272).74 
As such, she calls for the beauty myth to “slacken at once” (1997: 272). Although Wolf is 
“indebted to the theorists of femininity of the second wave,” she declares her project to 
constitute a new, “third wave” form of feminism (1997: 292, 276−283).  
In this section, I have examined the Wollstonecraftian influence in popular 
twentieth century liberal feminist interventions on the femininity question by focusing 
on Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique, Brownmiller’s Femininity, and Wolf’s The Beauty 
Myth. In a similar manner to Wollstonecraft,75 Friedan, Brownmiller and Wolf critique 
feminized commodities. Friedan offers a sustained critique and analysis of feminized 
commodities, although she assumes high levels of consumption require that most 
                                                          
74 Although she does not define her understanding of choice, she appears to mean the choice to reject or 
embrace the beauty myth without serious repercussions either way. Rejecting the beauty myth can have 
negative career implications (because of the importance of the “professional beauty quotient” for hiring 
and advancement) and embracing the beauty myth can mean anything from sexual dissatisfaction (1997: 
147) to death from anorexia or cosmetic surgery.  
75 Critiquing feminized commodities is similar to Wollstonecraft, and for that matter, to the 1950s socialist 
feminists. 
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women be housewives. Brownmiller discusses feminized commodities everywhere in 
her book, although theorizes them nowhere, and ultimately suggests that the 
consumption of feminized commodities is incompatible with feminism. Wolf implicates 
feminized commodities in her discussion of the beauty myth (or hegemonic femininity) 
as a form of backlash against feminism but is quite careful to distance herself from her 
predecessors in her argument that women who wear lipstick should not feel guilty 
(1997: 271−276). I have outlined other similarities between Wollstonecraft, Friedan, 
Brownmiller, and Wolf—including a focus on privileged white women of their own class 
and the assumption that hegemonic femininity is entirely artificial—which stem from 
their shared liberal feminism.  
Wolf’s treatment of feminized commodities and femininity in her concluding 
chapter represents the beginning of a conceptual break in popular Anglo-American 
feminist treatments of the femininity question. Indeed, as the next section will 
demonstrate, challenges to the idea that femininity is incompatible with feminism—
including challenging the derision toward feminized commodities and the assumption 
that femininity needs to be overcome—are all characteristics of the third wave. In 
straddling the line between liberal and third wave feminism, Wolf avoids the traces of 
Wollstonecraftian feminist misogyny that are present in the work of Friedan and 
Brownmiller. Moreover, in defending the right of women to use lipstick, she anticipates 
third wave treatments of feminized commodities and the femininity question more 
broadly. The traces of feminist misogyny present in Friedan and Brownmiller can be 
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summarized with the question Elshtain uses to characterize liberal feminism as a whole: 
“why can’t a woman be more like a man?” (1993: 228). 
2.6 Third Wave Feminist Interventions, 1990s−present 
Beginning in the 1990s, a period generally considered to mark the beginning of third 
wave feminism, the framing of the femininity question changed. Multiple gendered 
identities become an increasing point of focus; in other words, third wave treatments of 
the femininity question, in keeping with third wave feminism more generally, give 
greater attention to race, sexuality, and gender identity76 (Kinser, 2004: 141; Harnois, 
2008: 126, 133−134; Snyder, 2008: 180). This framing is also complicated by direct 
challenges to the assumption that femininity is a problem to be overcome—what I have 
called the feminism/femininity tension—and the overt or trace misogyny this 
assumption may entail. Two good examples of third wave feminist approaches to the 
femininity question can be found in Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richard’s 
Manifesta: Young Women, Feminism and the Future (2000)77 and the volume edited by 
Chloë Brushwood Rose and Anna Camilleri entitled Brazen Femme: Queering Femininity 
(2002). In this section, the way the femininity question is framed in the more dominant 
third wave of Baumgardner and Richards will be juxtaposed with the queer femme third 
wave of Brushwood Rose and Camilleri’s collection. Baumgardner and Richards focus on 
the importance of including all forms of femininity, particularly the hegemonic 
                                                          
76 As already noted, there is little to no discussion of the relationship between race, sexuality, and 
femininity in the work of Wollstonecraft, the socialist feminists, Brownmiller, and Wolf, all of whom 
normalize white heterosexual forms of femininity.  
77 For this discussion, I am using the tenth anniversary edition of Manifesta, which was published in 2010. 
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femininity involving cosmetics, nail polish, and fashion that has been denigrated by 
second wave feminists (2010: 140−141). Ultimately, however, their treatment of the 
femininity question involves little more than a celebration of femininity and feminized 
commodities. The contributors to Brazen Femme offer a more nuanced treatment of the 
femininity question. The commonality in these third wave approaches is their direct 
challenge of the assumption that femininity is a problem to be overcome. As such, they 
suggest a way out of Wollstonecraftian misogyny and disrupt the tension between 
feminism and femininity. Yet this disruption is easily commodified as both approaches 
allow for—and possibly even legitimize—commodity feminism to take hold. Indeed, 
Manifesta perpetuates a feminism = resistance + consumption equation, and Brazen 
Femme contains endless fetishization of femme-related commodities. 
2.6.1 Baumgardner and Richards’ Manifesta (2000) 
Baumgardner and Richards’ Manifesta is considered an important popular third wave 
feminist text (Harnois, 2008; Kinser, 2004; Purvis, 2004; Snyder, 2008). In the text, they 
examine the past, present, and future of American popular feminism—although they 
spend the vast majority of their book on the present.78 They examine the work of 
                                                          
78 Manifesta is considered fairly unique among third wave texts as it “conscientiously situates third-wave 
feminist practices within historical frameworks and acknowledges conceptual links” (Purvis, 2004: 121). 
Indeed, third wave feminists are often accused of setting up the second wave as a straw person—or straw 
woman—in order to seem more feminist, less racist, and more encompassing of diversity than the second 
wave, “overemphasiz[ing] their distinctiveness” and not acknowledging the commonalities between 
second and third wave (Purvis, 2004: 93−123; Harnois, 2008: 121−123, 133−134; Snyder, 2008: 179−182). 
Indeed, Baumgardner and Richards are careful to present popular American second wave liberal feminists 
in a sympathetic light, and even indicate friendship and respect with the older generation. For example, in 
their acknowledgements they write: “A special thank you to Gloria Steinem, who acted as if it was 
normal—and even fun—to have intergenerational sleepovers/writers’ workshops at her house for a year, 
and who offered her services as a combination historian and feminist librarian, while still remaining a firm 
 113 
feminists who preceded them including Wollstonecraft, Friedan, Brownmiller, Wolf, and 
countless other first and second wave feminists (2010: 20−21, 152−153, 132−133). They 
explore the work of their third wave contemporaries, and suggest that “the core belief 
in legal, political, and social equality hasn’t changed much since [Wollstonecraft]” (2010: 
21). They contend that issues of importance to the third wave include equal access to 
technology (for example, the internet), HIV/AIDS, child sexual abuse, globalization, body 
image, legal marriage, and sexual health in addition to issues associated with the second 
wave such as sexual harassment, domestic abuse, and the gendered wage gap (2010: 
21). In looking to the future, they provide two appendices that detail how their readers 
can become engaged in (largely liberal) feminist activism.79  
In their examination of the third wave, Baumgardner and Richards have a broad 
and remarkably diffuse understanding of contemporary feminism. Indeed, they contend 
that  
feminism is out there, tucked into our daily acts of righteousness and self-
respect. Feminism arrived in a different way in the lives of the women of this 
generation; we never knew a time before ‘girls can do anything boys can!’ The 
fruits of this confidence are enjoyed by almost every American girl or woman 
alive, a radical change from the suffragettes and bluestockings of the late 
nineteenth century, and from our serious sisters of the sixties and seventies. 
[…] for anyone born after the early 1960s, the presence of feminism in our 
lives is taken for granted. For our generation, feminism is like fluoride. We 
scarcely notice that we have it—it’s simply in the water (Baumgardner and 
Richards, 2010: 17, emphasis mine). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
believer that we know more about our generation of feminism than she does” (Baumgardner and 
Richards, 2010: xv−xvi). 
79 Appendix B, “A Young Woman’s Guide to the Revolution,” lists the names and contact information of 
almost entirely liberal feminist American organizations relevant to each chapter of the book, and 
Appendix C, “How to Put the Participatory Back into Participatory Democracy,” provides readers with a 
“sample action” (a voter-registration drive) that readers can take up themselves or follow the steps 
outlined for another issue of their choosing (Baumgardner and Richards, 2010: 343−388).  
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Feminism can be done by anyone because of this fluoride effect: it does not matter 
whether a woman is sexy or a wallflower, a stay-at-home mom or a sole-support 
mother, or if she shaves, plucks, and waxes her body; if she wants, she can even shop at 
Calvin Klein, wear a white wedding dress, and throw a traditional wedding. 
Baumgardner and Richards contend that “feminism wants you to be whoever you are—
but with a political consciousness” (2010: 56−57). In celebrating “whoever you are,” the 
issues of importance to third wave feminism outlined by Baumgardner and Richards are 
ultimately abandoned in favour of celebrating femininity and consumption.  
Regarding femininity, Manifesta expands far beyond Wolf’s contention in the 
concluding chapter of The Beauty Myth that women who wear lipstick should not feel 
guilty. Indeed, throughout all chapters of Manifesta, Baumgardner and Richards 
celebrate femininity in a concerted effort to disrupt the idea that femininity is 
incompatible with feminism. In particular, they spend several chapters exploring the 
girlie strand of third wave feminism, which is concerned primarily with embracing and 
revaluing femininity (2010: 135, 141). Baumgardner and Richards discuss a contentious 
exchange between panelist Debbie Stoller80 and an unnamed second wave feminist at 
an alternative journalism conference. While Stoller was “vociferously arguing that 
painting one’s nails is a feminist act because it expands the notions of what a feminist is 
allowed to do or how she may act,” the second wave feminist “countered that her 
generation had fought to free women from the traps of femininity” (2010: 140, 141). 
                                                          
80 The girlie strand of third wave feminism is most associated with Debbie Stoller. She is the co-founder of 
the third wave magazine Bust (founded in 1993) and the author of several Stitch ‘n Bitch books that link 
knitting and crocheting to feminism.  
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Although Baumgardner and Richards are critical of the girlie third wave—largely because 
most self-identified girlies are privileged white heterosexual women—they also contend 
that girlies have pushed third wave feminism in an important direction. For example, 
girlies have been tremendously successful in putting forth the view that cosmetics “can 
be sexy, campy, ironic, or simply decorating ourselves without the loaded issues” 
instead of being “a sign of our sway to the marketplace and the male gaze” (2010: 
138−139, 161, 136). Baumgardner and Richards do caution, however, that “without a 
body of politics, the nail polish is really going to waste;” in other words, without feminist 
politics, there might be little difference between girlie and Cosmopolitan magazine 
(2010: 166, 153−161). Yet they firmly believe that girlie combined with feminist 
consciousness has revolutionary potential (2010: 161). It is clear that Baumgardner and 
Richards are very far from their popular feminist predecessors in their understanding of 
the femininity question. They also differ from their predecessors in their unmitigated 
celebration of consumption; before examining consumption, however, I will first 
overview the treatment of the femininity question in Brazen Femme.  
2.6.2 Brushwood Rose and Camilleri’s Brazen Femme (2002) 
Brushwood Rose and Camilleri, along with other contributors to Brazen Femme, offer a 
queer third wave approach to the femininity question. In a similar manner to 
Manifesta—and the third wave more generally (Snyder, 2008: 179)—Brazen Femme 
actively plays with femininity. In doing so, the book examines the relationship between 
femme, femininity, and commodities. The contributors tend to resist singular definitions 
of femme. However, certain themes do emerge in the way in which the contributors 
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relate femme and femininity. Femme is an aesthetic femininity with something slightly 
off or out of place. It is “femininity gone wrong,” it is a “defiant” and “oppositional” 
form of femininity, it is an exaggerated or even “quantum” form of femininity 
(Brushwood Rose and Camilleri, 2002: 13; Bryan, 2002: 152; Ruth, 2002: 15−18). Femme 
is also inherently queer. Queer is understood “in the broadest application of the word—
as bent, unfixed, unhinged, and finally unhyphenated” (Brushwood Rose and Camilleri, 
2002: 12). As such, femme does not necessarily have to involve women (Gilbert, 2002: 
71−76). It is “released from the strictures of binary models of sexual orientation” and 
therefore in addition to separating femme from women, femme is separated from 
butches and from lesbians more generally (Brushwood Rose and Camilleri, 2002: 12). 
Femme is also not necessarily white. However, given the historical association of 
femininity with whiteness, non-white femmes often have problems being read as 
femme (Piepzna-Samarasinha, 2002: 33−34; Bryan, 2002: 147; Duggan and McHugh, 
2002: 168). Finally and most importantly for this discussion, femme is active and 
independent (Payne, 2002: 50, 54−55). As one contributor writes, “femininity + sexual 
agency = potential social chaos” (Payne, 2002: 50). As such, the understanding of femme 
in Brazen Femme can be read as a feminist femininity that disrupts the 
feminism/femininity tension.  
In addition to disrupting the tension between feminism and femininity, 
contributors to Brazen Femme challenge feminist and queer treatment of femmes. The 
feminist treatment of femininity, rather unsurprisingly, has been extended to the 
femme. For example, one contributor was called in to see her feminist department Chair 
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to account for her “different” (that is, femme) style of dress. As such, the Chair made 
“no attempt to extend the school’s ‘diversity policy’ into the realm of ‘faculty attire’” 
(Kole, 2002: 95). In addition, queer theorists—as well as the larger queer community—
have historically distrusted, if not maligned, the femme. Indeed, femme identities have 
historically been, and continue to be, subsumed by female and butch masculinity 
(Noble, 2005: 166; Serano, 2007: 339). In separating the femme from the butch and 
other binary constructions of sexuality, Brazen Femme carves out and revalues femme 
identities on their own terms. In sum, although both Manifesta and Brazen Femme 
disrupt the (pre-third wave) understanding that femininity is incompatible with 
feminism, contributors to Brazen Femme offer a far more radical treatment of the 
femininity question than Manifesta’s simple celebration of “whoever you are.” What 
Manifesta and Brazen Femme do have in common, however, is a celebration of the 
consumption of feminine/femme commodities.  
2.6.3 Third Wave Celebration and Fetishization of Feminized Commodities 
Baumgardner and Richards claim to be proud of the inclusivity of Manifesta:81 their 
version of inclusivity, however, seems to be more about including a variety of women 
who love hip and edgy consumer products than it is about uncovering intersectional 
forms of oppression. This is revealing in Baumgardner and Richards’ contemplation of 
the third wave “garden”:  
What does the Third Wave garden look like? Planted near Madonna, Sassy, 
Wolf, Riot Grrrls, and Bust are influential xerox-and-staple zines such as I 
                                                          
81 In the preface to the tenth anniversary edition, Baumgardner and Richards state: “we are proud that we 
created (not completely) an inclusive book” with the notable exception of trans issues (2010: xi, x).  
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(heart) Amy Carter, Sister Nobody, I’m So Fucking Beautiful, Bamboo Girl; the 
glossy but independent zines such as HUES, Roller Derby, Bitch, Fresh and 
Tasty, WIG; chicklit and estronet Web sites like Disgruntled Housewife, Girls 
On, gURL; webzines such as Minx and Maxi; feature films like Clueless, Go Fish, 
All Over Me, The Incredibly True Adventure of Two Girls in Love; Welcome to 
the Dollhouse, High Art; art films by Elisabeth Subrin, Sadie Benning, Pratibha 
Parmar, and Jocelyn Taylor; musicians such as Ani DiFranco, Brandy, Luscious 
Jackson, Courtney Love as the creamy Versace model, Erykah Badu, Me’shell 
Ndege’ocello, Bikini Kill, Missy Elliot, the Spice Girls, Salt-N-Pepa, TLC, Gwen 
Stefani, Team Dresch, Foxy Brown, Queen Latifah, Indigo Girls, and all those 
ladies featured at Lilith Fair; products galore, Urban Decay, Hard Candy, MAC, 
Manic Panic; on the small screen, Wonder Woman (in comic-book form, too), 
Buffy the Vampire Slayer, My So-Called Life, Xena, Felicity, and Alicia 
Silverstone in Aerosmith videos; Chelsea Clinton; the New York club Meow Mix 
and other joints with female go-go dancers getting down for women; funny 
girls loving Janeane Garofalo and Margaret Cho; angry women loving Hothead 
Paisan and Dirty Plotte comics; Jenny McCarthy, who somehow satirized being 
a pinup even as she was one; controversial ones like Backlash and The 
Morning After; uncontroversial ones like The Bust Guide to the New Girl Order 
and Listen Up; the West Coast mutual-admiration society of sex writers Lisa 
Palac and Susie Bright; Monica Lewinsky; the Women’s World Cup; the WNBA; 
and hundreds more films, bands, women, books, events, and zines 
(Baumgardner and Richards, 2010: 135−136). 
 
The third wave garden is inclusive insofar as it includes several different forms of 
commodity feminism. Indeed, most of the flowers in the garden can be consumed: CDs 
and mp3s by Madonna or Ani DiFranco (the latter of whom identifies as a feminist), 
tickets to the Lilith Fair music festival,82 Lilith Fair merchandise, “products galore” such 
as the bright colours and trendy marketing campaigns associated with the cosmetics 
companies Hard Candy and Urban Decay, blockbuster and more limited release films 
with strong female characters such as Clueless and High Art, and comic books and 
television shows with female superheroes such as Wonder Woman and Buffy the 
Vampire Slayer. In short, the feminist residing in the third wave garden is young, hip, 
and spends much of her time consuming popular culture. Baumgardner and Richards 
                                                          
82 Lilith Fair involved all female-fronted acts and toured Canada and the United States during the summers 
of 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2010. 
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contend that the fluoride effect of contemporary feminism means feminism “is 
becoming mainstreamed via popular culture” (2010: 36). However, Manifesta often 
reads as if contemporary feminism is nothing but pop culture and consumption involving 
feminist—or at least oppositional—forms of femininity.    
In a similar manner to Manifesta, Brazen Femme celebrates feminized 
commodities; yet unlike Manifesta, the book also presents critiques of consumption. 
The contributors critique consumption through the framework of access. For example, 
Anderson points out that many femmes cannot afford femme commodities (2002a: 43). 
This has already been pointed out by socialist feminists (see section 2.4, above) with 
reference to the production of femininity. However, contributors add that the 
production of femme can also be problematic for people with disabilities, or when 
commodities such as cosmetics are made primarily for white faces, or when 
commodities such as clothes are made primarily for thin bodies (Anderson, 2002a: 44; 
Piepzna-Samarasinha, 2002: 34; Slone and Mitchell, 2002: 108−109). In other words, 
embracing femme commodities can be problematic because access is constrained by 
class, ability, race, and body size. However, when the framework of access is the sole 
critique of consumption on offer, producing more commodities becomes the only 
solution: for example, the production of more shades of foundation to match all skin 
types, or more sizes of fishnet stockings to fit all body types. In this way, the solution to 
commodity feminism parallels the problem. In fairness to Brazen Femme, however, this 
constitutes more critique than what is offered by the authors of Manifesta.  
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Both Manifesta and Brazen Femme allow for—and perhaps even legitimize—an 
edgy urban version of commodity feminism. This can be argued by comparing the 
production of femme/feminine feminist aesthetic to the production of a “hipster” 
aesthetic.83 In a similar manner to the way in which the young New York City-based 
feminist of Manifesta84 and the urban Canadian femme of Brazen Femme take up 
femininity, Canadian and American hipsters take up a working-class aesthetic. The 
hipster does not simply wear second-hand (or vintage) clothing, but rather puts 
together a carefully constructed look using this clothing.85 The femme, the Manifesta 
                                                          
83 The term hipster has been in use since the 1940s. Originally used to describe participants in American 
jazz culture and beat literature, it has evolved to describe a variety of counter-cultural groups over the 
years (Heath and Potter, 2004: 32, 143, 192, 263; Leland, 2004: 14). The contemporary hipster of the 
1990s and 2000s can be defined as a subculture of generally young, white, well-educated, middle-class or 
upper-middle-class adults living in an urban working class or gentrifying neighbourhood. Although 
espousing ostensibly leftist politics, the hipster tends to be focused on creating an identity through 
consumption of non-mainstream commodities such as alternative or independent music, second-hand 
clothing, and foreign and alternative films. Hipsters understand themselves, and are often treated, as 
highly subversive; however, they are largely a consumption group that purchases “empty authenticity and 
rebellion” (Heath and Potter, 2004: 32; Haddow, 2008). Their consumption has the effect of accelerating 
“the pace of the market” in that marketers are always looking for the next hip thing to sell back to the 
masses (Leland, 2004: 14). As soon a trend, band, or style gains too much exposure, hipsters look on it 
with scorn and the cycle begins anew (Heath and Potter, 2004; Haddow, 2008). This subculture has been 
satirized in Robert Lanham’s The Hipster Handbook (2003), Christian Lander’s Stuff White People Like: A 
Guide to the Unique Taste of Millions (2008) and Whiter Shades of Pale: The Stuff White People Like, Coast 
to Coast, from Seattle’s Sweaters to Maine’s Microbrews (2010). 
84 The authors of Manifesta base their analysis on conversations with their friends, all of whom, although 
diverse ethnically, “live in New York City and mostly work in the media” (Baumgardner and Richards, 
2010: 22). 
85 As discussed in section 2.4 on socialist feminism, the working-class attempts to gain economic security, 
or even class mobility, by emulating the aesthetics of the middle class. It is therefore ironic that the 
middle class impose their values and aesthetics onto the working class, while at the same time 
appropriating a working-class aesthetic. In Haddow’s words, hipsters are “a class of individuals that seek 
to escape their own wealth and privilege by immersing themselves in the aesthetic of the working class” 
(2008). There are important differences, however, between a working-class aesthetic and how that 
aesthetic is taken up by the middle-class hipster. Second-hand clothing provides a good example of some 
of these differences. The hipster can discuss how little they paid for a 1970s leather jacket or 1980s pair of 
kitten-heel boots, yet it is assumed that they could have afforded to pay more. It takes class privilege and 
often white privilege to be able to wear worn clothing without being treated like the poor. Second-hand 
clothing worn by the middle class even has a different term: it is generally called vintage. Second-hand 
implies one cannot afford first-hand or previously unworn clothing, while vintage implies aging for a 
purpose. Vintage clothing, like vintage wine, is understood to get better with age. That leather jacket or 
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feminist, and the hipster all take up an aesthetic that has been completely debased and 
then subvert that aesthetic with commodities. Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarasinha from 
Brazen Femme defines her femme identity as such:  
I have magenta silk pillows and a junk shop bureau spray-painted silver […] I 
ride an adult trike circa the year I was born cuz I still fall over otherwise. I have 
silk and lace slips, platform boots, charcoal silver and lavender glitter 
eyeshadow sticks from the Body Shop, Epic, Lust, and Velvet from the MAC 
counter. I have indigo vintage jeans, fake leopard print furry platform flip-
flops, turquoise glitter nail polish, cocoa butter shining brown legs, and 
panther jacket, and a fake sheepskin furry ‘70s winter coat […] I have a carrot 
orange fleece baby hoodie, blue Oshun beads around my neck (2002: 41).  
 
In Piepzna-Samarasinha’s articulation of her own femme identity, femme and hipster 
identities merge: hipsters are also associated with refurbishing old furniture in non-
traditional ways, unique bicycles (which in this case is unique because it is as old and a 
tricycle) and vintage clothing.  
Both Brazen Femme and Manifesta contain a great deal of fetishism of 
femme/feminist commodities. Contributors to Brazen Femme praise the “perfection” of 
a “bra and panty combo […] in a deep rich red, black, or silver,” and understand their 
femme identities through commodities including “whore boots,” “Wet ‘N’ Wild” 
cosmetics, bead chokers, bracelets and gold-plated earrings (Anderson, 2002b: 69; 
Bryan, 2002: 155; Slone and Mitchell, 2002: 109; Tea, 2002: 134). Similarly, Manifesta 
repeatedly celebrates Bust magazine, with its plethora of vintage-look clothing modeled 
by edgy young women who might have tattoos, fluorescent orange (or other non-
natural coloured) highlights in their hair, and are not necessarily thin. In Baumgardner 
and Richards’ view, Bust promotes a “gynefocal aesthetic” that subverts the more 
                                                                                                                                                                             
kitten-heel boots are even better now than they were when they were mass produced twenty or thirty 
years ago. In this case, better implies scarcer, which according to capitalist logic means more valuable.  
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mainstream aesthetic promoted by non-feminist women’s magazines (2010: 133−166). 
In a similar manner to the hipster who purchases obscure punk music on vinyl records to 
subvert the pop music sold to the masses on compact discs or mp3 files, the femme and 
Manifesta feminist purchase turquoise glitter nail polish, “whore boots” and fluorescent 
orange hair dye to subvert the pink and red nails, lower-heeled boots, and blonde and 
caramel highlights of the more conventionally feminine masses. From the perspective of 
a critique of commodity fetishism, the hipster, femme, and Manifesta feminist 
accomplish little more than creating and sustaining niche markets for the production of 
their identities. Moreover, just as the hipster is the edgy version of the bourgeois 
consumer, the femme and Manifesta feminist are edgy versions of the more 
traditionally feminine consumer. Both the femme and Manifesta feminist, as queer 
and/or alternative variants of hegemonic femininity, are just as implicated in commodity 
production and consumption since the production of femme and Manifesta feminism 
requires commodities as much as the production of hegemonic femininity. With that 
being said, identity is fundamentally affected by several aspects of capitalism, including 
commodity production and consumption (Hennessy, 2000: 4). As such, producing a non-
commodified form of femme or femininity is difficult if not impossible. Moreover, the 
femme and Manifesta feminist are similar to hegemonic femininity only when they are 
primarily identified with aesthetics. There are, however, different and more radical 
politics in the production of femme (and to a lesser degree Manifesta femininity) than in 
hegemonic forms of femininity.  
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In sum, Manifesta and Brazen Femme offer good representations of third wave 
feminism, or more specifically, contemporary dominant and queer femme approaches 
to the femininity question. Both texts go further than their popular feminist 
predecessors on how femininity is queered and racialized, particularly Brazen Femme. 
Most importantly to this discussion of the femininity question, both texts effectively 
interrogate the feminism/femininity tension and the traces of Wollstonecraftian 
misogyny this tension can sometimes entail. Indeed, Baumgardner and Richards 
understand the reclamation of femininity in a misogynist society to be a feminist act 
(2010: 215−216), and the understanding of femme in Brazen Femme is a queer and 
feminist femininity. Indeed, although Serano does not engage with either Manifesta or 
Brazen Femme in her work, the treatment of the femininity question in these texts 
embraces her view that the feminine needs to be put back into feminism. In her words: 
“in a world awash with antifeminine sentiments, embracing and empowering femininity 
can potentially be one of the most transformative and revolutionary acts imaginable” 
(Serano, 2007: 313). With that being said, the endless fetishization of femme and 
feminine commodities in Brazen Femme and Manifesta has much in common with 
commodity feminism. Indeed, both texts may not only allow for, but also provide 
feminist justification of, commodity feminism.  
2.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has begun the work of theorizing the origins of commodity feminism as a 
way of understanding its ascendancy today. The focus of this origins discussion is the 
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femininity question in popular Anglo-American feminism. Wollstonecraft’s early and 
influential articulation of this question sets up a tension between feminism and 
femininity that is at times misogynist. Her feminist misogyny is evident in her critiques of 
women’s consumptive and non-consumptive behaviour, as well as in the language she 
uses to describe femininity. Underpinning her feminist misogyny is a belief in the 
abstract and disembodied Cartesian subject. This belief allows Wollstonecraft to make 
liberal feminist arguments for the rights of women in the abstract, while at the same 
time belittling women who fail to transcend their disgusting feminine bodies and 
achieve the Cartesian ideal. Wollstonecraft’s treatment of femininity influenced popular 
twentieth century liberal feminists including liberals Betty Friedan and Susan 
Brownmiller and is even evident in socialist feminist writings, including Joseph Hansen 
and Evelyn Reed. As such, misogynist elements—whether explicit (in Wollstonecraft, 
Hansen, and Reed) or simply traces (in Friedan, Brownmiller, and the rank-and-file 
members of the Socialist Worker’s Party)—can be observed in influential texts on 
femininity by popular Anglo-American feminist writers. I have suggested here that it was 
not until the third wave that Wollstonecraftian feminist misogyny and the attendant 
tension between feminism and femininity were to be challenged by popular Anglo-
American feminists. These challenges have been presented by Naomi Wolf (who 
straddles the line between liberal and third wave feminist approaches to femininity), 
Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards, and the contributors to Brazen Femme.  
I have engaged with the work of Julia Serano and Allyson Mitchell in my 
definition of misogyny as that of a deep hostility toward women and/or femininity. 
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Although I have adopted a similar definition of misogyny to Serano, I have disputed her 
claim that the derision of femininity is somehow new and have instead suggested that 
within the Anglo-American feminist tradition, this can be traced back at least as far as 
Wollstonecraft. I have also modified Mitchell’s understanding that rejecting femininity 
simply because of the ways it has been constructed is an act of misogyny. Without 
modification, Mitchell could be read to suggest that any critique of the norms associated 
with femininity—such as its privileging of whiteness or heteronormativity—cannot be 
made without falling prey to the charge of misogyny. Clearly, such critiques can and do 
serve an important feminist function, and not all critiques of femininity are necessarily 
misogynist. One question concerning feminist critiques of femininity remains: that is, 
how to critique femininity without falling into the trap of Wollstonecraftian feminist 
misogyny.  
 Mitchell’s discussion of misogyny, and Gubar’s discussion of Wollstonecraft’s 
misogyny, are useful in thinking through this question. Mitchell discusses misogyny in 
the context of her reaction to people calling her mom. She is normally called mom after 
she is “too bossy” or has prepared a meal. Although Mitchell is not a mother, she 
contends that she is called mom because she wears dresses (and other clothing 
associated with femininity) and is a large woman. Yet she resents being called mom not 
because she is not actually a mother, but for two reasons: first, because of meanings 
attached to motherhood in contemporary Canadian society, and second, because the 
tone taken often suggests she is acting like a “shrew” (2002: 104−106). Mitchell 
contends that her resentment suggests she needs to examine her own “internalized 
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misogyny.” Although she is a self-identified fat femme and fat activist,86 Mitchell resents 
being called mom because she has internalized the idea that mothers are fat, unsexy 
shrews.  
 Similarly, Gubar has suggested that Wollstonecraft displays an internalized 
misogyny in that the form of femininity she so harshly criticizes is a self-portrait (1994: 
460). After discussing Wollstonecraft’s two suicide attempts and disastrous love affairs 
with men, Gubar asks, “Did anyone better understand slavish passions, the 
overvaluation of love, fickle irrationality, weak dependency, the sense of personal 
irrelevance, and anxiety about personal attractiveness than Wollstonecraft herself?” 
(1994: 460). Wollstonecraft wants women to become abstract, rights-bearing Cartesian 
subjects, and is deeply hostile to the fact that she (and all the other women in her social 
class) remain trapped in their disgusting bodies and maintain their frivolous feminine 
ways. In short, in a similar manner to Mitchell’s resentment at being called mom, 
Wollstonecraft’s resentment of coquettes and ladies suggests an internalized 
misogyny.87  
Regardless of whether feminist misogyny stems from internalized misogyny, the 
important point here is that feminist misogyny is a danger that lies within feminist 
critiques of femininity. This can be illustrated by comparing the dangers of critiquing 
                                                          
86 Like other contributors to the Brazen Femme collection, Mitchell understands femme to be a crucial 
project of feminism. 
87 As a sidenote, Serano contends that all women have internalized misogyny. She argues: “at some point, 
all of us who identify as female have to come face-to-face with our own internalized misogyny. And when 
people ask me what has been the hardest part of becoming a transsexual, expecting me to say that it was 
coming out to my family or the growing pains of a second puberty, I tell them that the hardest part, by far, 
has been unlearning lessons that were etched into my psyche before I ever set foot into kindergarten. The 
hardest part has been learning how to take myself seriously when the entire world is constantly telling me 
that femininity is constantly inferior to masculinity” (2007: 276). 
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mothering with the dangers of critiquing femininity. In Anglo-American culture, the 
social construction of mothering is very different from the social construction of 
fathering: for example, the standards for a good mother are considerably higher than 
standards for a good father, mothers are expected to behave in a more selfless manner 
than fathers, all normal women are supposed to desire to be mothers, women who do 
not like children or are child-free by choice are unnatural or selfish, mothering is 
assumed to take place within a heterosexual family, mothers are primarily (or solely) 
responsible for the behaviour of their children and the types of adults they eventually 
become, and the behaviour of poor/working-class mothers is more likely to be morally 
suspect and legally regulated than middle-class mothers. Indeed, Wollstonecraft and 
Friedan are hardly exceptional in blaming women for the plight of their children. But 
while it is certainly possible to critique the mothering practices of women, doing so 
without a prior understanding of the problems associated with this construction of 
mothering allows for possible slippage into sexism, heteronormativity, classism, and 
possibly misogyny. Similarly, in Anglo-American culture, the social construction of 
femininity is very different from the social construction of masculinity. Feminine 
attributes are consistently assigned negative connotations and meanings—such as 
weakness, vanity, frivolity, immorality, stupidity and foolishness—in ways supposedly 
masculine attributes are not.88 As such, just as with critiques of mothering practices, it is 
possible to critique femininity without slipping into misogyny. Yet at the same time, 
                                                          
88 In addition, as Serano notes, being in touch with and expressing one’s emotions is derided and assumed 
to mean the speaker has difficulties reasoning or thinking logically. Recreational activities associated with 
femininity (such as decorating) are often considered frivolous while those associated with masculinity 
(such as watching sports) are not (Serano, 2007: 326−327). See also section B of this dissertation’s 
introductory chapter. 
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such critiques must be cognizant of how Anglo-American society constructs femininity. 
Indeed, keeping this understanding at the forefront is key to avoiding the danger of 
Wollstonecraftian misogyny.  
The danger would lessen—that is, it would become easier to put forth feminist 
critiques of femininity—if the negative connotations and meanings associated with 
hegemonic femininity in Anglo-American culture could be reduced or eliminated. 
Indeed, as Kole points out in her contribution to Brazen Femme, it is challenging enough 
to live in a society that “dreads” femininity (2002: 99). Serano argues for a better future:  
we must recognize that feminine expression is strong, daring and brave—that 
it is powerful—and not in an enchanting, enticing, or supernatural sort of way, 
but in a tangible, practical way  that facilitates openness, creativity, and honest 
expression. We must move beyond seeing femininity as helpless and 
dependent, or merely as masculinity’s sidekick, and instead acknowledge that 
feminine expression exists of its own accord and brings its own rewards to 
those who naturally gravitate toward it (2007: 343). 
 
This recognition and acknowledgement of feminine expression is exactly what 
Baumgardner and Richards and the contributors to Brazen Femme are trying to achieve. 
Unfortunately, in both Manifesta and Brazen Femme, this largely takes the form of 
celebrating consumption and endlessly fetishizing commodities. Indeed, third wave 
feminism has been accused of including “any approach, as long as it pays attention to 
gender issues and social justice” (Snyder, 2008: 181). As such, third wave feminism may 
lend legitimacy to—or even justify—commodity feminism. After all, commodity 
feminism pays attention to gender issues and a certain brand of highly individualistic 
social justice. At the same time, it is important not to collapse third wave feminism and 
commodity feminism. Third wave feminism certainly contains strands that are 
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supportive of commodity feminism; however, commodity feminism lacks the 
commitment to feminist activism and the collective social action of the third wave.  
While collapsing third wave and commodity feminism is problematic, the 
celebration of consumption as a way of challenging the tension between feminism and 
femininity is a crucial aspect of both feminisms. Indeed, although satirical, The Onion 
article discussed in the introduction of this chapter illustrates these commonalities 
well.89 In the article, (commodity) feminism wholeheartedly, and uncritically, celebrates 
everything associated with women. A spoof feminist academic contends that “a new 
strain of feminism has emerged in which mundane activities are championed as proud, 
bold assertions of independence from patriarchal hegemony” (The Onion, 2003). This 
offers a form of democratization of feminism, in that “empowerment is now accessible 
to women who were long excluded” (The Onion, 2003).90 More importantly, it allows for 
a commodified resolution of the feminism/femininity tension: there can be no tension 
when everything a woman does, everything she buys, and every form of femininity she 
embraces is automatically read as empowerment. Commodity feminism does not 
empower women so much as empower particular women’s desires to participate in the 
production of femininity. Yet at the same time, this revaluing of feminized commodities 
and the women who use them may serve to diminish the explicit and trace misogyny 
                                                          
89 The Onion article does not actually use the term “commodity feminism.”  
90 The Onion article suggests a muted critique of the failure of feminist academics to adequately respond 
to the “empowerment” that this shift in feminism represents (Gill, 2008: 36). It also suggests a reason 
feminist academics have been reluctant to respond: namely, that the democratization and popularization 
of feminism helps to legitimate their own place as feminists within academia. This will be discussed again 
in Chapter Four when I look at how several prominent feminist academics have been involved in a well-
known marketing campaign that masquerades as feminist activism—Dove’s “Campaign for Real Beauty”—
in a research or other support capacity. 
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that have been present in many popular feminist considerations of the femininity 
question since Wollstonecraft. 
I conclude by briefly returning to Friedan and Wolf. In her chapter on the “sexual 
sell,” Friedan examines the profitability of early 1960s housewife femininity. She 
contends that “it would take a clever economist to figure out what would keep our 
affluent economy going if the housewife market began to fall off” (1983: 208). Almost 
thirty years later, Wolf replies that  
“clever economists” did figure out what would keep our affluent economy 
going once the housewife market began to fall off […] the beauty myth, in its 
modern form, arose […] to save magazines and advertisers from the economic 
fallout of the women’s revolution (1997: 66). 
 
Yet both Friedan and Wolf are mistaken. As the next chapter will discuss, one marketing 
professional was clever enough to solve this problem over thirty years prior to Friedan’s 
observation, even though his techniques were not yet adopted on a mass scale. What 
Edward Bernays figured out was a way of selling commodities to women that would 
challenge both the yet-to-be perfected feminine mystique and beauty myth. Through an 
examination of the social and political theory of Sigmund Freud and Bernays’ application 
of Freudian theory to marketing, the next chapter will continue this exploration of the 
origins of commodity feminism.  
 131 
CHAPTER THREE 
Commodities as Social Control: Capitalism under Conservatism in Freudian Theory 
 
The psychological poverty of groups […] is most threatening where the bonds of a society are 
chiefly constituted with the identification of its members with one another, while individuals of 
the leader type do not acquire the importance that should fall to them […] The present cultural 
state of America would give us a good opportunity for studying the damage to civilization which 
is thus to be feared.  
—Sigmund Freud (1961: 74) 
 
If we understand the mechanism and motives of the group mind, is it not possible to control and 
regiment the masses according to our will and without them knowing about it? 
—Edward Bernays (2005: 71) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In contemporary Anglo-American culture, Sigmund Freud’s reach extends far beyond 
the university classroom or therapist’s couch. Freudian terms regularly circulate in 
advertising, the media, pop psychology, and popular culture more generally. Regardless 
of whether one has read Freud, terms such as libido, penis envy, sex drive, death drive, 
and repression are familiar to many. Much of Freud’s popularity (outside of scholarly 
and psychoanalytic circles) can be attributed to his American nephew Edward Bernays 
(1891−1995).91 Although his name is not well known, Bernays’ impact on twentieth-
century U.S. capitalism was immense. Indeed, he is generally regarded as a father of 
modern public relations (Olasky, 1985: 17; Ewen, 1996: 146; Tye, 1998; Curtis, 2002).  
 Bernays greatly admired his uncle, and the two kept up a regular 
correspondence between 1919 and 1933. Indeed, Bernays offered to oversee the 
translation of Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis into English, which Freud accepted 
since his savings had been depleted by inflation after the First World War. When 
                                                          
91 Bernays was actually Freud’s double nephew, as his mother was Freud’s sister and his father’s sister 
was Freud’s wife (Bernays, 1965: 4; Justman, 1994: 458). 
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Bernays marketed Introductory Lectures to an American audience for the first time, 
waiving his usual percentage for doing so, he began a decades-long project of 
relentlessly promoting Freud and his work (Bernays, 1965: 252−276, 179−180; Justman, 
1994: 463; Tye, 1998: 195; Curtis, 2002). Freud later received financial advice, royalties 
from further publications, and other forms of practical business-related help from his 
nephew (Tye, 1998: 185−187). Freud loathed the marketing of his image and writings to 
the American masses but was grateful to his nephew for the financial assistance.92   
Freud was not the sole beneficiary of this relationship; it was quite lucrative for 
Bernays as well, who not only promoted Freud but also used his personal relationship 
with him to raise his own profile. In fact, Bernays’ promotion of this relationship was so 
persistent that Variety magazine once mockingly referred to him as a “professional 
nephew” (Tye, 1998: 189). Bernays, however, liked to think of himself as his uncle’s 
intellectual counterpart,93 believing that he had revolutionized business just as his uncle 
had revolutionized psychology. Freud, however, did not feel the same way.94 When 
Bernays sent Freud a copy of his book Crystallizing Public Opinion in 1924, Freud 
responded with a short comment that it was “a truly American publication.” Similarly, 
Freud wrote to Bernays in 1928 saying that his book Propaganda “might prove too 
American for my taste” (letters reprinted in Bernays, 1965: 269−270). Freud’s comments 
                                                          
92 Bernays reprints several letters from his uncle (written after the First World War) in his 1965 memoirs. 
Many of these letters outline Freud’s financial problems and convey gratitude for his nephew’s help 
(Bernays, 1965: 252−276).  
93 For example, Bernays brags in his memoirs about spending time with his uncle in Carlsbad in 1913: 
“although Freud was almost a quarter century my senior, we got along like two contemporaries.” 
Moreover, “it was as if two close friends were exchanging confidences instead of a famous uncle of fifty-
seven and an unknown nephew of twenty-two” (Bernays, 1965, 62−63).  
94 Indeed, Justman has suggested that Freud considered Bernays “an embarrassment in his family” (1994: 
474). 
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were not intended to be complimentary, as he held a strong—and elitist—dislike of 
America (Kaye, 1993; Justman, 1994: 473−474; Curtis, 2002; Edmundson, 2003).95  
I begin this chapter by discussing the personal relationship between Freud and 
Bernays because it is central to the origins of commodity feminism. This chapter moves 
from the first way in which I situate the origins of commodity feminism (the femininity 
question) to the second (capitalism under conservatism), considering the processes 
through which the feminism/femininity tension is resolved in capitalist terms. The 
concept of capitalism under conservatism—a conservative view of society as a whole in 
which commodity consumption is treated as a necessary form of social control—is 
central to this resolution. I contend that one of the earliest articulations of these politics 
can be found in the writings of Bernays. In a manner similar to Freud and conservative 
thinkers before him, Bernays was an avowed elitist, suspicious of democracy, and put 
his faith in the intelligent few in society. For Bernays, the public relations counsel 
numbered among these few. The PR man helps to preserve stability in society by 
                                                          
95 Freud’s dislike of America increased over the course of his life. In his youth, he was enamoured with 
American ideals (Kaye, 1993: 118−120). After the depression of 1873, he even considered emigration to 
the United States (as well as England and Australia) to escape the increase of Austrian anti-Semitism 
(Kaye, 1993: 119). However, after his first (and only) visit to the United States in 1909, he came to see the 
country as “a gigantic mistake,” a “miscarriage,” and “a bad experiment conducted by Providence” (Freud 
cited in Kaye, 1993: 120). Freud particularly disliked American nationalism, culture, and democracy. 
American nationalism, he believed, gave most Americans an inflated sense of self beyond what their 
inferior culture ought to sustain. In understanding America as “God’s own country,” Freud suggested 
American nationalists have much in common with religious believers in that they are deluded, narcissistic, 
and infantile (Freud, 2004a: 138−140; Rose, 2004: xviii−xx). Freud’s views on American culture are evident 
in a 1920 letter to his nephew: he complained about “the rotten taste of an uncultivated [American] 
public” and “the low level of American literature” (letter reprinted in Bernays, 1965: 262−264). Kaye 
describes Freud’s belief in the inferiority of American culture as a “thoroughly conventional European 
snobbery toward the New World” that later “gave way to a pervasive and deeply irrational hatred that 
grew with the passing years” (1993: 120). Finally, for Freud, American nationalism and culture were 
shaped by American democracy. Freud’s dislike of American democracy is reflective of his dislike of 
democracy more generally, discussed in section 3.4 of this chapter.  
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manipulating public opinion (or what he sometimes called “the engineering of consent”) 
to focus the public on capitalist values such as buying commodities. Although capitalism 
under conservatism entails a conservative view of society as a whole, it does not 
preclude more liberal politics concerning historically marginalized groups in society, 
including women. Indeed, one of Bernays’ most famous public relations campaign is also 
one of the earliest examples of commodity feminism. His 1929 Torches of Freedom 
campaign for the American Tobacco Company linked women’s rights to cigarette 
smoking. This campaign helped to break the taboo against white middle-class women 
smoking, and more importantly to the American Tobacco Company, greatly expanded 
the market for cigarettes. Bernays is important to the origins of commodity feminism, 
therefore, not only for articulating its underlying politics of capitalism under 
conservatism, but also for establishing the first commodity feminist marketing 
campaigns. 
The ensuing discussion of capitalism under conservatism is organized into four 
sections. Section 3.2 makes the case for reading Bernays as both a political theorist and 
a conservative. Section 3.3 further illuminates Bernays’ conservatism through a closer 
reading of Propaganda (1928), “Manipulating Public Opinion” (1928), “The Engineering 
of Consent” (1947) and Public Relations (1952). This section compares Bernays’ political 
project to that of Plato, with a particular emphasis on the similarities between the role 
of Bernays’ public relations counsel and Plato’s philosopher-king. However, despite the 
many similarities between the public relations counsel and philosopher-king, it is Freud, 
not Plato, whom Bernays repeatedly references in his writings. Section 3.4 considers the 
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similarities between the political thought of Bernays and his uncle by examining writings 
of Freud with the most relevance to Bernays’ work: Totem and Taboo (1912), Mass 
Psychology and the Analysis of the ‘I’ (1921), The Future of An Illusion (1927), Civilization 
and Its Discontents (1930) and Moses and Monotheism (1939). I will contend that 
despite Freud’s obvious influence on Bernays, his thought is best characterized as a form 
of crass Freudianism. Section 3.5 demonstrates how Bernays rejected the then-
dominant approach to marketing to women (that is, the happy homemaker archetype) 
and examines some of Bernays’ early commodity feminist campaigns, including the 
Torches of Freedom campaign.  
In situating the origins of commodity feminism through the femininity question in 
the previous chapter and through capitalism under conservatism in this chapter, I 
expand upon my explanation of the ascendancy of commodity feminism, working within 
but also going beyond the usual Marxist understandings of processes of 
commodification; namely, that under capitalism all aspects of social and cultural life are 
affected or mediated by the commodity form, and that resistance and dissent are no 
exception (Jameson, 1991; Hennessy, 2000). Unlike its feminist counterparts, 
commodity feminism resolves the feminism/femininity tension not only through 
revaluing feminized commodities and the women who use them (as discussed in the last 
chapter) but also through a Bernaysian political framework in which commodities 
become a form of social control. As indicated by the quote from Freud’s Civilization and 
Its Discontents (cited in the epigraph to this chapter), Freud was troubled by the fact 
that the American democratic system does not allow for a strong leader. Indeed, in 
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Freud’s work on social groups, America loomed large in his mind as a warning of the 
dangers of a “society of individuals freed from the submission to any authority” (Kaye, 
1993: 124; Justman, 1994). This view would, in turn, have a strong impact on Bernays. 
3.2 Bernays as Conservative Political Theorist 
It might seem odd to situate the origins of commodity feminism in conservatism, given 
that the justifying ideology of capitalism is liberalism, and the feminism of commodity 
feminism is also liberal and highly individualistic. Yet when the imperative to sell 
commodities and manipulate the masses to keep them consuming is framed as a matter 
of moral necessity to maintain social control (rather than the natural outcome of 
rational self-maximizing individuals interacting in a market economy) there is a dramatic 
political shift. Edward Bernays framed his work in this manner. In this section I read 
Bernays’ writings on public relations from the 1920s to the 1950s as a form of 
conservative political theory.  
Few (if any) academic circles would consider Bernays to be a political theorist. 
Among those who have heard of Bernays, he is known primarily as a public relations 
hack, a clever marketer of cigarettes, a propagandist for the U.S. government,96 and one 
of the people responsible for misleading the American government into sponsoring the 
                                                          
96 Bernays handled a great deal of public relations for the United States federal government. After the 
First World War, he worked for the War Department on a national campaign to find jobs for veterans; just 
before the Second World War, he advised a presidential committee on how to represent its “battle” on 
the Depression; during the Second World War, he advised the U.S. Information Agency on how to do a 
better job disseminating U.S. propaganda and also handled public relations for the army and navy (Tye, 
1998: 84). However, Bernays did not accept every job he was offered with government and political 
figures. He claimed to have turned down several jobs including handling publicity for the Leipzig Fair in the 
1930s as he was not interested in working for Nazis, handling publicity for Nicaragua’s right-wing 
government, and helping then-Vice President Richard Nixon in his bid for the presidency in the 1950s 
(Tye, 1998: 89).  
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1954 military coup in Guatemala.97 While Bernays filled all of those roles, I argue that he 
was also a highly influential political theorist, not in the realm of academic political 
theory, but in the sphere of American capitalism and beyond. In his 1952 book Public 
Relations, Bernays contends that “public relations [should] not concern itself primarily 
with selling something to somebody or advertising something to someone.” Rather, he 
suggests “it is a field of theory and practice dealing with the relationships of people to 
the society on which they are dependent” (1952: 123, emphasis mine). One of the 
primary concerns of modern political theory is the justification of authority, that is, the 
demonstration that a particular form of authority will benefit society (Klosko, 1995: 
xx−xxi). Bernays had a lifelong preoccupation with authority, both generally and with 
specific reference to the public relations counsel. The role Bernays establishes for the PR 
counsel in managing the relationship between people and society, and his 
preoccupation with authority more generally, suggests that one of the things Bernays is 
doing in his books and journal articles is writing political theory. 
Bernays might not be read as a political theorist due to the obvious self-interest 
underpinning his writings. He is clearly attempting to both establish public relations as a 
legitimate field and attract clients in his writings. On the former, in his writings Bernays 
                                                          
97 Bernays worked as PR counsel to the American-owned United Fruit Company (now known as Chiquita) 
from the early 1940s to the late 1950s. In 1954, United Fruit was the largest landowner in Guatemala. 
Jacobo Arbenz, the leftist president of Guatemala, attempted to nationalize lands held by United Fruit; 
this lead to his ouster (and exile) in a military coup sponsored by the United States government (Handy, 
1984; Frank, 2005: 11). Before Bernays’ death in 1995, much of his role in toppling the Guatemalan 
government was speculative. After his death, however, the Library of Congress made public fifty-three 
boxes of his papers on United Fruit, which “paint in vivid detail his behind-the-scenes manoeuvring” (Tye, 
1998: 156). Bernays used and abused his considerable influence in political, business and media circles to 
help develop consensus on the supposed necessity of American intervention in Guatemala as a means of 
containing the communist “threat” (Tye, 1998: 160−182).  
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consistently expresses a desire for the profession of public relations to be taken as 
seriously as law or medicine. He preferred the term public relations counsel, rather than 
contemporary terms such as press agent (today’s marketing or advertising 
professionals) to garner prestige for the field. He chose the title “public relations 
counsel” as it invoked “legal counsel” (Bernays, 1947: 116; 1952: 6, 83; 2005: 69; Miller, 
2005: 23). On the latter, his book Propaganda is a piece of propaganda itself. Written 
when Bernays was a leading figure in the field, the book has been characterized by 
Miller as “an extended ad for ‘public relations’ as Bernays himself had learned to 
practice it with rare intelligence and skill” (2005: 18). Yet this self-interest does not take 
away from the fact that Bernays is also writing political theory. Indeed, he would hardly 
be the first political theorist with self-interested motivations. For example, Machiavelli 
famously dedicated The Prince to Lorenzo de’ Medici in an (unsuccessful) attempt to 
resume his political career in Florence (Klosko, 1995: 3). Another example can be found 
in Locke’s Two Treatises, which at times reads as “a document written to justify specific 
policies” (Klosko, 1995: 93). Locke worked as a colonial administrator in Carolina and 
had considerable political and financial interest in British colonial policies, particularly 
those concerning taking possession of Aboriginal land (Arneil, 1996; Armitage, 2004). 
Therefore, insofar as self-interest plays an influential role in his political thought, 
Bernays has rather high-profile company in the political theory canon.  
Bernays would not have characterized himself as espousing a political theory of 
capitalism under conservatism. Tye describes him as caring “deeply about his legacy as a 
liberal who was anti-Communist but not paranoid like the McCarthyites” (1998: 182). 
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This is evident in his support of the use of public relations to promote the rights of 
women, workers, and African-Americans. For example, he discusses the use of PR as 
essential to campaigns for suffrage and the eight-hour work day as well as better wages 
and working conditions for nurses (Bernays, 1952: 187−201; 2005: 130). He even goes 
so far as to suggest that PR played a large role in the decline of lynching and 
improvement of race relations. Unsurprisingly, given his tendency to self-promote, 
Bernays worked directly on two of these four issues personally. In the 1920s, he worked 
for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) including 
promoting a controversial convention in Atlanta (Bernays, 1928: 962−964; 1952: 81; 
1965: 210−216). In the 1940s, he worked for the American Nurses Association to 
increase the profile of nursing (Bernays, 1952: 187−201; 1965: 669−670).  
Bernays’ understanding of his own “liberal legacy” is correct only insofar as he 
had more sympathy for the aspirations of historically marginalized groups, particularly 
women and African-Americans, than tends to be found in conservative thinkers. His 
feminist politics—if he had any—were liberal feminist in their focus on the rights of 
bourgeois women. Justman describes Bernays’ as having “feminist sympathies” (1994: 
461) rather than feminist politics, which is as far as any of Bernays’ commentators are 
willing to go. For example, both Tye in his Bernays biography and Ewen in PR! A Social 
History of Spin (1996) are reluctant to characterize Bernays as a feminist. At the same 
time, it has been suggested that his interest in feminism and anti-racism was not 
entirely profit-driven and contained a degree of sincerity in that he identified with the 
outsider status of women and African-Americans (Justman, 1994: 461; Tye, 1998: 
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251−2). Indeed, Bernays comments in his memoirs that it is difficult to be Jewish in a 
corporate world that provides “equal opportunity for all, especially white Protestant 
Americans” (1965: 348). At times in his writings, Bernays seems sympathetic to the 
working class. This is more likely an entirely profit-driven “sympathy,” as he was paid 
well to handle public relations for trade unions.98 In his later book Public Relations, 
Bernays seems to disapprove of union activities; he contends strikes are indicative of 
social “maladjustment” (Bernays, 1952: 116, 318). Predictably, Bernays’ sympathies (or 
appearance thereof) for women, African-Americans, and unions often had the effect of 
alienating him from the larger conservative business community.  
The (surprisingly few) commentators on Bernays’ work tend to agree that his 
politics were highly contradictory. For example, Tye argues that Bernays was “a bundle 
of contradictions” because he espoused liberal values of tolerance, democracy and 
rights while riding “roughshod over young staffers” and treating “his female employees, 
and even his wife, like indentured servants” (1998: x). In other words, Tye reads Bernays 
as a liberal whose politics do not always translate into practice. Ewen contends that 
Bernays’ views are so contradictory he resembles “two different people”: on the one 
hand, he understands society to be full of people with “expanding democratic 
expectations” launching an attack from below on the “old, hierarchical social order,” 
                                                          
98 Tye notes that Bernays handled public relations for unions such as the Brotherhood of Railroad 
Trainmen and the International Union of Electrical Workers. Yet at the same time, he handled public 
relations for large corporations including manufacturers (such as Proctor and Gamble, his client for over 
thirty years, as well as General Electric and General Motors), financial institutions (such as Mutual Benefit 
Life Insurance and Title Guarantee and Trust), communications (such as Columbia Broadcasting System 
and National Broadcasting Company), magazines (such as Cosmopolitan, Fortune, Good Housekeeping, 
Ladies’ Home Journal, the New Republic and Time) and retailers (The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea 
Company, F.W. Woolworth and R.H. Macy). Indeed, Bernays had 435 clients over his forty years of full-
time practice, most of which were not trade unions (Tye, 1998: 55−56).  
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and on the other hand, he views the masses at the bottom as unthreatening and as 
easily controlled and manipulated by a wise public relations counsel (1996: 399). 
Therefore according to Ewen, Bernays has two sets of contradictory positions on the 
masses: between understanding the masses as a threat and not a threat, and between 
understanding the masses as needing to be appeased and needing to be controlled. For 
Ewen, such positions are mutually exclusive, and as such, Bernays’ views are not only 
contradictory but dichotomous, and with “this dichotomy characteriz[ing] Bernays’ 
thinking over a lifetime” (1996: 400).  
However, I am contending that Bernays’ political thought is not at all 
contradictory or dichotomous but actually quite coherent. Tye’s critique that Bernays’ 
behaviour did not always reflect his officially espoused political opinions is irrelevant to 
his political thought as such.99 In addition, Ewen’s construction of a dichotomous 
Bernays is valid only when underpinned by a liberal understanding of power. Liberals 
understand power (and the political more generally) as operating primarily through 
institutions of the state.100 As such, modern liberalism requires representative 
democracy (that is, government derived from the people) to avoid or reduce abuses of 
power. Thus for liberals, any legitimation of unelected power within the state—which in 
the case of Bernays involves the wise public relations counsel controlling and 
                                                          
99 Indeed, Bernays would not be the first, or last, person to hold strong political convictions that are at 
odds with his behaviour. Regardless of political orientation—liberal, conservative, feminist, anti-racist or 
otherwise—it is not uncommon for a person’s politics and praxis to diverge. 
100 For liberals, the state has two primary functions: to secure a citizen’s rights and liberties within the 
state and to protect its members from dangers outside the state. Within the state, securing rights and 
liberties involves making space available for individuals to carve out their own lives and interests. The 
immediate threat to this space—that is, the potential for abuse of power—comes from the state itself.  
 142 
manipulating the threatening masses—is anti-liberal and anti-democratic.101 As Meiksins 
Wood points out, for liberals who understand power to derive from the people, there 
can be no politics, or at least no legitimate politics, outside of elected representatives 
(1994: 68). Therefore, Bernays’ political thought is dichotomous only when viewed 
through a liberal lens: that is, if power is only seen to work through the institutions of 
the state, then to advocate both for representative democracy and for the unelected 
rule of the public relations counsel is contradictory. At the same time, Ewen might be 
defended for his construction of a dichotomous Bernays if he is reacting to Bernays’ 
understanding of his own politics as liberal. However, if capitalist social relations are 
taken into account with respect to power, and Bernays’ politics are not assumed to be 
liberal, his political theory can be read as no longer contradictory or dichotomous but as 
entirely coherent.  
Bernays understood liberal democracy as a way of protecting elite interests: 
institutions that are ostensibly democratic serve to conceal (and at times facilitate) the 
way in which desire is contained and directed by capitalist elites. Bernays not only 
understood this but became highly skilled at controlling the masses by appearing to 
appease them. Olasky argues that Bernays was one of the first to understand that 
                                                          
101 Ewen’s reading of Bernays as anti-democratic is similar to the original reviews of Propaganda by the 
American press (St. John, 2010: 92−93). St. John argues that in the period following the First World War, 
most American journalists were aware of the degree to which they were “duped” by wartime 
propagandists into supporting the war (2010: 34−78). As such, they were anxious to convince the public—
and their fellow journalists—of the independence, impartiality, and ethics of a newly professionalized 
press (St. John, 2010: 77). St. John cites several reviews and editorials by the press of Bernays’ 
Propaganda, all of which suggest Bernays is anti-democratic (and, at least implicitly, anti-liberal). For 
example, an Editor & Publisher editorial from September 15, 1928 contends: “Who are you to decide for 
the public, and for a fee, what is social or anti-social, what is true or false, what is reason or prejudice, 
what is good or bad? To whom are you accountable, in the event of misjudgment or (forbid) 
skullduggery?” (editorial cited in St. John, 2010: 93).  
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“liberalism would be increasingly based on social control posing as democracy” (quoted 
in Ewen, 1996: 190). Yet Bernays was hardly the first to come to this understanding. As 
discussed in section 1.2, close to fifty years before Bernays, Marx argued that in 
distracting the masses with seemingly fantastic objects, commodity fetishism is a form 
of social control (1990: 163−5). However, Olasky is correct in that Bernays was one of 
the first to utilize this understanding to benefit himself and other capitalist elites. 
Needless to say, unlike Marx, Bernays did not denounce the distraction of the masses or 
the benefit it incurred to capitalists. In fact, Bernays understood it as essential to a 
society that would otherwise descend into chaos (Bernays, 1947: 115; 2005: 168; 
Olasky, 1985: 19; Ewen, 1996: 10; Tye, 1998: 91−2; St. John, 2010: 81−83). As such, 
despite his sympathy for the aspirations of historically marginalized groups, Bernays’ 
political theory is consistently conservative.  
Bernays can be read as a conservative political theorist for two fundamental 
reasons. First, the starting point of Bernays’ analysis is society as a whole in contrast to 
liberalism’s focus on the individual. He contends that there is a “philosophical reason for 
the existence of public relations […] an underlying truth” (1952: 3). This philosophical 
reason or truth is that the masses present a fundamental threat to the stability of 
democratic societies. It is the moral duty of the “intelligent few” of society to take on 
the role of public relations counsel: that is, to act as the “invisible government” and use 
propaganda to “manipulate” or “engineer” the consent of the masses and “bring order 
out of chaos” (Bernays, 1928; 1947; 2005: 38−39, 127, 168). Implicit in his discussion of 
societal instability is the assumption that the natural order of society is hierarchical, with 
 144 
the “intelligent few” properly above and dictating to the democratic masses. The second 
reason establishes Bernays’ thought less as conservative and more properly as not 
liberal. He declares the (rational self-maximizing) “economic man” to be a myth, 
contending that “the human personality is far too complex to be pinned down to any 
simple formula” (Bernays, 1952: 217). Desire for commodities is complex, and despite 
what liberal political economy suggests, people do not desire for any straightforward, 
rational reason. Therefore, in starting with society, situating societal stability as central 
to his theoretical framework, assuming the natural order of society is hierarchical (in 
which people fulfill their proper place) and rejecting the rational individual of liberalism, 
Bernays’ political thought is clearly conservative. 
3.3 The Public Relations Counsel as Philosopher-King 
Bernays’ conservatism is specifically expressed as a political theory of capitalism under 
conservatism. Capitalism under conservatism involves a conservative view of society as 
a whole, which holds that because people are unequal, the preservation of social order 
requires social classes. Indeed, on the question of equality, conservative political 
thought tends to understand people to have equal moral worth, yet requires them to be 
unequal in social terms.102 Modern democracy is feared because it is thought to give 
undue power to the unwise, poorly educated masses and threaten social stability. An 
important role is given to the intelligent few who manipulate the desires and 
                                                          
102 Conservative thinker Edmund Burke, for example, frequently idealizes the aristocracy. He believes they 
represent the interests of society as a whole (rather than their own privileged class) in that they help to 
maintain societal stability for all. The aristocracy is in a unique position to do so as they possess superior 
qualities not held by the uneducated masses (Klosko, 1995: 266, 276, 308).  
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dissatisfactions of the masses (including women) to distract them with consumption. In 
this section, I continue to examine the political thought of Bernays by comparing his 
conservatism to that of Plato. Indeed, if transposed to a modern capitalist society, 
Bernays’ ideal public relations counsel plays a very similar role to that of Plato’s 
philosopher-king.  
Bernays is clearly a conservative thinker in the tradition that dates back to 
Plato.103 A comparison with Plato illustrates a great deal about Bernays: both Plato and 
Bernays are suspicious of democracy, are avowed elitists who believe knowledge and 
power must coalesce, and understand deception of the masses to be ethical insofar as it 
maintains order. Bernays himself would likely reject such a comparison, not only 
because he understood himself as a liberal, but because he situated Plato in the 
tradition of “socialist, communist, and collectivist” theorists (1952: 25). Regardless of 
these protestations, on the first point of comparison, Plato understood democracy as a 
“disease” because it treats people as equals when they are unequal in knowledge, 
understanding, and ability (1992: 558c, 563e−564a, 564e). Moreover, democracy hands 
over an undue amount of influence to the “third class” of ignorant “drones” who when 
assembled become “the largest and most powerful class” (Plato, 1992: 565a). Similarly, 
Bernays thought very little of the ability of the average person to “think out, 
understand, or act upon the world in which he or she lives” (Ewen, 1996: 10). Indeed, in 
a 1947 publication, Bernays claims that the average American has only six years of 
                                                          
103 As Horowitz and Horowitz argue, it is possible to “draw a line of descent which leads from Plato, 
through the Stoic natural law, through Christianity’s City of God, through the Christian middle ages and its 
conception of natural law, to modern conservatism” (1988: 100).  
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schooling104 and as such, leaders “cannot wait for the people to arrive at even general 
understanding” (114). He is clear that propaganda should not take the place of the 
education system (Bernays, 1947: 114−115). However, he contends that even if the 
American education system were to improve, indeed, even if the United States were to 
have a perfect education system, “equal progress would not be achieved […] there 
would always be time lags, blind spots and points of weakness” (Bernays, 1947: 115). In 
other words, equal opportunity does not mean equal progress. For Bernays, some 
individuals will always be better (that is, possess greater understanding and ability) than 
others.  
Following from the first point, because the masses are easily manipulated by 
anyone with a “fine, big, persuasive voice” (Plato, 1992: 568c), it is crucially important 
that the voice to whom they are listening is a wise one. In other words, power and 
knowledge must coalesce: for Plato this is when philosophers become kings, and for 
Bernays this is when the social scientist rules through public relations. In other words, 
Plato’s philosopher-king becomes Bernays’ public relations counsel. Just as the 
philosopher-king applies their extensive education in mathematical sciences to their 
work, the public relations counsel applies modern social sciences to theirs (Plato, 1992: 
537c−d, 522c−531d; Bernays, 1928: 961; 1952: 3, 83, 108−109, 215; Ewen, 1996: 166). 
More specifically, the public relations counsel must understand psychology, sociology, 
political economy and other social sciences, read books and journal articles, interview 
experts, and conduct research in the manner of a rigorous social scientist (Bernays, 
                                                          
104 Bernays does not cite his sources in making this claim. 
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1928: 961; 1952: 83, 218−219, 245; Tye, 1998: 91). Indeed, although his degree was in 
agriculture, Bernays understood his own work as epitomizing this social scientific 
approach to public relations. Indeed, he contends that he “defined [the] profession” by 
teaching the first-ever course on the subject at New York University in 1923, and by 
publishing two “ground-breaking” publications in 1920 (an article in the American 
Journal of Sociology and his book Propaganda) (Bernays, 1952: 84, 95). Like the 
philosopher-king, the counsel is among the “intelligent few” in society, belonging to a 
“highly educated class of opinion-molding tacticians [who are] continuously at work, 
analyzing the social terrain and adjusting the mental scenery from which the public 
mind, with its limited intellect, derives its opinions” (Ewen, 1996: 163, 9−10). Or in 
Bernays’ words, the counsel must “continuously and systematically [work at] 
regimenting the public mind” (Bernays cited in Ewen, 1996: 166). Although Bernays was 
an early proponent of the view that knowledge and power ought to coalesce in the 
public relations counsel, this view is common in contemporary capitalism under 
conservatism. For example, Horowitz and Horowitz compare the hero in Plato to the 
hero in modern capitalism: while Plato’s hero is the philosopher “whose wisdom is the 
attainment of the heights of selflessness,” the “modern hero is the great businessman, 
the incarnation of the spirit of rational egoism” (1988: 11). As such, whether the hero is 
driven by selflessness or selfishness (or a mix of both like the public relations counsel), 
the best society is one in which the hero is both wise and powerful.  
This comparison between the philosopher-king and public relations counsel is 
further evident in Bernays’ discussion of “committees of wise men.” Without 
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mentioning Plato, Bernays argues for something akin to a guardian class. In Plato’s 
Republic, the guardians constitute the class from which the philosopher-kings are 
chosen; the philosopher-kings are the wisest and possess the best understanding of 
what is advantageous for society as a whole (1992: 412a−413d). In Propaganda, Bernays 
contends:  
It might be better to have, instead of propaganda and special pleading, 
committees of wise men who would choose our rulers, dictate our conduct, 
private and public, and decide upon the best types of clothes for us to wear 
and the best kinds of food for us to eat. But we have chosen the opposite 
method, that of open competition. We must find a way to make free 
competition function with reasonable smoothness. To achieve this society has 
consented to permit free competition to be organized by leadership and 
propaganda (2005: 39).  
 
In other words, instead of the (likely) superior society favoured by Plato, we have a 
society of “free competition,” that is, a capitalist liberal democracy. Moreover, Bernays 
suggests that in consenting to a capitalist democracy, we have consented (at least 
implicitly) to rule by the wise public relations counsel. The public relations counsel, as a 
member of the “intelligent minority,” both administers the leaders and “regiment[s] and 
guide[s] the masses” (Bernays, 2005: 127). As such, those we think of as leaders—
including the President, members of Congress, governors, chairs of corporations and 
union presidents—are in fact led by others. They are led by “persons whose names are 
known to a few” and yet “control the destinies of millions” (2005: 61). 
Indeed, this is the primary difference between Plato’s philosopher-king and 
Bernays’ public relations counsel: the rule of the former can be visible as they govern an 
undemocratic society, while the rule of the latter must be invisible as they govern a 
democratic society. Bernays gives the example of the leaders of the fashion industry:  
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In some departments of our daily life, in which we imagine ourselves free 
agents, we are ruled by dictators exercising great power. A man buying a suit 
of clothes imagines that he is choosing, according to his taste and his 
personality, the kind of garment which he prefers. In reality, he may be 
obeying the orders of any anonymous gentleman tailor in London. This 
personage is the silent partner in a modest tailoring establishment, which is 
patronized by gentlemen of fashion and princes of blood. He suggests to 
British noblemen and others a blue cloth instead of gray, two buttons instead 
of three, or sleeves a quarter of an inch narrower than last season. The 
distinguished customer approves the idea (2005: 61−62).  
 
Of course, in contemporary globalized capitalism, the “anonymous gentleman tailor” 
discussed by Bernays is likely working for a large multinational corporation. He (and less 
often she) no longer rules the fashion tastes of the British and American bourgeoisie. 
Rather, he rules the fashion tastes of those in the Global North who purchase the 
garments, as well as the working conditions of those in the Global South who produce 
the garments. Yet if anything, the role of the contemporary multinational corporation 
only confirms Bernays’ understanding of invisible rulers in (ostensibly) democratic 
societies. For Bernays, the invisible rule of the public relations counsel allows for 
maintaining the appearance of democracy while avoiding the chaos of real democracy 
(Bernays, 2005: 38, 61).  
Both the philosopher-king and the public relations counsel work to guide and 
temper the excesses of various groups in society. Plato believes in rule by philosopher-
king in large part because they are a force for moderation. He defines moderation as 
“order,” “harmony,” and a “mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires” (1992: 
430e, 431e). Rule by those who are not philosopher-kings can only result in excess. For 
example, rule by honour-lovers (timocracy) encourages war-mongering, rule by the 
masses (democracy) encourages people to be weak-willed and give into pleasure, and 
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rule by money-lovers (oligarchy) encourages people to “neglect everything except 
making money” (Plato, 1992: 549a−549b, 551a, 561c−561d, 556c). Similarly, Bernays 
believes in rule by public relations counsel because they can temper not only democracy 
but also unfettered capitalism. In guiding elected “leaders,” the democratic masses, and 
unelected “business leaders,” the public relations counsel is a force for moderation. On 
the latter question, Bernays is quite critical of American capitalism in the 1865−1900 
period, of which he complains, “capitalism was aggressive and overindividualistic,” and 
“exploitation of people and things was a keynote of the era” (1952: 51).  
Bernays repeatedly discussed ethics in his writings, and he considered it 
important to temper both war-mongering and the excesses of capitalism. From early in 
his career, Bernays was well aware of the fact that public relations “can be used 
constructively or abused.” He argued that it was no different from any other profession, 
as there are both “honest lawyers and shyster lawyers” and because the law can be 
used “to bring justice or […] to abuse the principles of justice on which the society rests” 
(Bernays cited in Tye, 1998: 89). He repeatedly states that the public relations counsel 
should refuse clients whom he believes to be dishonest, selling a fraudulent product, or 
promoting causes that are “antisocial” (Bernays, 2005: 69−70, 88−89, 122; 1952: 6). 
Later in his career, as he witnessed American presidents such as Nixon and Johnson use 
public relations strategies he developed to manage their problems (for example, in the 
Watergate scandal and the Vietnam War), Bernays further distanced himself from those 
who use deception for evil instead of good (Tye, 1998: 88−89). For Bernays, aggressive 
capitalism lacks moderation because it lacks ethics. The ethical public relations counsel 
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is only interested in “socially constructive action” and “worthwhile social objectives” 
that are not “antisocial” (Bernays, 1947: 113, 116). Thus only the wise philosopher-king 
(or public relations counsel) can temper the honour-lovers (elected representatives), the 
money-lovers (business leaders) and the passion-lovers (democratic masses) in society. 
Indeed, it is because Bernays’ conservatism tempers his capitalism that I have 
characterized his political theory as “capitalism under conservatism” rather than the 
reverse.  
The final point of comparison between Plato and Bernays is that they both 
advocate deceiving the masses and believe this deception to be ethical insofar as it 
helps to maintain order. Plato famously argues for telling the populace “noble 
falsehoods” as a way of maintaining a just society; which for him means an orderly, 
hierarchical society where everyone fulfills their proper role (1992: 414a−415e, 433a−e). 
In his words, “rulers will have to make considerable use of falsehood and deception for 
the benefit of those they rule” (Plato, 1992: 459c). Similarly, Bernays literally wrote the 
book on propaganda, in which he argues that deceiving and manipulating the masses 
through propaganda is crucial to preserving social stability. He delineates ways in which 
the manipulated will act as desired without knowing they are being manipulated 
(Olasky, 1985: 21). In his words, “intelligent men must realize that propaganda is the 
modern instrument by which they can fight for productive ends and help to bring order 
out of chaos” (Bernays, 2005: 168, my emphasis).  
Unsurprisingly (given his tendency for self-promotion), Bernays understands 
public relations to be one of the oldest and most morally demanding professions. 
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Indeed, in his 1952 book Public Relations, Bernays situates the origins of public relations 
in ancient Greece and Rome and traces its use (in a cursory manner) through the 
European Dark Ages to the United States in the 1950s. He contends “the three main 
elements of public relations are practically as old as society.” These elements are 
“informing people, persuading people, [and] integrating people with people” (Bernays, 
1952: 12). Given the role of the public relations counsel to inform, persuade, and 
integrate, Bernays aligns himself with literary figures and political theorists such as 
Dante, Machiavelli, Shakespeare, Milton, Rousseau, Bentham, and Harriet Beecher 
Stowe (author of the anti-slavery book Uncle Tom’s Cabin) (Bernays, 1952: 18, 20, 22, 
41). The glorious history of public relations, according to Bernays, is also evident in the 
abolitionist cause. He contends that “although the abolitionists were a minority, their 
public relations was so effective that many politicians were forced to modify their 
position on the slavery question” (Bernays, 1952: 42). In sum, for Bernays public 
relations is an ancient and morally demanding profession that replaces the kings of the 
past (Tye, 1998: 97) and mobilizes deception for the greater good.  
This section has read the writings of Edward Bernays from the 1920s to 1950s as 
a political theory of capitalism under conservatism. If transposed to a modern capitalist 
society, Bernays’ ideal public relations counsel would act very similarly to Plato’s 
philosopher-king, manipulating the masses to preserve stability. Despite my comparison 
of Plato and Bernays, Bernays’ conservatism was more likely influenced by his uncle 
Freud than Plato (Justman, 1994: 475; Ewen, 1996: 159; Tye, 1998: 97). The next section 
will connect Bernays’ political thought to that of his uncle. Later in this chapter, I discuss 
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Bernays’ application of theory to practice, that is, his commodity feminist campaigns of 
the 1910s and 1920s.  
3.4 Uncle Freud and Bernays  
As previously established,105 Bernays was very proud of his familial and personal 
relationship with Freud and spent decades promoting his uncle’s work. As such, it is not 
surprising that Bernays repeatedly references his uncle in his own writings on public 
relations and meticulously documents seemingly every encounter with Freud (both 
written correspondence and personal visits) in his 1965 memoirs.106 Yet despite these 
frequent references, Bernays never engages with the work of Freud with any degree of 
depth. I will argue that despite Freud’s obvious influence on his nephew’s thought, 
Bernays’ thought is best characterized as a form of crass Freudianism. Bernays’ thought 
is crass in two senses. First is the sense suggested by the term crass commercialism. 
Indeed, as mentioned previously,107 Bernays made a great deal of money marketing 
Freud’s image and writings to the American masses. The second (and primary) use of 
the term crass in this section is in the sense of superficiality. This section will examine 
the writings of Freud with the most relevance to Bernays’ work: Totem and Taboo 
(1912), Mass Psychology and the Analysis of the ‘I’ (1921), The Future of An Illusion 
(1927), Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), and Moses and Monotheism (1939). In 
these texts, Freud applies his work on individual psychology to different social and 
                                                          
105 See section 3.1. 
106 In his memoirs, Bernays refers to Freud on several occasions as “Uncle Siggy.”  
107 See section 3.1. 
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political groups.108 In examining how Freud’s relationship between individual and group 
psychological processes inform his conservative fear of the masses and democracy, this 
section will focus on his understanding of the Oedipus complex. The importance of the 
Oedipus complex goes beyond individual and group psychology; indeed, it is the central 
complex around which Freudian theory revolves (Stanton, 1992: 290; Freud, 2003b: 127; 
2004a: 142). In Freud’s words: “the beginnings of religion, morals, society and art 
converge in the Oedipus complex” (1989c: 194).  
Freud uses several concepts from individual psychology in his discussion of 
different social groups.109 For Freud, “the antithesis between individual and social or 
mass psychology, which at first glance may seem very important, loses a great deal of its 
sharpness on close examination” (Freud, 2004b: 17). Moreover, the cultural 
development of the group and the cultural development of the individual are “always 
interlocked” (Freud, 1961: 107). Of all the concepts from individual psychology that 
Freud applies to group psychology, he returns most often to, and places the greatest 
deal of emphasis upon, the Oedipus complex.  
                                                          
108 Indeed, these texts might be characterized as Freud’s social and political thought. Although Freud 
claimed to be a medical scientist, since his youth he had aspired to be a social theorist. As such, Kaye has 
suggested that Freud’s work on human organization should not be understood as “applied 
psychoanalysis”—for example, applying psychoanalysis to the development of Judaism in Moses and 
Monotheism—but rather as a set of “explorations of those cultural problems that dominated his 
intellectual life” (2003: 380). Until the late 1960s, Freud was treated as a social theorist in sociology and 
other social science disciplines, but this approach to his work has fallen out of favour (Kaye, 1991: 81−89). 
Yet Freud himself believed that psychoanalysis could make its greatest contribution not to the treatment 
of individual neuroses but to social theory (Parisi, 1999: 16; Kaye, 2003: 377). 
109 These concepts include the Eros (or the life/love/sex drive), the death instinct, the super-ego, libido, 
narcissism, and the Oedipus complex (Freud, 1961: 75−82, 104, 106−107; 2004: 41−43, 84−85). 
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3.4.1 Freud on the Oedipus Complex 
Originally, Freud developed the Oedipus complex—invoking the plot of Sophocles’ 
ancient Greek play Oedipus Rex110—in order to apply it to individual psychology. In the 
play, Oedipus is destined from birth to kill his father and marry his mother. He 
eventually does both and becomes the King of Thebes. However, because Oedipus was 
raised by a couple who were not his biological parents, he does not realize until many 
years later that he has attained his destiny: in short, a man he killed at the side of a road 
long ago was his father, and the woman to whom he is married is his mother (Stanton, 
1992: 291). For Freud, the fact that Oedipus killed his father and slept with his mother111 
without consciously realizing it is important because it represents the repressed and 
unconscious desires of everyone (Mitchell, 1974: 63; Freud, 1990a: 56; 1990b: 367). In a 
letter to his friend Dr. Wilhelm Fleiss, Freud suggests that 
we can understand the gripping power of Oedipus Rex […] [because] the Greek 
legend seizes upon a compulsion which everyone recognizes because he 
senses its existence within himself. Everyone in the audience was once a 
budding Oedipus in fantasy and each recoils in horror from the dream 
fulfillment here transplanted into reality, with the full quality of repression 
which separates his infantile state from his present one (Freud, 1990a: 56). 
 
This 1897 letter represents the first known mention of Oedipus by Freud. In suggesting 
that everyone “was once a budding Oedipus,” and in separating a person’s infantile 
state from their adult state, Freud is anticipating his later work on the role of the 
Oedipus complex in child psychosexual development. Although he speaks here of the 
universality of these Oedipal fantasies, Freud uses male pronouns throughout. This 
                                                          
110 Today Sophocles’ play is commonly known by its Latin title Oedipus Rex, which translates into English 
as Oedipus the King. 
111 Oedipus clearly had sex with his mother, as she had given birth to his two daughters (also his half-
sisters).  
 156 
reflects not only Freud’s masculinism,112 but also his uncertainty concerning the 
relationship (if any) of girls and women to the Oedipus complex.113 It is ultimately the 
male experience of the Oedipus complex that Freud applies to group psychology.  
3.4.2 Freud on the Primordial Parricide 
Although Freud gives the Oedipus complex primary importance in both individual114 and 
group psychology, the Oedipus complex of individual (male) psychology differs 
somewhat from that of group psychology. The most important difference is that in 
individual psychology there is repressed desire to kill the father; in group psychology, an 
                                                          
112 The Oedipus complex, like Freud’s work on child psychosexual development more broadly, has been 
subject to much critique from feminists for a variety of reasons. The most obvious reason is Freud’s 
gendered division of labour and heteronormativity. The Oedipus complex presupposes that all children 
have one father and one mother, with the mother as the primary caregiver, and the father sexually 
dominating the mother. Indeed, it is the father’s sexual domination of the mother that brings about the 
child’s desire to kill the father (Stanton, 1992: 291; Freud, 2003a: 122). Furthermore, in both the Oedipus 
complex and his broader work on child psychosexual development, Freud equates activity with 
masculinity and passivity with femininity (Young-Bruehl, 1990: 19−22, 41). Finally, although Freud allows 
for a wide range of sexual expression outside of heterosexual reproduction in his work, he ultimately 
contends that various sexual desires and practices not associated with reproduction (including lesbian 
desire, clitoral orgasms, and anal sex) are immature and suggest abnormal psychosexual development 
(Hardy, 2011: 108−109; Seidman, 2011: 4−5). It is important to note, however, that many feminists have 
understood feminist potential in Freud’s work. For example, in the pre-Oedipal phase, boys and girls are 
essentially the same and both are bisexual (Young-Bruehl, 1990: 20−21; Freud, 2003b: 122−125). This was 
a shocking idea for Freud’s contemporaries, in part because it opened up the idea that rigid gender roles 
and heterosexuality are neither “normal” nor “natural” (Mitchell, 1974: 17−23; Kurzweil, 1995: 13−14). 
Indeed, psychoanalytic feminists have re-told the Oedipal tale to emphasize the ways in which gender 
identity and the family are socially constructed, and to develop a critique of masculinity (Brod, 1992: 237). 
Overall, feminists generally agree that Freud’s work is highly gendered and heteronormative. The debates 
tend to concern whether his work is proscriptive or descriptive, or in Juliet Mitchell’s words, whether his 
work is “a recommendation for a patriarchal society, [or] an analysis of one” (Mitchell, 1974: xv; Bowlby, 
1999: 138). The question concerning Freud’s feminist potential, or lack thereof, remains a matter of 
considerable debate. 
113 Freud’s uncertainty concerning how, and to what extent, the Oedipus complex applies to girls and 
women lasts for decades. In 1912, he characterized it as the “typical attitude of a male child towards his 
parents” (Freud, 1989: 160). By the 1930s, Freud comes to understand the Oedipus complex as a specific 
phase of development (between approximately three and five years of age) for both boys and girls 
(Stanton, 1992: 290−291). In his final book, An Outline of Psychoanalysis (unfinished at the time of his 
death in 1939), Freud outlined how girls enter into, pass through, and leave the Oedipal phase in a 
manner entirely different from boys (Freud, 1990b: 368−369). 
114 At the individual level, the Oedipus complex is more than a phase of development; it is the “nucleus of 
all neuroses” (Freud, 1989: 194−195).  
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actual primordial murder of the father is carried out, not by an individual son, but by a 
murderous band of brothers. Originally appearing in Totem and Taboo, this parricide 
appears in all of Freud’s work on group psychology and is ultimately given primary 
importance in his social and political thought as a whole. In Totem and Taboo, Freud 
proposes that “in the beginning was the Deed” (1989c: 200). The Deed, which marks the 
beginning of civilization, involves a band of brothers killing and eating their father. After 
the murder and feast, the collective guilt of the brothers becomes the sense of guilt that 
every person in civilization attaches to the father or father-substitute (Freud, 1961: 93; 
1989c: 187; 2001: 81−83; 2004a: 128−130). Freud outlines several examples of the 
primordial Deed in religion.  
Examples of the Deed can be found in totemic or tribal religions, Judaism,115 
Christianity, and Islam. Indeed, for Freud the very origin of religion is “the will of the 
father” (2001: 122). Moreover, “religious phenomenon are only to be understood […] as 
the long since forgotten, important events in the primeval history of the human family” 
(Freud, 2001: 58). For Freud, the father(-substitute) in totemic religions is an animal 
spirit. The father/animal is killed and eaten once a year in a ritual sacrifice (Freud, 
1989c: 5, 40−41, 62−65, 85−89, 94−97, 116, 194−195; 2001: 131; 2004a: 129). In 
Judaism, the father was Moses. In a controversial hypothesis, Freud claims that Moses 
was not Hebrew but an aristocratic Egyptian—“a prince, perhaps, or a priest or high 
official”—who adhered to the monotheistic religion of the Egyptian pharaoh Akhenaten 
                                                          
115 Totemic religions and Judaism each have a whole book devoted to them: Totem and Taboo for the 
former, and Moses and Monotheism for the latter. However, both religious traditions appear elsewhere in 
Freud’s social and political writings.  
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(Freud, 2001: 18). Moses was killed in the forest by a band of rebels, who later felt so 
guilty about the murder of their father-substitute that they founded Judaism (Freud, 
2001: 36−37, 47−50, 69, 89−90, 93−94, 101, 135).116 In Christianity, the killing of the 
father becomes the killing of Jesus Christ.117 It is the collective guilt about the death of 
the father (as Christians believe that Jesus died for the sins of humanity) that becomes 
the guilt that characterizes Christians as a social group (Freud, 1961: 106−107; 2001: 
101, 135−136). In addition, Freud reads the Christian practice of communion—that is, 
consuming the blood (in the form of red wine) and body (in the form of bread) of 
Jesus—as a reenactment of the primordial cannibalistic feast upon the body of the 
father (2001: 84, 131). Freud also offers far more abbreviated discussions of other 
religions including Islam (which he suggests is an “abbreviated repetition” and 
“imitation” of the Jewish Oedipal scene) and the ill-defined “rationalistic religions of the 
East” (which are “in their core ancestor-worship”) (2001: 92−93). Beyond religion, there 
are several other social and political groups in which elements of the (individual male) 
Oedipus complex can be located.118  
                                                          
116 It is important to note that two of Freud’s central claims with respect to Judaism—that Moses was an 
Egyptian and that he was murdered—are not generally accepted by scholars of Jewish theology and 
history (Paul, 1996: 9−10). In an early review of Moses and Monotheism, M. R. Cohen contends that 
Freud’s evidence for suggesting Moses was Egyptian is “questionable” and “does not deserve serious 
attention;” similarly, Freud’s evidence for the murder of Moses is “entirely baseless” (Cohen, 1939: 473). 
It has been suggested that Freud freely appeals to the Hebrew Bible when it suits him and dismisses it as a 
distortion when it contradicts his arguments (Cohen, 1939: 471; Bernstein, 1998: 14). R. Z. Friedman goes 
further than that and suggests that what Freud is doing is entirely recasting “Judaism as a Mosaic religion 
purged of traditional theological elements and built around an Oedipal explanation of Moses” (1998: 148). 
117 Although Christians believe that Jesus is the son (of God), not the father (God), Freud argues that 
Christianity “has not escaped the fate of having to get rid of the father” (2001: 136). Indeed, “having arose 
out of a father-religion, [Christianity] became a son-religion” (Freud, 2001: 136). 
118 Over and over again, history—or rather, Freud’s version of history—is full of brothers (or brother 
substitutes) murdering their father (or father-substitute). See the concluding chapter of this dissertation 
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All of these murders are reenactments of the original primordial parricide that 
supposedly ushered in civilization. In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud draws out 
the similarities “between the processes of civilization and the libidinal development of 
the individual” (Freud, 1961: 51). He contends that both civilization and individuals 
require a “sublimation of instinct”: just as the child must pass through the Oedipal phase 
to emerge as a well-adjusted, stable subject, society must pass through the parricidal 
stage to be orderly and stable (1961: 51−52). Parricide, therefore, is a basic human 
instinct: it is a compulsion that must be resisted by both individuals and social groups. 
Parricidal instincts relate to other aggressive instincts and sexual impulses held by both 
individuals and civilization as a whole (1961: 61−69). For Freud, people 
are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can 
defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures 
among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of 
aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbour is for them not only a potential 
helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their 
aggressiveness on him, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his 
possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and kill him. Homo 
homini lupus (1961: 68−69). 
 
The Latin conclusion here translates as “man is a wolf to man” and is derived from the 
ancient Roman playwright Plautus. Due to this constant desire to kill, to sexually assault, 
to humiliate, and to torture, Freud contends that it is absolutely “impossible to overlook 
the extent to which civilization is built upon a renunciation of instinct” (Freud, 1961: 51). 
 For Freud, the political implications of homo homini lupus centre around the 
following question: “what means does civilization employ in order to inhibit the 
aggressiveness which opposes it, to make it harmless, to get rid of it, perhaps?” (1961: 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(section A) for more on Freud’s (mis)use of history in his recasting of the Oedipal narrative as an “origin 
story.” 
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83). The answer for Freud is a complex relationship between love and authority: love is 
constituted on the basis of authority, and love is also both the instrument and effect of 
authority (Freud, 1961: 88−96; 2004b: 41−43; Brunner, 1995: 173). This relationship 
between love and authority is explored more concretely by Freud in Mass Psychology 
through various social and political groups, including the military and the Catholic 
Church. Freud notes that people are not generally asked if they want to join these 
groups, and they are discouraged from, or even severely punished, for leaving; however, 
this does not explain why these groups operate effectively (Freud, 2004b: 45−46). Freud 
contends that both the military and the Catholic Church are held together by the illusion 
that a supreme leader (or father-substitute) exists—Jesus Christ in the case of 
Catholicism and the commander in the case of the military—and that the father loves 
each of his believers/soldiers equally (Freud, 2004b: 46). Each individual has libidinal ties 
to the father and to the rest of the individuals/brothers in the group. By using the 
military and Catholic Church as examples, Freud intends to demonstrate the critical 
importance of the father-substitute/leader to group (or mass) psychology (2004b: 47). 
Thus in order to sublimate our aggressive, violent, wolf-like instincts, all states and 
nations require a strong and authoritative father-substitute as leader.119 
                                                          
119 To return to the individual/group psychology comparison: Freud contends that just as families need a 
wise father figure to rule and the rest of the family to obey, large-scale social formations require this form 
of organization as well (Brunner, 1995: 186).  
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3.4.3 Freud’s Conservatism 
Freud’s belief in the necessity of an authoritative father—a leader who is both loved and 
feared120—relates to his elitism and dislike of democracy. Elitism underpins Freud’s 
social and political thought to such an extent that Paul Roazen suggests that Moses “had 
to be an Egyptian nobleman if Freud’s [elitist] fantasies were to be retained” (1999: 
245−246). Clearly Freud shares his elitism and suspicion of democracy with Bernays.121 
Like Bernays, Freud understands democracy to be at odds with cultural progress in that 
it gives too much power to the democratic masses who are gullible, naïve, and out of 
touch with reality (Freud, 2001: 55). In addition, Freud suggests the masses are 
“lethargic and unreasonable, they are averse to renouncing their drives, they cannot be 
persuaded by arguments that this is unavoidable, and individuals within masses 
reinforce one another in giving free rein to their lack of restraint” (2004a: 112). At the 
same time, Freud’s reasoning is different from his nephew’s insofar as he understands 
democracy to open up the possibility of another parricide, with social chaos as the 
inevitable result (Freud, 1961: 69, 74).   
                                                          
120 José Brunner critiques Freud’s “obtuseness to the dangers of paternal authority” and finds it 
“astonishing” that developments in Europe in no way suggested to Freud the dangers existing in all 
authoritarian regimes (1995: 170, 166). Indeed, although Freud criticizes fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and 
the Soviet Union, he never makes any critique of authoritarianism as such (Johnston, 1965: 49–50; 
Brunner, 1995: 166).  
121 Indeed, in his reading of Freud through political theory, José Brunner describes Freud’s politics in 
similar terms to how I have described those of Bernays: “Freud’s outlook was not only authoritarian, it 
was also elitist. He never believed it was possible to achieve a working social order without the 
submission of the majority under the command of a minority. He always drew a clear distinction between 
‘the masses,’ whom he thought to be driven by the impulses and passions of their bodies, and a minority 
of people, who organized their lives according to the reality principle and accepted the demands which 
social necessities imposed on them” (1995: 166). Moreover, in similar manner to his nephew (and Plato), 
Brunner describes Freud’s understanding that “only those who exercise self-mastery are entitled to 
govern society” (Brunner, 1995: 166).  
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3.4.4 Bernays as Crass Freudian 
The most important difference between Freud and Bernays is that Bernays’ engagement 
with psychology is crass: while Freud spends several books applying his work on 
individual psychology to group psychology, Bernays does little more than repeatedly 
suggest that group psychology ought to be applied to business. There are two possible 
exceptions. First, in Propaganda, Bernays contends that the business world has been 
operating for too long under a mistaken belief in the economic man of liberal political 
economy. This man, who desires commodities for straightforward and rational reasons, 
is far too simplistic. Instead, we should understand  
many of man’s thoughts and actions [as] compensatory substitutes for desires 
which they have been obliged to suppress. A thing may be desired not for its 
intrinsic worth or usefulness, but because he has unconsciously come to see in 
it a symbol of something else, the desire for which he is ashamed to admit to 
himself (2005: 75). 
 
Bernays is presumably using man here to refer to people, as he contends substitution 
and symbolism are also important in marketing fashion to women (2005: 43, 61). 
Second, in Public Relations, Bernays suggests that Freud can help us understand the 
“hidden markets in the human personality,” because “we all have hidden urges to which 
we respond […] which play a part in our desire to buy” (1952: 218, 217). He even briefly 
discusses these urges with reference to Freud’s work on the id, ego, and superego and 
suggests that his readers look at Freud’s New Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis 
(1952: 249−250).  
 Yet these two exceptions are by no means an in-depth engagement with his 
uncle’s work. In the second exception, Bernays does not actually examine any of the 
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arguments or themes in New Introductory Lectures, he simply defines the terms id, ego, 
and superego. As such, Bernays’ mention of New Introductory Lectures reads more like 
an attempt to give scholarly justification to his own work while simultaneously 
promoting Freud’s work (something he had been doing professionally already). Given 
this, Bernays had to possess some basic understanding of Freud’s work on individual and 
group psychology; indeed, this might explain the similarity between Bernays’ politics of 
capitalism under conservatism and Freud’s elitist, anti-democratic politics. Yet Bernays’ 
references to Freud involve little more than platitudes combined with boasting about his 
personal relationship with an important thinker. If Bernays were interested in rigorously 
applying Freud’s work on group psychology to mass marketing, it would have been 
impossible to ignore the Oedipus complex or the primordial parricide I have outlined in 
this section. Given the centrality of the Oedipus complex to Freud’s social and political 
thought—and indeed, to Freudian theory as a whole—it is revealing that Bernays never 
once mentions it in any of his published work.  
3.4.5 Bernays and Psychology 
Bernays was not doing anything particularly original or innovative, not only as a crass 
Freudian, but in another important respect as well. Bernays’ view that psychology ought 
to be used in marketing was not at all unique: beginning in the late nineteenth century 
and accelerating in the early twentieth, marketing techniques in Anglo-America were 
undergoing change and the marketing industry as a whole expanded greatly (Strasser, 
1982: 242−243; 2009: 27; Ewen and Ewen, 1992; 35−38; Sivulka, 2009: 84−96; O’Reilly, 
2011). Central to this change and expansion was the increasing use of psychology (Ewen, 
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1976: 33−37; Marchand, 1985: 7−13, 235−236; Bowlby, 1993: 96; Sivulka, 2009: 41, 
86−96). In his oft-cited social history of Anglo-American consumer culture, Stuart Ewen 
argues that  
to create consumers efficiently the advertising industry had to develop 
universal notions of what makes people respond, going beyond the “horse 
sense” psychology that had characterized the earlier industry. Such general 
conceptions of human instinct promised to provide ways of reaching a mass 
audience via a universal appeal. Considering the task of having to build a mass 
industry to attend to the needs of mass production, the ad men welcomed the 
work of psychologists in the articulation of these general conceptions (1976: 
33−34; emphasis mine). 
 
To expand upon Ewen’s comments, prior to the late nineteenth century, the “horse 
sense” (or common sense) approach to selling commodities was used. There was some 
print advertising,122 largely within local communities, and these ads tended to employ 
messages of utility and practicality123 (Ewen, 1976: 80; Strasser, 1982: 251−253; O’Reilly, 
2011). However, marketing as an industry124 did not yet exist (Strasser, 1982: 251−252; 
Breazeale, 1994: 2; Sivulka, 2009: 37; O’Reilly, 2011). A large and sophisticated 
marketing industry, complete with psychological appeals to consume, was brought 
about by the development of mass production and the need for mass consumption. As 
such, it is not surprising that in the first four decades of the twentieth century—more or 
                                                          
122 Until the mid-nineteenth century in Anglo-America, advertising was primarily undertaken by peddlers 
(or travelling salespeople) in advance of their arrival to a community and found within general stores 
(Strasser, 1982: 244; Ewen and Ewen, 1992: 37−38, 40−41). Later in the nineteenth century, advertising 
went beyond the local community through mail-order merchandising and department stores (Ewen and 
Ewen, 1992: 37−44). 
123 Ewen cites a fifty-year retrospective (1888−1938) in a 1938 edition of Printers’ Ink magazine that 
overviewed changes to advertising: “The first advertising told the name of the product. In the second 
stage, the specifications of the product were outlined. Then came emphasis upon the uses of the product. 
With each step the advertisement moved farther away from the factory viewpoint and edged itself closer 
into the mental processes of the consumer” (Printers’ Ink cited in Ewen, 1976: 80).  
124 Today advertising is generally understood to be one (among many) forms of marketing 
communications. Marketing encompasses everything from market research to packaging to brand 
mentions in the media (Fletcher, 2010: 1; Richards and Curran, 2002). 
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less contemporaneous with Bernays’ various work—there was a tremendous output of 
publications on the psychology of marketing. These included scholarly and popular texts 
directed at a variety of audiences from door-to-door sales people and department store 
assistants to corporate marketing firms and business scholars (Bowlby, 1993: 94−97). 
  Despite Bernays’ crass Freudianism and unoriginal argument for the use of 
psychology in marketing, Bernays’ work was highly original and innovative in an 
important respect: namely, the application of his political theory (of capitalism under 
conservatism) for marketing to women. In the next section, I examine Bernays’ early 
commodity feminist public relations campaigns of the 1910s and 1920s, particularly his 
most famous, the Torches of Freedom.  
3.5 Happy Homemakers and Torches of Freedom 
In order to demonstrate the originality and innovation of Bernays’ marketing to women, 
some historical context is required. In 1929, the same year as the Torches of Freedom 
campaign, an oft-cited advertisement in Printers’ Ink suggested: “the proper study of 
mankind is man […] but the proper study of markets is woman” (Emerson B. Knight, Inc., 
1929: 133). Printers’ Ink, the leading trade publication for marketing at the time,125 was 
not the only magazine linking women to consumption. That same year Ladies’ Home 
Journal, which had the largest circulation of any American periodical (Hunter, 1990: 
586), suggested that 80 to 85 percent of the forty billion dollars in annual retail spending 
in the United States was done by women (Sivulka, 2009: 96). In fact, most marketing 
trade journals in the 1920s and 1930s attributed around 85 percent of all consumer 
                                                          
125 Printers’ Ink later became Advertising Age (Strasser, 1982: 244).  
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spending to women; and few estimated below 80 percent (Ewen, 1976: 167; Marchand, 
1985: 66). The originality and innovation of Edward Bernays was not that he marketed 
to women, but how he marketed to women. Breazeale notes that there was 
“widespread acceptance of not only the avalanche of statistics but also the mythology 
that accompanied it” (1994: 4). This mythology concerned an idealized white, 
heteronormative, middle-class family. In this family, the benevolent husband earned a 
family wage to support his wife and children; his perky wife was a happy homemaker 
who transformed her husband’s earnings into a clean, tastefully decorated home with 
state-of-the-art appliances (Ewen, 1976: 151−176; Strasser, 1982: 245−249; O’Reilly, 
2011; Warlaumont, 2001: 205; Sivulka, 2009: 42). This section begins by examining 
traditional approaches to marketing to Anglo-American women (including the happy 
homemaker archetype) in order to highlight Bernays’ unique commodity feminist 
approach. 
 From the 1920s to the 1950s, the happy homemaker was used so extensively in 
marketing to women that it became the predominant image of femininity in Anglo-
America. In 1928, Ladies’ Home Journal contended that housewives no longer required 
spinning and weaving skills, but rather that “an entirely different task presents itself, 
more difficult and complex, requiring an infinitely wider range of ability, and for these 
very reasons more interesting and inspiring” (editorial cited in Strasser, 1982: 250). 
What was supposedly “more interesting and inspiring” was the new world of consuming 
commodities. Household consumption was not only framed by marketers as women’s 
work, but as a form of work involving scientific management and advanced 
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administrative skills: for example, developing budgets, keeping purchasing records, and 
undergoing extensive research on various consumer products were all required to run 
efficient households (Ewen, 1976: 163−164, 168−170; Strasser, 1982: 246−249; 
Marchand, 1985: 167−171; Rutherford, 2003: 33; Sivulka, 2009: 42). Advertising 
copywriters frequently described the housewife as the family G.P.A. or General 
Purchasing Agent (Marchand, 1985: 168). Popular women’s magazines “unified the tasks 
of motherhood and consumption” (Ewen, 1976: 172−173). For all of these reasons, 
O’Reilly (2011) has described the happy homemaker as an invention of Madison 
Avenue.126  
 Indeed, during this 1920s−1950s time period, several Madison Avenue marketers 
turned to the development of radio and television programming which venerated the 
happy homemaker. Programs that were developed by Madison Avenue marketers 
included several 1930s and 1940s radio soap operas and the television program Leave It 
To Beaver (1957−1963). Radio soap operas pioneered the practice of product 
placement; indeed, these daytime radio serials were originally dubbed soap operas 
because most were sponsored by soap companies. Their storylines repeatedly 
reaffirmed the importance of homemaking and urged women to consume commodities 
for their families and identify primarily as housewives. The television program Leave It 
To Beaver was developed by Bob Mosher and Joe Connelly, who met while working 
together on Madison Avenue at the J. Walter Thompson marketing agency (now known 
as JWT). The immensely popular show featured perhaps the most famous and iconic 
                                                          
126 Madison Avenue was the street in New York City on which most of the major marketing firms were 
located. 
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happy homemaker, the character June Cleaver (O’Reilly and Tennant, 2009: 51−57; 
O’Reilly, 2011). June was perky and well-dressed; indeed, she almost always wore a nice 
dress (or blouse and skirt), pearl necklace and high-heeled shoes, even while cleaning 
her house. In marketing to women, unlike most of his contemporaries on Madison 
Avenue (and elsewhere), Bernays refused to use any image of femininity akin to the 
happy homemaker. While most marketers sold women washing machines and cake mix 
as the family G.P.A., Bernays sold women cigarettes as torches of (feminist) freedom 
from stifling domestic conformity. 
  The history of how the cigarette eventually became the preferred form of 
tobacco consumption in the United States and Canada, along with Bernays’ role in its 
promotion, is a good illustration of early commodity feminism. Machine production of 
the paper cigarette was introduced in the late nineteenth century. This expansion of 
cigarette consumption has been attributed to both its lowered costs with 
mechanization127 and aggressive public relations campaigns to overcome negative 
associations with cigarettes in the minds of the American public. There were at least 
three negative associations that limited the consumer base for cigarettes in the late 
nineteenth century. First, concerns about smoking-related health problems were widely 
publicized by the anti-cigarette movement.128 Second, the original consumers of 
machine-made cigarettes were recent immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, 
                                                          
127 For example, in her history of cigarettes in America entitled Cigarette Wars: The Triumph of “The Little 
White Slaver,” Cassandra Tate notes the price of ten cigarettes was the same as the price of one cigar in 
the 1890s (1999: 18).  
128 An important group in the movement was The Anti-Cigarette League of America, which in 1901 had 
chapters throughout the United States and Canada, and claimed a membership of 300 000. By the 1920s 
the movement had started to decline, although the League itself survived into the 1930s (Tate, 1999: 39, 
132−3).  
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where cigarette smoking was already common (Tate, 1999: 18). As such, cigarettes had 
to be disassociated from immigrants to make smoking palatable to the larger (racist and 
xenophobic) American population. Third, even after cigarette smoking for English-
speaking white middle-class men became socially acceptable, there remained powerful 
negative associations with white middle-class women smoking.  
Following from the third negative association, cigarettes served as a moral 
marker separating the men of white middle-class America from the women. This 
morality was in many ways created and sustained by the law, medicine, advertising, and 
the media (Tate, 1999: 8, 23). Women who smoked could face legal penalties in parts of 
the United States, often because of concerns about their roles as mothers. For example, 
Tate notes that in 1904, a woman in New York was sentenced to thirty days in jail for 
smoking in front of her children (1999: 5). Smoking was seen by some members of the 
medical profession to be more harmful to women than men, for reasons that it 
compounded women’s supposed higher degree of emotional instability (Tate, 1999: 
114). Advertising campaigns from the 1880s to the 1920s targeted men and rarely 
suggested women smoke. Prior to Bernays, only a small number of advertisements 
suggested that women smoke cigarettes. Yet such advertisements were still directed at 
men: it was suggested that women smoke using misogynist reasoning. For example, an 
early 1880s poster produced by the Duke family tobacco company entitled “My Mother-
in-Law” implied that smoking could improve a woman’s disposition (Tate, 1999: 105). 
Despite addressing advertising campaigns to men, women’s images were commonly 
used in promoting tobacco, such as in the popular trading cards that doubled as package 
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stiffeners (Tate, 1999: 105). The eugenics movement also worked to associate women 
smoking with immorality. There were concerns expressed in medical journals, the 
media, and even the tobacco trade press that (white) women who smoked contributed 
to the supposed problem of “race degeneracy.” The linkage of women smoking to “race 
degeneracy” was first made in the 1880s and reached its height in the 1920s (Tate, 
1999: 115).  
In making cigarettes palatable to white middle-class women, Bernays had to 
overcome not only health-related concerns, but also masculinist and racist129 
associations with women who smoked. In 1928 he started working for George 
Washington Hill, the head of the American Tobacco Company. The Company produced 
Lucky Strikes, a fast-growing brand of cigarettes. The share of cigarettes consumed by 
women had more than doubled from 1923 to 1929 (Tye, 1998: 23−24). This increase in 
consumption is usually attributed to the war having lowered social barriers that 
inhibited women smoking: soldiers smoked130 and women serving abroad took up the 
habit, as did women filling jobs vacated by men in the factories and in tobacco retail 
(Tye, 1998: 24; Tate, 1999: 106−110). However, in 1929 the share of cigarettes 
consumed by women was still only twelve percent (Tye, 1998: 24). In an attempt to 
expand the share of cigarettes consumed by women, Hill asked Bernays to put together 
                                                          
129 Bernays was never able to address racism directly, as Hill wished him to focus on white women. 
Bernays did propose aggressively courting black consumers in 1931 in a similar manner to how he courted 
white women; however, the American Tobacco Company declined as they did not wish to alienate their 
(racist) white clients (Tye, 1998: 42−43). 
130 Tate argues that soldiers smoked in large part due to the American government: the War Department 
issued soldiers cigarettes in their rations and subsidized their sale in the United States and abroad. The 
reason was that because the U.S. had entered the war under the banner of moral reform, smoking was 
seen to divert soldiers from worse sins such as “bad liquor and worse women.” Indeed, “the American 
government soon became the largest single purchaser of cigarettes in the world” (Tate, 1999: 66).  
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a campaign that directly targeted women. From a feminist perspective, his first 
campaign was not much of an improvement over the days of trading cards depicting 
hegemonic forms of femininity for the objectifying gaze of men. Although Bernays’ first 
campaign actually addressed women, it did so by suggesting they be concerned about 
their weight. The slogan, “Reach for a Lucky instead of a Sweet,” sold women cigarettes 
as a fat-free way to curb their hunger (Tye, 1998: 24). Bernays’ second campaign was 
not only more feminist but was also far more successful.  
The campaign relied on the ostensibly empowering image of women marching 
for their rights, and linked women’s rights to cigarette smoking. In 1929, the Easter 
Parade in New York City was set to receive a great deal of media attention. Bernays 
organized a group of fashionable young women, dressed in the flapper style that 
signified so-called modern femininity, to march in the parade. During the march, the 
women were directed to pull out and light cigarettes together in a grand flourish. 
Bernays told the press that the women were marching for women’s rights and provided 
the catchphrase Torches of Freedom to describe their cigarettes. The campaign received 
a tremendous amount of coverage and established a precedent for selling women 
cigarettes using feminist discourse (Bernays, 1965: 386−387; Ewen, 1976: 160−161; 
1996: 3−4; Tate, 1999: 105; Tye, 1998: 27−31; Curtis, 2002).  
It is important to note, however, that the extent of Bernays’ role in overcoming 
the taboo against white women smoking is controversial. In the documentary The 
Century of the Self (2002), Adam Curtis suggests Bernays’ role in overcoming this taboo 
was substantial. In contrast, Tate argues that women were smoking in considerable 
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numbers before the cigarette industry began directing messages at them. Moreover, she 
contends the industry “made virtually no direct overtures to the female trade until after 
that trade was already so large and so widely accepted that it was safe to do so” (Tate, 
1999: 105). Indeed, the twelve percent share of cigarettes consumed by women in 1929 
when the Torches of Freedom campaign was launched—however small it seemed to Hill 
and Bernays—is significant. Bernays claimed that his Torches of Freedom campaign 
single-handedly popularized smoking for women (Tate, 1999: 105), although this ought 
to be treated with skepticism. Indeed, one of the problems with evaluating the extent of 
Bernays’ role in any public relations campaign is Bernays himself. As mentioned 
previously, Bernays tended to be perpetually self-promoting: he “found it tough to turn 
off the rhetoric even when he was telling his own story,” and therefore tended to take 
more credit than he actually merited (Tye, 1998: viii, 75, 253).131 Whatever the extent of 
Bernays’ role, it is clear that cigarette use among women greatly expanded in the 
1930s.132 Yet the extent of his role is almost beside the point. It does not take away 
from his importance to the origins of commodity feminism. 
There were other (albeit less famous) campaigns in which Bernays was involved 
earlier in his career that can be described as commodity feminist. The first was his 
                                                          
131 In the last chapter of his biography, The Father of Spin: Edward L. Bernays and the Birth of Public 
Relations (1998), Larry Tye argues that Bernays’ longest and last public relations campaign was to sell 
himself as a historical figure. Bernays outlived all of his contemporaries (he died in 1995 at the age of 102) 
and to the end of his life continued “to advance his contention that he, more than they, deserved to be 
called the prince of publicity” (Tye, 1998: x). Tye also contends, however, that Bernays’ “actual 
accomplishments were so momentous that he didn’t need to bend the truth” (1998: 75).  
132 The greatest expansion of the use of cigarettes was actually in the 1930s, with cigarettes eventually 
reaching their height in 1965 when 42 percent of American adults smoked them (Tate, 1999: 3). The 
expansion of cigarette use is quite remarkable when one considers that in 1880, of the total quantity of 
tobacco consumed in the United States, cigarettes constituted barely 1 percent. Chewing tobacco was the 
most popular, accounting for 58 percent, followed by tobacco for pipes and cigars at 19 percent. Even the 
consumption of snuff, at less than 3 percent, was higher than cigarettes (Tate, 1999: 11).  
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promotion of the play Damaged Goods in 1913. The play was controversial as it dealt 
with syphilis and prostitution, and attacked the prevailing standards of sexist prudery. 
Bernays and his business partner Fred Robinson turned the controversy into a cause, 
recruited backers who were public role models, and after doing so sold many tickets to 
the play (Tye, 1998: 6−7). The second was a 1922 media event with his new wife Doris 
Fleishman. Bernays handled the public relations for the Waldorf Astoria and instituted a 
policy whereby the press would be immediately notified about anything newsworthy 
that happened at the hotel. Knowing this policy was in place, after his wedding to 
Fleishman, Bernays persuaded her to register with him at the hotel under her maiden 
name. This act resulted in newspaper headlines in both the United States and Europe, 
and Fleishman became a symbol of women’s rights. More importantly, the Waldorf 
Astoria gained a reputation for being modern and forward-thinking in allowing a 
married woman to register under her own name (Tye, 1998: 2−3). Fleishman also 
reiterated her status symbol for women’s rights in being the first married woman in the 
United States to get a passport issued in her maiden name (Tye, 1998: non-paginated 
picture page); thus Bernays, by extension, became a symbol of the enlightened feminist 
husband. 
From a capitalist perspective, Edward Bernays was a thinker and practitioner 
who was ahead of his time. Today the Torches of Freedom is seen as “a classic in the 
world of public relations” and one in which Bernays “roughed out what have become 
the strategies and practices of public relations in the United States” (Tye, 1993: 31; 
Ewen, 1996: 4). Bernays influenced the subsequent development of other (now-famous) 
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commodity feminist campaigns for cigarettes. For example, Lucky Strike used Amelia 
Earhart, a pioneer in women’s aviation, to sell cigarettes (Ware, 1993: 98; Hermann, 
2000: 94). Earhart is best known for being the first woman (and only second person) to 
fly solo across the Atlantic Ocean in 1932, as well as for her mysterious disappearance 
somewhere over the Pacific Ocean in 1937. Earhart herself identified as a feminist and is 
described by feminist historian Susan Ware as a “model of women’s postsuffrage 
achievement” (1993: 13, 202).133 Another example of commodity feminist campaigns 
influenced by Bernays can be found in Virginia Slims’ brand of cigarettes. The brand has 
been selling cigarettes with the slogan “You’ve Come a Long Way” (later adding “baby” 
to the end) since they were first marketed in 1968. Outside of cigarettes, commodity 
feminism remained a niche form of marketing from Bernays’ early commodity feminist 
campaigns until the 1980s.  
3.6 Conclusion  
Peter Gay has noted that “we all speak Freud now, correctly or not. We casually refer to 
Oedipal conflicts and sibling rivalry, narcissism and Freudian slips” (1989c: ix). I began 
this chapter by discussing the role of Edward Bernays in popularizing his uncle 
Sigmund’s work. Indeed, it is in large part due to Bernays’ efforts that “we all speak 
Freud” in Anglo-America today. Similarly, in her recent book The Aftermath of Feminism, 
Angela McRobbie has suggested that “feminism has achieved the status of common 
                                                          
133 Earhart used her image for financial gain in more than just cigarettes. She was married to public 
relations counsel George Putnam—who was not as well-known as Bernays but quite successful in his own 
right—and the couple used her image to promote commodities signifying modern, active femininity, 
including luggage and “active clothes” (Ware, 1993: 97−103). 
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sense” (2009: 6). Just as Anglo-Americans draw casually upon Freudian terms, they also 
draw casually “upon a vocabulary that includes words like ‘empowerment’ and ‘choice’ 
[…] as a kind of substitute for feminism” (McRobbie, 2009: 1).134 Given the tremendous 
influence of marketing and commodity culture, feminism as common sense cannot be 
disentangled from the ascendancy of commodity feminism today. In this intervention on 
the origins of commodity feminism, I have explored Bernays’ writings and his early 
commodity feminist marketing campaigns. I have read Bernays as a political theorist and 
as espousing a political theory of capitalism under conservatism, defined as a 
conservative view of society in which commodity consumption is treated as a necessary 
form of social control. In undergoing this reading, I have compared the behaviour of 
Bernays’ ideal public relations counsel to Plato’s philosopher-king and explored the 
relationship between Bernays’ elitist anti-democratic politics to his uncle Freud’s belief 
in the necessity of a strong and authoritative father(-substitute). Finally, I have 
suggested that after Bernays, commodity feminism has developed from an 
unconventional approach for marketing to women in the early twentieth century to its 
ascendancy in the early twenty-first century.  
 Indeed, on the final point, most marketing to women in Anglo-America 
continued to rely upon heteronormative, traditional roles for women until the 1980s. 
Although the happy homemaker in marketing imagery started to decline in the 1960s, 
women continued to be marketed to primarily as men’s girlfriends or potential 
                                                          
134 Although McRobbie’s primary focus of inquiry is feminism in popular culture (rather than commodity 
feminism in my understanding of the term) her point is quite relevant. She looks at a variety of popular 
culture sources, from the Bridget Jones’ Diary books and film adaptations to television makeover 
programs. For more on feminism in popular culture—and how it differs from my understanding of 
commodity feminism—see the introductory chapter to this dissertation.  
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girlfriends, wives, and mothers (Warlaumont, 2001: 204−208, 233); in other words, 
women were defined in terms of their relationships to men and the family. The 
difference was that (beginning in the 1960s) women started to be more sexualized in 
ads, which was a marked departure from the seemingly asexual happy homemaker 
(O’Reilly, 2011).135 In addition, women started to be depicted undergoing activities that 
would have been considered inappropriate for the virtuous happy homemaker: for 
example, women were behind the wheel in automobile ads, and drank alcohol in liquor 
ads (Warlaumont, 2001: 205). Yet on the whole, prior to the 1980s, women were largely 
represented by marketers as confined to the home, and/or as sexualized objects for the 
desiring male gaze.  
 In the 1970s, change was anticipated by many American scholars and 
practitioners of marketing. Studies were conducted that claimed to empirically test the 
accuracy of feminist critiques of advertising (Toland Frith and Mueller, 2010: 91). 
Interestingly, most studies agreed that feminist critiques were justified (Dominick and 
Rauch, 1972; Belkaoui and Belkaoui, 1976; Kovacs, 1972; Venkatesan and Losco, 1975; 
Venkatesh, 1980), or “at least partially justified” (Courtney and Lockeretz, 1971: 95; 
Wagner and Banos, 1973; Brown, El-Ansary et al., 1976; Duker and Tucker, 1977). These 
were important studies (from a capitalist perspective) because women in the 1970s 
were as much the key decision-makers in purchasing many consumer products as they 
were in the 1920s.  
                                                          
135 Indeed, the iconic happy homemaker June Cleaver did not sleep in the same bed as her husband Ward: 
they slept in separate twin beds. 
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What was debated was how—and less often whether—marketing practitioners 
should address feminist (or so-called women’s liberationist) critiques. Opinions ranged 
from the idea that ignoring feminist critiques would be a serious and costly mistake 
(Dominick and Rauch, 1972; Kovacs, 1972; Belkaoui and Belkaoui, 1976), to the idea that 
having marketing practices influenced by feminist values would alienate the 
considerably larger consumer base of more so-called traditional women who were 
married to men and did not participate in the paid labour force (Lazer, Smallwood et al., 
1972; Duker and Tucker, 1977). On the latter perspective, Jacob M. Duker and Lewis R. 
Tucker warned in 1977:  
Women’s lib attitudes, especially among younger women may, after all, be an 
affectation or a fad or both. Marketing or advertising policies which cater to 
affectations or fads should do so consciously and deliberately. To alter a 
product image in a mistaken belief that the change to be accommodated is 
long term when it really is not can be costly (1977: 470). 
 
Yet among the marketing scholars and practitioners writing in this time period, Duker 
and Tucker were largely exceptional. Most agreed that change was required in 
marketing to women; the primary debate was the degree of change. After all, it is the 
marketer’s job to maintain and expand consumer bases, and this involves paying close 
attention to social, cultural, political, and economic changes.  
 Indeed, by the 1970s, it was hard to ignore not only feminist critiques of 
representations of women by marketers, but also significant changes to the position of 
women in Anglo-American societies. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
participation of women in the paid labour force expanded greatly, brought about by 
second wave feminism combined with a labour shortage and economic boom in the 
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Global North (Newman and White, 2012: 192). In addition, Betty Friedan’s book The 
Feminine Mystique136 helped to create a wide public discourse in the popular media 
(including books, magazines, newspapers, television and radio shows) that explored the 
limitations of traditional understandings of femininity and the need for women to 
develop “identities of their own” (Starr, 2004: 276). Marketing scholars and 
practitioners in the 1970s were paying attention to these social, cultural, political, and 
economic changes. As such, most did not share Duker and Tucker’s view that feminism 
was merely an affectation put on by some women or a fad that would come to pass. 
Indeed, some of these marketing studies even engaged with then-popular feminist 
writings including Friedan and Germaine Greer (see Dominick and Rauch, 1972: 259; 
Venkatesan and Losco, 1975: 49). Of course, the underlying motivating factor in these 
studies was the pursuit of profit, competition, and free trade, rather than social justice 
(Belisle, 2003: 194).137 In other words, these studies were less concerned with how 
predominant representations of women by marketers were limiting or demeaning, 
focusing rather on how women’s perception of these representations as limiting or 
demeaning could adversely affect profit margins. 
 In a 1980 special issue of Marketing News,138 various Anglo-American marketing 
scholars and practitioners outlined their predictions and recommendations for the new 
decade. Fabian Lindon, in his article “Demographically, 1980s Look Bright,” contended 
                                                          
136 See section 2.5 for an extended discussion of Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique. 
137 Indeed, as Donica Belisle notes, “an unbridgeable political gulf” separates marketing scholarship from 
social history and cultural studies (2003: 194); indeed, I would add that this political gulf separates 
marketing scholarship from the critical social sciences as a whole. Moreover, the former is in many ways 
the antithesis of the latter (Belisle, 2003: 194).  
138 Marketing News was (and remains) a trade publication of the American Marketing Association (AMA). 
This special issue concerned retail marketing in the 1980s.  
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that one of the reasons the 1980s “look bright” is the “the ever-increasing number of 
working women” that are well-educated with a high disposable income (1980: 2). Roger 
D. Blackwell predicted that successful marketers of the 1980s would be “able to 
understand and cater to […] unique lifestyle segments,” particularly the empowered 
working woman (1980: 3). Another article argued that marketing research in the new 
decade must be entirely different from the 1970s, in that it needs to accurately reflect 
changes in the position of women (Marketing News, 1980: 21, 23). This issue of 
Marketing News was part of a larger discussion among practitioners and scholars in the 
early 1980s on women and their changing roles, and more importantly, how these 
changing roles could be harnessed in marketing consumer products to women (see also 
Taylor, 1980; Young, 1980; Collins, 1981; Johnston, 1981; Luongo, 1981; Schaninger and 
Allen, 1981; Business Week, 1982; Willard, 1983). The happy homemaker archetype,139 
and the attendant assumption that the so-called women’s market was “any housewife 
18 to 49” (Bartos, 1977: 31), had long been abandoned. In addition, debates from the 
1970s concerning women’s lib—that is, whether and/or to what extent it should have an 
effect on marketing to women140—had ceased. The only question for 1980s marketing 
practitioners and scholars was how to best sell commodities to the (supposedly) newly 
empowered woman.  
 Commodity feminism remained a niche form of marketing from Bernays’ early 
commodity feminist campaigns until the 1980s, during which there was a widespread 
adoption of commodity feminist marketing practices in Anglo-America. In the 1980s, 
                                                          
139 See section 3.5. 
140 See section 3.6.  
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commodity feminism expanded at the same time as popular women’s magazines 
flourished; the magazines themselves became purveyors of commodity feminism, both 
in editorial content and advertising (Goldman et al., 1991: 331, 337; Goldman, 1992: 
130−154; McRobbie, 2009: 13−14, 34). The archetype of the power dressing career 
woman was used regularly in marketing and popular women’s magazines.141 This 
expansion of commodity feminism also occurred at a time in which consumption was 
increasingly framed as patriotic (by state discourses) and conspicuous consumption was 
fervently celebrated (by popular culture) (Banet-Weiser and Mukherjee, 2012: 5).142  
 In concluding this chapter (and my discussion of the origins of commodity 
feminism), it is important to note that both Bernays’ political theory and public relations 
campaigns greatly influenced the subsequent development of commodity feminism. 
From the outset, the politics of commodity feminism involved liberal feminist political 
values combined with capitalism under conservatism: liberal political values allow 
                                                          
141 The power dresser was, or aspired to be, a business executive or other high-powered woman. Power 
dressing generally involved a tailored skirt or pants in a neutral colour (such as grey, black, or navy blue), a 
matching suit jacket with shoulder pads, discreet jewelry, and tasteful makeup (Brewis et al., 1997: 1287; 
Entwistle, 1997: 311). The power dresser was often depicted as a white woman wearing a business suit 
and running shoes, sprinting through the streets of Manhattan. She was also regularly likened to powerful 
female public figures such as then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Indeed, Thatcher reportedly 
changed her clothing style in the early 1980s after reading the British edition of John T. Molloy’s 1980 
dress manual, Women: Dress for Success (Entwistle, 1997: 311−312). According to Molloy’s book, and the 
power dressing popular wisdom that followed, women were supposed to dress for success by learning the 
rules of, and purchasing the commodities associated with, power dressing (Entwistle, 1997: 323; Zukin 
and Smith Maguire, 2004: 182). As Entwistle notes, power dressing “marked the emergence of a new kind 
of consumption for women, who are traditionally associated with the ‘frivolity’ and aesthetics of fashion” 
(1997: 312; emphasis mine). In other words, power dressing can be seen as a pre-third wave feminist 
reclamation of feminized commodities and consumption. (See part B of the introduction and section 2.3 
of this dissertation for more on the construction of women’s consumption as “frivolous.” See section 2.6 
for a discussion of third wave feminism from the 1990s to present.) However, unlike the third wave, 
power dressing made no claims of inclusivity; this was clearly a form of commodity feminism exclusively 
for university-educated, professional career women (Entwistle, 1997: 314).  
142 Indeed, the 1980s are often referred to as the “free-spending 80s” and “the decade of consumption” 
(Gray, 1992). Over the course of the decade, consumption of consumer products increased substantially 
in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere (Attanasio and Weber, 1994). 
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women to feel like feminists through their consumption commodities, yet because this 
is contained within a framework of capitalism under conservatism, these commodities 
serve as a form of social control. Bernays recognized a century ago that passivity in both 
women and men is the key to social control in a large capitalist democracy. In lighting a 
Bernaysian torch of freedom, a woman may feel a temporary sense of liberty while at 
the same time find herself lulled into complacency. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Commodity Feminism as Subjectivity:  
Cosmetics and Corporate-Sponsored Empowerment 
 
The question of the subject was and remained a problem for Marx. 
—Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1987: 49) 
 
Under the auspices of corporate management, the commodity form penetrates and reshapes 
dimensions of social life […] to the point where subjectivity itself seemingly becomes a 
commodity to be bought and sold on the market. 
—James Livingston (1998: 416) 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The British fashion model Lesley Hornby, popularly known by her nickname “Twiggy,” 
first appeared in the pages of Vogue in 1967. At the time, her body was considered 
shockingly thin. Her nickname was explained by a Vogue writer as the result of her 
appearing “as though a strong gale would snap her in two and dash her to the ground” 
(Wolf, 1997: 184). Today models with a body type similar to Twiggy are the norm; 
models any larger are considered plus-sized. According to the fashion industry, clothes 
hang better on the very thin. Feminists have long critiqued the unrealistic 
representations of femininity embodied by these models and linked these 
representations to a wide variety of psychological and physical harm to girls and 
women, such as low self-esteem and eating disorders. What is often lost in these 
critiques is discussion of commodities and processes of commodification. Insofar as 
there is discussion, it usually concerns how the models themselves are objectified and 
fetishized as commodities. Yet as the previous chapters have made clear, the 
relationship between women and commodities is more complicated than this type of 
discussion would suggest.  
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Fashion models are not simply commodities in and of themselves: as the concern 
for the manner in which clothes hang would suggest, they are also clothes hangers for 
other commodities.143 Women are expected to starve themselves, not only to be better 
commodities, but also to be better display frames for other commodities. When we 
ignore women’s status as display frames, any representation of femininity that deviates 
from the Twiggy norm becomes understood as progressive. A good example of such a 
representation is the Dove Corporation’s “Campaign for Real Beauty.” Since 2004, Dove 
(a subsidiary of the Unilever Corporation) has used real women—that is, women with no 
previous modelling experience, bodies larger than the Twiggy norm, and not necessarily 
white—to sell Dove products. Women in the Global North are encouraged to endorse 
this ostensibly progressive campaign by purchasing the commodities displayed by other 
women. Yet in the Global South, Unilever is selling women the skin lightening cream Fair 
& Lovely. Although the Campaign for Real Beauty is not associated with Fair & Lovely, 
both are Unilever initiatives and the marketing of the latter uses language and strategies 
strikingly similar to the former. As such, the corporate-sponsored empowerment offered 
by the Unilever Corporation globally reinscribes women’s status as display frames for 
other commodities (if not commodities themselves), suggests women understand this 
status as empowering, and solidifies a relationship between feminist activism and the 
consumption of (racialized and racist) commodities.  
                                                          
143 Although it is difficult to confirm, Hornby herself likely understood her job in this manner. It has been 
widely reported that when asked why she was retiring from modelling at the age of twenty, Hornby 
responded with the statement: “You can’t be a clothes hanger for your entire life!” 
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The previous two chapters charted how commodity feminism has gained 
ascendancy as a predominant form of feminism today. Additionally, they established 
commodity feminism as both empowering (in revaluing femininity) and disempowering 
(in creating docile consuming female subjects). Although it has not yet been brought to 
the forefront, underlying the discussion of commodity feminism as simultaneously 
empowering and disempowering is the question of subjectivity. This chapter moves 
from theorizing the origins of commodity feminism to theorizing contemporary 
commodity feminism, locating the ascendancy of commodity feminism in its role in 
subject formation. This maneuver from origins to ascendancy also involves moving from 
the unconventional public relations campaigns of one individual (Edward Bernays) in the 
early twentieth century United States to a dominant paradigm for the globalized 
marketing campaigns of the early twenty-first century. As the Unilever examples will 
demonstrate, the campaigns and political writings of Bernays continue to influence 
contemporary commodity feminism.  
The ensuing discussion of subjectivity and cosmetics is organized into five 
sections. Section 4.2 examines in greater depth the marketing of the Dove Campaign for 
Real Beauty and Fair & Lovely of the Unilever Corporation for its so-called 
empowerment of women in the Global North and South respectively. The next two 
sections concern Marx’s conception of subjectivity. Section 4.3 discusses Marx’s use of 
the term species-being, as it tends to be understood as his theory of subjectivity. Finding 
that it is overly essentialist, I argue for a different Marxist conception of subjectivity. 
Section 4.4 examines two articles published in the 1980s, Gayatri Spivak’s “Scattered 
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Speculations on the Question of Value” (1985) and Jack Amariglio and Antonio Callari’s 
“Marxian Value Theory and the Problem of the Subject: The Role of Commodity 
Fetishism” (1989), both of which establish a relationship between subjectivity and value. 
Yet it is only the latter piece which has been taken up by what Swanson refers to as 
“anti-essentialist” Marxist theorists (2005: 87), primarily in the pages of the journals 
Rethinking Marxism and Historical Materialism. I critique this body of literature for 
ignoring Spivak’s original contribution, and as such, treating subjectivity in abstraction 
from gender and race. I read commodity fetishism as a particular white male subjectivity 
typical of capitalist social formations. Through these sections, I rethink Livingston’s 
argument (from the quote cited in the epitaph to this chapter) that subjectivity seems to 
become a commodity sold by corporations. Section 4.5 returns to Spivak to contend that 
if commodity fetishism constitutes particular forms of white masculine subjectivity then 
commodity feminism constitutes particular forms of feminine/feminist subjectivities 
located in both the Global North and South. This argument is made by further exploring 
the operation of the Campaign for Real Beauty and Fair & Lovely. The overarching 
argument of this chapter, therefore, takes Livingston one step further: in selling a 
feminine subjectivity through feminized and racialized commodities, corporations 
themselves play a crucial role in subject formation. Commodity feminism in the 
contemporary context will be read as constituting several prevalent forms of female 
subjectivity, which are racialized in various ways.  
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4.2 The Unilever Corporation in the Global North and South  
In order to put forth the argument of this chapter, it is important to first describe my 
reasons for choosing Unilever as my example of contemporary commodity feminism, 
overview both the Campaign for Real Beauty and Fair & Lovely, as well as the 
contradictory messages between the two campaigns. This section sets up the 
subsequent discussion of the role of corporate-sponsored commodity feminism in the 
formation of subjectivity (using Marx, Spivak, and the anti-essentialist Marxists144). In 
addition to an overview of the various aspects of the two Unilever commodity feminist 
campaigns, subsection 4.2.2 also links Edward Bernays’ political theory of capitalism 
under conservatism to the Campaign for Real Beauty.  
4.2.1 Rationale for Unilever Example 
There are several reasons I have chosen Unilever as my example of contemporary 
commodity feminism. First, the marketing of cosmetics is a particularly apt site of 
investigation, given the historical role of cosmetics in popular feminist debates 
concerning the femininity question.145 Unilever is well-known for its cosmetics146 (and 
so-called “cosmeceuticals”147) directed at women, particularly the brands Dove and Fair 
                                                          
144 See sections 4.3–4.5. 
145 See sections 2.3–2.7. 
146 Cosmetic products sold by Unilever—or more specifically, Dove and Fair & Lovely—include those 
associated with skin (such as creams, lotions, face cleansing products, and a variety of skin lightening 
products including creams, face washes, and sunscreens) and hair (such as shampoo, conditioner, mousse, 
and hair spray). 
147 The term cosmeceuticals suggests a blend between cosmetics and pharmaceuticals; these are products 
that promise longer-lasting changes than cosmetics such as makeup. In the twenty-first century, 
cosmeceuticals (including skin lightening cream) constitute a growing segment of the industry. Before the 
advent of cosmeceuticals, cosmetic products were understood to involve temporary changes to one’s 
appearance (such as covering liver spots on the skin), while more permanent changes (such as removing 
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& Lovely. In fact, Dove and Fair & Lovely are considered the flagship brands of Unilever 
and Hindustan Unilever Limited (HUL) respectively; the latter has become the largest 
selling skin lightening cream in the world (Karan, 2008; Chakraborty, 2011; McDougle, 
2013). Second, perhaps in part due to Unilever’s sheer size and marketing budget,148 
Unilever’s commodity feminist marketing campaigns have been highly profitable. The 
Campaign for Real Beauty is seen to have completely “revitalized” a brand that was 
“commercially stagnating” (Robinson et al., 2008). Indeed, before the campaign began 
in 2003, sales were declining to the point that major retailers such as Walmart were 
threatening to stop stocking Dove products (Robinson et al., 2008). Although Fair & 
Lovely has consistently been the market leader in the skin lightening cream industry in 
India, in the early 2000s the brand was facing problems with fakes and duplicates in 
rural India (Vasavada-Oza et al., 2012: 12). This problem has largely been overcome 
through commodity feminist marketing practices in rural communities (Vasavada-Oza et 
al., 2012: 10, 12−13, 15). Today, Fair & Lovely “defines the cosmetic industry in India, 
[as] most women only use one cosmetic—and that is a fairness cream” (Chakraborty, 
2011). Third, Unilever’s commodity feminism is highly regarded among marketing 
scholars and practitioners (and the wider international business community). Dove’s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
these spots entirely) would be classified as a drug. Cosmeceuticals create regulatory difficulties for the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the United States and similar government agencies in other 
countries because it is unclear whether cosmeceuticals are cosmetics or drugs. Although cosmeceuticals 
as a term was invented by marketers, the industry continues to insist that cosmeceuticals are cosmetics 
(as cosmetics are subject to less strenuous testing and regulation than pharmaceuticals). The cosmetics 
industry has a vested interest in keeping cosmeceuticals subject to less regulation: the global market for 
thigh creams alone, the effectiveness of which is questionable, is worth 90 million USD (Dowsett, 2011: 
346−347).  
148 Unilever is a huge multinational corporation. It is the second-largest advertiser in the world today, and 
two billion people use its products on a daily basis (Clift, 2013). 
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Campaign for Real Beauty is widely considered to be an example of marketing best 
practices, and it is regularly used as an example in business schools such as Harvard 
(WARC, 2009). The campaign has received a tremendous amount of attention in the 
marketing trade and scholarly publications, and other corporations have launched 
similar campaigns.149 HUL has been credited as developing best practices for marketing 
to poor, rural women (Kopper, 2010).  
The two final reasons I have chosen Unilever as my example of contemporary 
commodity feminism concern the way in which Dove’s Campaign for Real Beauty has 
escaped much critique. First, within Anglo-American mainstream media and popular 
culture, the campaign has received almost exclusively positive publicity, and an 
exceptional amount of it. For example, the campaign landed on the cover of People 
magazine in 2005 and has been featured on popular American television shows such as 
The Today Show,150 The Ellen DeGeneres Show, The Oprah Winfrey Show,151 The View, 
The Apprentice and Good Morning America (Flavelle, 2006: A6; MacLeod, 2007; 
Johnston and Taylor, 2008: 942, 951; Robinson et al., 2008).152 Second, the campaign 
has yet to be subject to much feminist critique; in fact, some academic feminists were 
                                                          
149 For example, the Procter & Gamble brand “Secret” deodorant—long-associated with the commodity 
feminist slogan “Strong Enough for a Man”—has recently started a campaign for the U.S. market to 
(ostensibly) promote self-esteem in girls. This campaign uses many of the same language and tactics 
originated by Dove. 
150 As Robinson et al. note, “Katie Couric […] spent 16 minutes on The Today Show with Dove’s firming 
girls, exposure that you just can’t buy” (2008). The “firming girls” were the women who appeared in the 
earliest Campaign for Real Beauty advertisements for firming cream. 
151 Oprah Winfrey dedicated an entire show to the Campaign for Real Beauty’s Pro-Age products in 
February 2007. Winfrey and Dove were in a public relations partnership at the time. This partnership has 
been credited as giving Dove a 6:1 return: that is, Dove made $6 USD for every $1 spent (Robinson et al., 
2008).  
152 The campaign also received coverage in nearly every major media channel in the United Kingdom 
(January 2007) and Germany (February 2007) (Robinson et al., 2008).  
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actually involved with the campaign. For example, Carol Gilligan (author of the 1982 text 
In A Different Voice), Mary Pipher (author of the 1994 text Reviving Ophelia: Saving the 
Selves of Adolescent Girls), and Joan Jacobs Brumberg (author of the 1997 text The Body 
Project: An Intimate History of American Girls) played an active role in Dove’s market 
research (or Global Studies, which are discussed in the next section). This suggests that 
much has changed since 1992, when marketing scholar Barbara B. Stern complained 
about the “anti-consumption stance” of academic feminists who are “hostile to 
corporate America” (1992: 11). She called for “a re-integration of feminist and business 
research” given the “potential for enriching our [marketing] discipline by offering 
innovative ways to look at advertising text and consumer responses” (Stern, 1992: 11). 
Feminist participation in Dove’s campaign suggests that Stern’s call is starting to be 
heeded.  
4.2.2 The Campaign for Real Beauty  
In 2004, the Campaign for Real Beauty launched in the United Kingdom. It subsequently 
spread to various countries in North, South, and Central America, Europe, and Southeast 
Asia, although it remains concentrated in the Global North. Ostensibly designed to 
challenge unrealistic images of women in mainstream media and marketing, the actual 
goal of the campaign is to sell Dove products, using real women rather than models. The 
campaign uses traditional marketing, such as advertisements in magazines, on 
billboards, and on public transportation vehicles. It also relies heavily on non-traditional 
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marketing, through an interactive website,153 social media, and even consumer-
generated content. The campaign website encourages women and girls to engage in 
democratic activities such as casting votes, participating in online workshops, attending 
local consciousness-raising events sponsored by Dove, and even creating content for the 
website itself. The campaign’s website also has an ever-growing collection of articles on 
various topics related to the body image of women and girls. Dove has produced several 
short films which have received wide circulation via the video-sharing website YouTube: 
Mothers and Daughters, Evolution, and Little Girls154 in 2006, Onslaught and Amy in 
2007, and Camera Shy and a series of six Real Beauty Sketches in 2013. One of the most 
well-known of the early Dove films, Evolution, received some circulation before trailers 
in North American cinemas and then was posted to YouTube just as the website was 
gaining popularity. It became an internet sensation, as millions of viewers circulated the 
film through e-mail and media-sharing websites (Banet-Weiser, 2012: 40). Evolution has 
been credited by marketers as saving Unilever tens of thousands of dollars it might have 
otherwise spent in advertising (Flavelle, 2006: A9; MacLeod, 2007).  
 Other aspects of the campaign include a play and the creation of a Self-Esteem 
Fund. Body & Soul, the play commissioned by Dove and performed in Toronto’s Distillery 
District in 2008, was meant to “give a voice to women over 45” (according to a 
marketer) and challenge conceptions about women and aging (Bradshaw, 2008: R1, R4). 
Unsurprisingly, the play happened to correspond to Dove’s then new Pro-Age line of 
                                                          
153 See www.campaignforrealbeauty.com. 
154 Little Girls is more commonly known as True Colors, after the 1986 Cyndi Lauper song that is used in 
the film. This film first appeared on North American television during a commercial break in the 2006 
Superbowl and then received wide circulation through the internet (Robinson et al., 2008). 
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products for women over 45. The Self-Esteem Fund sponsored by Dove offers free 
online educational tools to promote girls’ self-esteem and also funds charitable 
organizations that foster self-esteem. Of course, the education tools also serve to 
educate young girls on the importance of purchasing commodities, and Dove 
commodities in particular.155 Of the various aspects of the campaign, it is their website 
and internet films that are considered “revolutionary” in marketing circles (Banet-
Weiser, 2012: 44; Clift, 2013). The internet aspects of the campaign will be discussed in 
more depth with respect to subject formation in section 4.6.  
 The Campaign for Real Beauty illustrates the continued relevance of Edward 
Bernays’ political theory of capitalism under conservatism in contemporary commodity 
feminism both in how the role of the marketing professional is framed, and the use of 
social science research in marketing. This is particularly clear when examining two public 
talks given by marketing representatives from the campaign (Sharon MacLeod and Janet 
Kestin) and four global studies commissioned by Dove. To begin with the talks, both 
were given by white women who presented themselves and the work they do as 
feminist, albeit without actually mentioning the word feminism. The first talk was given 
by Sharon MacLeod (the Dove Brand Director) to the York University Collegiate Branch 
of the American Marketing Association in January 2007.156 The second talk was given by 
Janet Kestin (the Chief Creative Officer of Ogilvy and Mather Ad Toronto) at a luncheon 
                                                          
155 According to Janet Kestin, these online workbooks have been used all over the world by parents in 
discussion about body image issues with their children, in schools, in churches for Sunday school classes, 
and by therapists whose patients have eating disorders. She also notes the Dove programs have been 
worked into the regular school curriculum in Australia and claims there is lobbying for that going on all 
around the world (Kestin, 2008: 4−5).  
156 MacLeod’s lecture was one of a series of events devoted to give students insight into the world of 
marketing and careers in marketing.  
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supporting a shelter for battered women in Mississauga, Ontario in June 2008. Both 
MacLeod and Kestin presented themselves as playing an important role in a feminist 
struggle: MacLeod as a lone agent for change in a culture that is hostile to women’s self-
esteem,157 and Kestin as a feminist hero in a male-dominated advertising world 
(MacLeod, 2007; Kestin, 2008: 7−8). Despite these presentations, not only was the word 
feminism never mentioned, but there was no acknowledgement of the existence of a 
women’s movement in any form or at any time. Indeed, an uncritical observer of 
MacLeod and Kestin’s lectures might come to the conclusion that no feminist texts had 
ever been written on the femininity question, no activism around body politics existed 
before the campaign, no large scale quantitative research on women’s body image had 
been done prior to Dove funding their global studies, and no school curriculum ever 
included topics on body image or eating disorders. The one exception is when Kestin 
mentioned Naomi Wolf’s The Beauty Myth (Kestin, 2008: 1). However, given that Wolf 
has served as a spokesperson for the campaign (in exchange for Dove donating money 
to The Woodhull Institute for Ethical Leadership, a feminist organization she co-
founded), this is hardly surprising. Overall, the impression was given that it is MacLeod 
and her company Dove, and Kestin and her advertising company Ogilvy and Mather, 
who are fighting this fight on behalf of all women.  
 MacLeod and Kestin are both commodity feminist marketers in the tradition of 
Edward Bernays. MacLeod framed her discussion of marketing as a matter of “ethics,” 
                                                          
157 MacLeod, to her credit, did admit that her “fight” is lucrative for her company and herself. For 
example, she acknowledged the great deal of free advertising the campaign has secured through YouTube 
and media coverage (MacLeod, 2007).  
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enjoining marketing students to think about the ethics of marketing generally and the 
ethics of choosing a company for which to work more specifically (MacLeod, 2007). She 
claimed that although she did not think about ethics when looking for a job, she was 
fortunate enough to secure a job with an “ethical company,” the Unilever Corporation. 
For this reason, “employees of Unilever are very proud to be so” (MacLeod, 2007). It is a 
matter of ethical imperative, argued MacLeod, to think about what one is selling. She 
urged students to think about themselves at retirement age. She questioned how one 
would feel to look back upon one’s career and know that one did not do anything except 
persuade people to smoke or children to eat sugar. According to MacLeod, marketing is 
about creating culture and makes a tremendous difference in people’s lives. She 
contended Dove is creating a counter-culture that is broadening the definition of 
femininity, challenging people to think about beauty stereotypes, and sparking dialogue 
(MacLeod, 2007). Similarly, Kestin began her talk by stating that after graduation, her 
best friend in university went to work in Africa (presumably doing development work), 
and she went to work in advertising. She contended that advertising can be a 
“guarantee against self-worth, if you kind of have the lurking suspicion that you kind of 
want to do something useful with your life” (Kestin, 2008: 2). Pro bono work for 
charities is the advertiser’s one chance to redeem themselves, or in her words, the 
advertiser’s “hedge against going to hell for all the kinds of stuff that we do” (Kestin, 
2008: 2). Although she acknowledged the campaign is not exactly pro bono work (at 
least insofar as she admitted to Unilever’s profit motive), she contended that since 
corporations have the power to reach people, “they might as well use [that power] to 
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do good” (Kestin, 2008: 3). Both MacLeod’s discussion of the ethics of marketing and 
Kestin’s good/bad marketing distinction are reminiscent of Bernays. As discussed in the 
previous chapter,158 Bernays believed that in a similar manner to the law (in which there 
exist both “honest lawyers and shyster lawyers”), marketing can have both good and 
bad consequences (Bernays cited in Tye, 1998: 89).  
 MacLeod and Kestin also share with Bernays his Platonic belief that knowledge 
and power ought to coalesce in the marketing professional, and his conviction that 
marketers ought to conduct social science research in the manner of an academic. On 
the former point, both talks suggested that marketing professionals (such as MacLeod 
and Kestin) are uniquely situated to understand the serious problems with female body 
image, and as such, had the responsibility to make the masses of women and girls aware 
of this problem.159 On the latter point, Dove combined the ostensibly greater knowledge 
of marketing professionals with academics to conduct four global studies: “The Real 
Truth About Beauty: A Global Report” in 2004, “Beyond Stereotypes: Rebuilding the 
Foundation of Beauty Beliefs” in 2005, “Beauty Comes of Age” in 2006, and “The Real 
Truth About Beauty: Revisited” in 2011. They claim to adopt an “academic approach” 
that is “rigorous” (Etcoff et al., 2004: 3; 2006: 9; Butler et al., 2006: 9). As mentioned in 
section 4.2, several prominent feminist academics were involved with these studies. The 
conclusion of each of these studies was that women in various countries have a 
distorted body image and that some of the blame for this resides with popular culture 
                                                          
158 See section 3.3. 
159 See section 3.3’s discussion comparing the role of the philosopher-king in Plato’s Republic to the role of 
the public relations counsel (or marketer) in Bernays’ political writings. Bernays viewed the masses as 
having limited intellect, and as such, as needing to derive their views from the marketer. For Bernays, this 
was crucial to preserving the stability of society. 
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and the media; as such, the studies present findings that are hardly revolutionary. The 
second study expands the parameters of the first to include more women in the Global 
South. Interestingly, the paper emerging from the study critiques the association of 
whiteness with beauty and contends this leads to girls growing up in Asia and Saudi 
Arabia wishing for “lighter or fairer skin” and wanting to change their skin colour as 
adults (Etcoff et al., 2006: 21, 42). Unsurprisingly, the paper does not acknowledge 
Unilever’s role in creating this association of whiteness with beauty through Fair & 
Lovely.  
4.2.3 Fair & Lovely 
Long before Unilever was selling women in the Global North empowerment with the 
message that different sizes and colours of bodies are beautiful, they were selling 
women skin lightening cream with the message that lighter-coloured skin is more 
beautiful in the Global South. Yet ironically, Unilever uses similar commodity feminist 
language and marketing strategies in the Global South with Fair & Lovely as it does in 
the Global North with the Campaign for Real Beauty. In fact, the commodity feminism of 
Fair & Lovely predates the commodity feminism of Dove by a year. In this section, I 
overview the commodity feminism of Fair & Lovely in India: both the marketing of the 
product and the Fair & Lovely Foundation.  
 Fair & Lovely was patented in 1971 by Unilever’s Indian subsidiary Hindustan 
Lever Limited (now Hindustan Unilever Limited), after the patenting of its active 
ingredient, the melanin suppressor niacinamide. It was test marketed in southern India 
in 1975 and became widely available all over the country in 1990 (Nakano Glenn, 2008: 
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297; Karan, 2008). The success of Fair & Lovely encouraged Unilever to launch the 
product in other South Asian countries, and it has sold particularly well in Sri Lanka and 
Pakistan (Shevde, 2008). It is currently sold in forty countries in Asia, Africa, and the 
Middle East; however, its largest single market continues to be India. Indeed, Fair & 
Lovely held a 50–70% share of the skin lightening market in India in 2006; this market 
was valued at $212 million USD in 2008 and has been consistently growing at 10–15% 
each year (Karnani, 2007: 1352; Shevde, 2008; Hussain, 2010). The expansion of the skin 
lightening market in India has been read as a result of the neoliberal economic reforms 
dating back to 1991160 (Nakano Glenn 2008: 297).  
 Fair & Lovely’s commodity feminism began as a response to complaints of 
racism. A variety of Indian feminists, most vocally the All India Democratic Women’s 
Association (AIDWA), were highly critical of Fair & Lovely’s television advertisements in 
the early 2000s (Parmar, 2003: 4; Anonymous, 2004: 61; Nakano Glenn, 2008: 297). One 
advertisement critiqued by AIDWA depicted a financially strapped father lamenting that 
he did not have a son to help support the family.161 His ostensibly “unattractive” (that is, 
dark-skinned) daughter overhears his lament and decides to try Fair & Lovely. A few 
months later, the daughter not only looks different—her skin has lightened and she 
wears a mini-skirt—but she has also started a successful career as a flight attendant. The 
advertisement ends with the daughter taking her father out to dinner at a five-star 
restaurant, and both family members are happy (Parmar, 2003: 4). AIDWA received no 
                                                          
160 See section C of the Conclusion. 
161 This advertisement was put on Indian television in December 2001 and finally pulled in February 2003 
(Parmar, 2003: 4).  
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reply from Unilever after complaining about the father-daughter ad and another 
similarly racist and sexist ad. In response, AIDWA launched a year-long campaign against 
Fair & Lovely in 2002, including a complaint with the National Human Rights Commission 
(Parmar, 2003: 4). After the Commission passed the complaint on to the Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, the federal government issued notice of the complaints 
to Unilever. The two advertisements named in the complaint were pulled off the air. To 
recover from the bad publicity these complaints created, the Fair & Lovely Foundation 
was launched in 2003. The stated mission of the Foundation is “empowering women in 
India to change their destinies through Education, Career Guidance and Skills Training” 
(Fair & Lovely, 2009).  
 The Fair & Lovely Foundation has supported several projects since its launch. The 
main project is funding scholarships for Indian women from lower-income families to 
pursue higher education, from undergraduate to doctoral degrees. Offered annually 
every year since 2003, in ten years these scholarships have funded close to 1500 women 
(Fair & Lovely, 2013). It is unclear whether women must use Fair & Lovely to lighten 
their skin in order to receive scholarship funding.162 It is also unclear whether the 
applicant’s physical appearance affects their chances of receiving a scholarship.163 Past 
projects funded by the Foundation also include career guidance fairs for women in cities 
across India (2003–2005) and projects funding women’s athletics and women training to 
be preschool teachers (2005). Also in 2005, the Foundation funded a thirteen episode 
                                                          
162 The website does not specify whether women are required to lighten their skin to receive scholarship 
money. When called by a representative from Ms. magazine in 2004 with this question, the corporation 
refused to comment (Anonymous, 2004: 61).  
163 According to the website, women are required to send two photographs of themselves as part of their 
application package. The website also states that incomplete applications are automatically rejected. 
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television series entitled “Fair & Lovely Shikhar.” Each episode of the series focused on a 
different Indian woman who overcame adversity to “change her destiny.” Some of the 
featured women included an engineer, a domestic violence activist, an athlete, a 
Bollywood dance choreographer, a photojournalist, and an activist against the sexual 
exploitation of women and girls. Much like Dove’s Self-Esteem Fund, the projects 
funded by the Fair & Lovely Foundation work to justify the role of the corporation in 
society, improve Unilever’s public image (including mollifying critiques of racism in the 
case of Fair & Lovely), and of course, increase sales of their products.  
 The commodity feminism of Fair & Lovely products and the Fair & Lovely 
Foundation continue to be racist. The success of AIDWA in getting two television 
commercials pulled off the air in 2003 has not prevented Fair & Lovely from continuing 
to produce commercials with the same narrative of a depressed woman gaining a 
brighter future by lightening her skin. However, while earlier commercials tended to 
show women acquiring a husband or boyfriend through lighter skin, newer (commodity 
feminist) twists on the narrative have been added to show women acquiring 
employment through lighter skin. Some commercials show women not merely gaining 
employment but doing so in professions normally held by men, such as cricket match 
announcers (Timmons, 2007; Chakraborty, 2011). Another example can be found in Fair 
& Lovely changing their marketing slogan to “The Power of Beauty.” According to this 
slogan, women are supposed to gain feminist empowerment through embracing racist 
standards of beauty. A final example can be found on the main page of the Fair & Lovely 
Foundation’s website. On this page is an image of a woman in a dark room. She is 
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looking longingly through an open door into a well-lit room full of books, which is 
presumably a university library. The light from the library spills into the dark room and 
casts a dark shadow of the woman (Fair & Lovely, 2009). The image suggests a 
Foundation scholarship will allow the woman to step out of the dark and into the light. 
This image is similar to product advertisements in that oppression is linked with dark 
and empowerment with light: the Foundation allows dark women to be bathed in the 
light of the library, just as the products allow dark women to be bathed in light after use. 
In stepping into the light, Fair & Lovely scholarships and products allow women to free 
themselves from the darkness of their skin colour and taint of their class position.  
 To conclude this section, commodity feminism has become a dominant paradigm 
for the globalized marketing campaigns of the early twenty-first century. As such, its 
days of limited and unconventional marketing tactics by one individual are long past. 
While the examples of commodity feminism from the last chapter are the various (local 
and national) American public relations campaigns of Edward Bernays in the early 
twentieth century, the examples from this chapter are two multinational marketing 
campaigns of Unilever in the early twenty-first century with a particular focus on India, 
Canada, and the United States. Yet the political writings and public relations strategies 
of Bernays continue to influence contemporary commodity feminism. In a similar 
manner to Bernays’ campaigns, both the Fair & Lovely Foundation and the Campaign for 
Real Beauty frame corporations such as Unilever as a legitimate social and political 
institution, and suggest the corporation is an indispensable agent of social change. They 
offer an individualized solution to a social problem: we can consume our way to social 
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change. The exceptional amount of positive publicity received by the campaign 
highlights the degree to which corporations are allowed to control the terms of the 
public debate and legitimately present themselves as the liberator of girls and women. 
This control is achieved in part through the role of the corporation in subject formation. 
Before theorizing the role of Unilever in the production and maintenance of racialized 
and feminized subjectivities, the next two sections will consider subjectivity through the 
work of Marx, Gayatri Spivak, and the anti-essentialist Marxists. 
4.3 Marx on the Subject: Species-Being and Essentialism 
Marx’s conception of subjectivity is generally understood to be encapsulated in the term 
Gattungswesen, which is usually translated as species-being. Making this claim is 
somewhat problematic in that the subject and subjectivity—at least as they are 
conceptualized in twentieth and twenty-first century social and political thought—did 
not exist in Marx’s time. However, the contemporary use of subjectivity is generally 
understood to capture the experience of being a person (Davies 1991: 43), which might 
explain why species-being tends to be understood as Marx’s theory of subjectivity. Marx 
borrowed the term from Ludwig Feuerbach’s 1841 The Essence of Christianity and uses 
species-being in several texts, including “On the Jewish Question” (1843), The Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, and the Grundrisse (1858). This section will 
examine Marx’s various uses of the term in these texts, critique species-being for its 
essentialism, and argue for a different Marxian conception of subjectivity.  
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Species-being is first introduced by Marx in “On the Jewish Question.” Marx 
seems to understand species-being to be that which defines men as men,164 and the 
term plays a crucial role in his argument concerning the difference between political 
emancipation and human emancipation. Political emancipation is the form achieved 
with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in France and with various state 
constitutions in the United States. Marx argues that political emancipation is not 
actually emancipation. Rather, it is the “reduction of man […] [to] an independent and 
egoistic individual” (1978b: 46). Man becomes a “profane being” who “treats other men 
as means, degrades himself to the role of a mere means, and becomes the plaything of 
alien powers” (1978b: 34). The profanity of political emancipation is that man becomes 
completely disconnected, or alienated, from his species-being (1978b: 38). In Marx’s 
words, “man is far from being considered, in the rights of man, as a species-being; on 
the contrary, species-life itself—society—appears as a system which is external to the 
individual and as a limitation of his original independence” (1978b: 43, emphasis mine). 
In other words, the politically emancipated man is so disconnected from his species-
being and from other men, that he might be actively hostile to his species-being in that 
he understands it as a limitation. The only real form of emancipation for Marx is human 
emancipation. While political emancipation involves hostility to species-being, human 
emancipation involves embracing species-being. In Marx’s words, “human emancipation 
will only be complete when […] he has become a species-being” (1978b: 46). Although 
                                                          
164 I retain Marx’s characterization of the individual as male; however, I do so critically. Feminist theory 
generally understands the use of masculine pronouns in malestream political thought to be not universal 
but rather referring to men in general or particular groups of men. Retaining Marx’s assumption of the 
male individual is in line with my subsequent argument that conceptions of subjectivity as put forth by 
both Marx and his interpreters are masculinist. 
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species-being figures largely into one of the main arguments of “On the Jewish 
Question,” Marx does not offer a very specific definition of species-being or much 
clarification on how men might become species-being.165  
In The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (or 1844 Manuscripts), 
Marx clarifies why “man is a species-being.” Rooting the species in “inorganic nature,” 
he contends the species is not only man’s being but also his object: the species is his 
being because it is his very means of life (he “lives on inorganic nature”), and the species 
is his object because it is “the instrument of his life-activity” (1978a: 75). Alienation from 
species-being is not only alienation from himself and from other men, as Marx already 
established in “On the Jewish Question,” but also alienation from life-activity (1978a: 
77). For Marx, life-activity is labour; indeed, what he terms life-activity in the 1844 
Manuscripts he later terms labour power.166 Although Marx clarifies a definition of 
species-being in this text, he does not suggest how the species might be reconciled with 
the man. Given that life-activity is labour, the reconciliation of species with the man 
requires a much more extended critique of capitalism and its alternatives.167  
The final text in which Marx discusses species-being is the Grundrisse, where he 
discusses species-being only once, and in specific relation to his critique of the 
individualism of liberal theory. In this discussion he equates species-being with a “clan 
                                                          
165 Marx suggests that the latter would occur when man “has recognized and organized his own powers 
(forces propres) as social powers so that he no longer separates this social power from himself as political 
power” (1978b: 46). However, he offers no further explanation.  
166 Labour-power is the capacity to work or general expenditure of labour. Useful labour is the useful 
character of different concrete forms of labour. When utility disappears into exchange-value, all labour is 
reduced to labour in the abstract (Marx, 1990: 125). The process through which labour becomes more and 
more abstract is key to understanding the logic of capital. Thus, Marx’s early writings on life-activity 
represent the beginning of his thinking on the relationship between labour and capital.  
167 The critique is accomplished by Marx, of course, in the three volumes of Capital.  
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being” and “herd animal,” and he differentiates clearly between species-being and 
Aristotle’s conception of the “political animal” (1993: 496). Marx expands upon his 
critique of the profanity of individualism from “On the Jewish Question” by arguing that 
men are not by nature “isolated individuals,” but rather they “become individuals only 
through the process of history” (1993: 496). There is, however, an important difference 
between the previous two texts discussed and the Grundrisse. In the earlier texts, Marx 
argues man ought to return to his species-being; however, it is difficult to see how that 
would be possible in this text. For example, Marx argues:  
Exchange itself is a chief means of this individuation. It makes the herd-like 
existence superfluous and dissolves it. Soon the matter [has] turned in such a 
way that as an individual he relates only to himself, while the means with 
which he posits himself as individual have become the making of his generality 
and commonness (1993: 496, emphasis mine).  
 
Given Marx’s argument that individuals have been created through historical 
processes—historical processes that involve the development of relationships of 
exchange—it is unclear at this historical juncture how we could return to species-being. 
This is especially the case given that in the Grundrisse, Marx equates species-being with 
clan beings and herd animals.  
Despite the differences in Marx’s treatment of species-being in “On the Jewish 
Question,” the 1844 Manuscripts and the Grundrisse, the common thread in all of these 
treatments is essentialism. He assumes that people themselves have natures (or real 
essences) that underlie and explain their other properties. This is particularly evident in 
the 1844 Manuscripts, in which he argues man is estranged from his body, nature, and 
“spiritual essence” (1978a: 77). Moreover, Marx contends that this fundamental 
 204 
estrangement from body, nature, and essence underlies other forms of estrangement 
and alienation, such as the estrangement from other men already established in the 
“Jewish Question” and the estrangement from the product of their labour (1978a: 77). 
His essentialism starts to unravel in the Grundrisse, insofar as he tries to balance 
essentialized species-being with more historical conceptions of subjectivity. He argues 
the subject has “more or less naturally arisen” yet “at the same time […] results of a 
historic process” (1993: 496). Yet species-being remains essentialist in that it relies on a 
relationship with nature: however dialectical and historical this relationship, nature 
itself remains untheorized. At the same time, although he maintains species-being in the 
Grundrisse, it is only in one passage, and even within that passage he is putting forth a 
more dialectical conception of history. Given this limited treatment in the Grundrisse, 
and the fact that he drops species-being altogether in the three volumes of Capital, 
Marx seems less committed to species-being (and therefore an essentialist conception 
of subjectivity) over time. Moreover, Marx’s most substantive discussion of species-
being occurred before he developed his larger analysis of capitalist modes of 
production.168 All of this suggests that Marx’s conception of the form of subjectivity 
specific to capitalist society ought not to be understood as species-being. Before moving 
on to argue for an alternative Marxist conception of subjectivity, however, there is a 
final point to be made about the essentialism of species-being.  
                                                          
168 For example, in “On the Jewish Question” Marx refers to elements of what would later be included in 
his analysis of the capitalist mode of production, such as the worship of commodities, money as a 
commodity, and alienated labour. However, he refers to these elements as constituting “hucksterism” or, 
in one of the many examples of anti-Semitism in this article, “real and practical Judaism” (1978b: 48).  
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In maintaining an essentialist conception of nature, Marx falls into a similar trap 
to the possessive individualists he is critiquing.169 Possessive individualism is an 
important aspect of liberal theory and has been since the seventeenth century. Liberal 
theorists such as Hobbes and Locke read market relations back into the very nature of 
people (or state of nature). Their deductions start “with the individual and [move] out to 
society and the state;” however, their starting point “has already been created in the 
image of market man” (Macpherson, 1962: 268, 269).170 Marx, on the other hand, 
stresses the importance of not abstracting the “individual” from “society” and critiques 
the “so-called rights of man” and other tenants of liberal theory for doing so (1978a: 86; 
1978b: 40). Possessive individualism and species-being seem to be making opposite 
arguments: possessive individualism suggests the subject of modern capitalism is 
natural, while species-being suggests the subject of modern capitalism represents an 
artificial covering over what is natural. Yet both rely on an essentialist conception of 
nature in that possessive individualism invokes nature to justify capitalist social 
relations, and species-being invokes nature to critique capitalist social relations.  
Possessive individualism and species-being have more than essentialism in 
common: neither say much about how the subject of modern capitalist societies comes 
to be constituted. Yet there is clearly a link between possessive individualism and 
subjectivity. As Livingston argues:  
                                                          
169 Possessive individualism is not a term Marx himself used; it was coined by Macpherson in 1962 with 
the publication of The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. However, the term conveys quite well 
the aspect of liberalism Marx was critiquing in his use of the term species-being.  
170 See section B of the conclusion for discussion of state of nature theorizing in political origin stories. 
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The sovereignty of the modern self is experienced and expressed as the 
ontological priority of the unbound individual, that is, the individual whose 
freedom resides in the release from obligations determined by political 
communities, or, what amounts to the same thing, in the exercise of “natural 
rights” that such communities can neither confer nor abrogate” (1998: 413). 
 
Possessive individualism (or “sovereignty of the modern self,” in Livingston’s words) 
cannot be thought of an as artificial overlay that can easily be ignored or suspended: it is 
an important aspect of people’s life experience and cultural and political expression. As 
Marx starts to move away from species-being and toward a more dialectical conception 
of history in the Grundrisse, he does suggest a relationship between possessive 
individualism and subjectivity. As already mentioned, he contends that the creation of 
the sense of the individual is central to exchange, and “exchange itself is a chief means 
of this individuation” (1993: 496). In other words, one must feel some degree of 
possessive individualism in order to enter into exchange relationships. Yet in species-
being, being remains associated with species (or nature) and as such, subjectivity is 
nothing more than an artificial overlay—subjectivity is merely an effect.  
A more complicated way of understanding subjectivity in capitalist societies is 
clearly required, and that can be found in Capital. Species-being is dropped in favour of 
commodity fetishism, which as discussed previously, Marx gives predominance by 
locating it in the first chapter of the first volume. Yet Marx’s early writings have haunted 
interpretations of Capital: more specifically, his writings on species-being have affected 
how commodity fetishism has been understood. Although he clearly argues that 
commodity fetishism involves transforming the social into the natural and therefore 
masks the social relations between people involved in the production and exchange of 
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the commodity,171 commodity fetishism has commonly been understood as a form of 
“false consciousness” (Kennedy, 1985: 968−969; Amariglio and Callari, 1989: 38, 57; 
Knafo, 2002: 149). In this false consciousness framework, commodity fetishism is 
artificial and covers over what is natural; yet Marx clearly argues that commodity 
fetishism appears to be natural and covers over what is social. The next section will use 
the work of Gayatri Spivak and Jack Amariglio and Antonio Callari to read into Capital a 
conception of the subject that is not essentialist.  
4.4 Marxist Theorists on the Subject: Commodity Fetishism and Anti-Essentialism 
The question of subjectivity has been described as “the great lacuna” of Marxist theory 
(Wayne, 2005: 209). Jack Amariglio has been credited, both for his work in the 1980s 
and for the piece co-authored with Antonio Callari in 1989, for bringing the question of 
subjectivity to the forefront of Marxist analysis and for inaugurating “a debate and 
research agenda that still continues” (Madra, 2006: 212). In their 1989 piece, Amariglio 
and Callari argue that commodity fetishism constitutes Marx’s theory of subjectivity, or 
more specifically, “the peculiar subjectivity typical of capitalist social formations” (1989: 
31). They make this argument through value theory. In doing so, they acknowledge 
Gayatri Spivak—in a footnote—for her earlier “kindred reading” of value (Amariglio and 
Callari, 1989: 32). Spivak treats subjectivity as an inherent part of value theory and 
brings questions of gender and race to Marxist subjectivity. Yet Spivak’s contributions 
remain largely ignored by not only Amariglio and Callari, but also theorists who have 
subsequently taken up the relationship between value and subjectivity. This group of 
                                                          
171 See subsection 1.2.1 for further discussion. 
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theorists has been described by Swanson as the “anti-essentialist” Marxist theorists 
(2005: 87). In this section, I will compare the anti-essentialist arguments of Spivak with 
the anti-essentialist arguments of Amariglio and Callari and their commentators, and I 
contend that the latter are problematic in that they abstract subjectivity from processes 
of gendering and racialization. I critique this body of literature for ignoring Spivak’s 
original contribution, and as such, treating subjectivity in abstraction from gender and 
race. This would suggest that commodity fetishism is a particular white male subjectivity 
typical of capitalist social formations.  
Before discussing the articles by Spivak and Amariglio and Callari, it is important 
to briefly return to and expand upon my previous discussion (in Chapter One172) of 
Marx’s understanding of commodities and the value ascribed to them. To briefly 
recapitulate, commodities are imbued with a value that has little to do with the form or 
production of the commodity itself: while value seems to be either a natural relationship 
between things or technical relationship between things, it is in actuality a social 
relationship between people. Marx originally understood this social relationship as 
being between capitalists and labourers; however, later theorists (especially feminist 
theorists) have understood this social relationship in more complicated ways. Regardless 
of how the social relationship is understood, the social relations inherent in value are 
concealed through commodity fetishism. To push beyond the scope of the first chapter, 
the social relations of modern capitalism do not exist between already constituted 
subjects, but rather, they require the production of particular subjectivities. Commodity 
                                                          
172 See section 1.2. 
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fetishism does not merely conceal the social relations inherent in value; commodity 
fetishism also helps to produce and sustain these social relations and their requisite 
subjectivities. The concealment of social relations, in other words, cannot be separated 
from their production and sustainment. In more general terms, the relationship 
between social relations and commodity fetishism is also a relationship between 
subjectivity and value.  
In “Scattered Speculations on the Question of Value,” originally published in 
1985, Spivak argues that to understand value one needs to understand the predication 
of the subject.173 She contends that there are two predominant conceptualizations of 
subjectivity: the “materialist predication of the subject” and “idealist predication of the 
subject,” both of which are exclusive predications and do not speak to one another 
(1988: 154). Spivak is primarily concerned with the former, although she critiques the 
“embarrassment of the final economic determinant” (1988: 155).174 She argues 
economic determinism is problematic because questions of value can “escape the onto-
phenomenological question” (1988: 155). In order to bring ontology and 
phenomenology (or crudely, conceptions of being and bodies) back to questions of 
value, she reconsiders Marx’s understanding of use-value.  
                                                          
173 In “Scattered Speculations on the Question of Value” Spivak builds on an article from 1983, which was 
later expanded upon and published as “Speculation on reading Marx: after reading Derrida” in 1987. I 
reference the earlier written “Speculation” in this section yet focus on “Scattered Speculations,” as the 
latter involves a more extended discussion of the relationship between subjectivity and value.  
174 Indeed, Spivak has remained consistently concerned with how contemporary theory far too easily 
writes off any consideration of capitalism as mere “economic determinism” (Chow, 1993: 3). Her 
consideration, therefore, moves beyond narrow economic determinism in considerations of subjectivity 
but without removing capitalism.  
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Use-value, to briefly review, is differentiated by Marx from exchange-value in 
Capital. He argues that use-value remains constant while exchange-value varies greatly 
across time and location (1990: 126). As such, the utility and exchange-value of a 
commodity do not have any bearing upon one another (1992: 213). Yet at the same 
time, Marx repeatedly references the “dual nature” of commodities. Marxists have 
tended to ignore Marx’s “dual nature” references and have focused on exchange-value 
instead; indeed, Knafo argues that use-value tends to be rejected altogether in favour of 
grounding theory entirely in exchange-value (2002: 160−161). Spivak’s reconsideration 
of use-value moves against this tendency. She suggests use-value is “both outside and 
inside the system of value-determinations” (1988: 162). Indeed, in an earlier 
publication, she argues that the opposition between use-value and exchange-value is 
false and suggests use-value is a “theoretical fiction” (1987: 40, 54).175 In “Scattered 
Speculations,” she argues use-value “puts the entire textual chain of Value into 
question” (1988: 162).  
Spivak reconsiders use-value because exchange-value does not answer the onto-
phenomenological question: it only allows the subject to be read as labour power (1988: 
164). Any ontological or phenomenological considerations of the subject, including 
subjectivity, are excluded because “consciousness itself is subsumed under the 
‘materialist’ predication of the subject” (Spivak, 1988: 164). When the subject is read as 
labour power alone, the subject is assumed to reside in the Global North. As such, the 
                                                          
175 Knafo, following Spivak, contends that due to its simultaneous insider and outsider status, where 
commodities are concerned, there cannot be a fundamental difference between use-value and exchange-
value (2002: 162).  
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international division of labour is ignored, and the creation of value in the Global South 
is erased (Spivak, 1988: 166).176 Moreover, the gendered effects of the exacerbation of 
the international division of labour are also ignored (Spivak, 1988: 167). In making this 
argument, Spivak brings a discussion of social injustice and global inequality into her 
interrogation of use-value in particular and the relationship between value and 
subjectivity more generally (Chow, 1993; Kaplan and Grewal, 1999). She wishes to “join 
forces with those Marxists who would rescue Marxism from its European provenance” 
(Spivak, 1988: 157). In Castree’s words, Spivak offers a new “prism” for understanding 
how a “complex, intersecting, but often discontinuous array of individual and group 
identities and activities in production and place are brought into a social relation” 
(1996/97: 72). Yet that “prism” is not fully realized. At the end of her piece Spivak 
remarks that she “must now admit what many Marxist theoreticians admit today: that 
in any theoretical formulation, the horizon of full realization must be indefinitely and 
irreducibly postponed” (1988: 175). Despite this, the space she opens up is important. 
Spivak’s “Scattered Speculations” is important not only for linking subjectivity and value 
but also for opening up space to consider gender and race in Marxist subjectivity. 
 Spivak’s methodology is similar to Amariglio and Callari’s in “Marxian Value 
Theory and the Problem of the Subject: The Role of Commodity Fetishism.” In one 
respect, however, Amariglio and Callari put forth a more developed thesis: in reading 
commodity fetishism as Marx’s theory of subjectivity, they come to more definitive 
                                                          
176 Moreover, Spivak goes on to argue that “any critique of the labor theory of value, pointing at the 
unfeasibility of the theory under post-industrialism, or as a calculus of economic indicators, ignores the 
dark presence of the Third World” (1988: 167). 
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conclusions about subjectivity in capitalist social relations. At the same time, their thesis 
is less developed than Spivak’s in that their discussion of the relationship between 
subjectivity and value is abstracted from gender and race. Amariglio and Callari begin by 
contending that subjectivity remains a problem in contemporary Marxism. They suggest 
there are two predominant conceptualizations of subjectivity: those of the “economic 
determinists” and those of the “autonomists” (which are similar to how Spivak 
characterizes the “materialist predication of the subject” and “idealist predication of the 
subject”). The “economic determinists” understand subjectivity as “mediating” the 
economy, yet because they continue to assert the primacy of the economy “in the last 
instance,” their accounts “remain embedded in, or at least infected by, an economic 
determinism” (1989: 32). Thus, also in the same vein as Spivak, Amariglio and Callari 
understand this economic determinism to constitute an embarrassment. Moreover, 
economic determinism ultimately negates the problem of subjectivity (1989: 33). Yet at 
the same time, the “autonomists” privilege culture, ideology, and power as constituting 
the subject, which renders subjectivity completely autonomous from the economy. 
Economic determinism is replaced by another form of determinism, namely, the 
determinism of culture, ideology, and power. These economic determinists and 
autonomists create a schism within Marxism that is both “unnecessary and 
unproductive” (1989: 33).  
Amariglio and Callari believe that overcoming this schism between economic 
determinism and autonomism requires joining value theory with a theory of the subject. 
Such a union makes sense in that “the act of exchange is not simply the site of an 
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economic process, but also one of the key locations within capitalism in which a 
symbolic order is partially constituted and learned” (1989: 56). Or to use terminology 
from the last section, the exchange of commodities instills within the exchangers a 
sense of self constituted by possessive individualism. Amariglio and Callari do not use 
the term “possessive individualism.” However, the set of attributes they describe as 
being associated with the individual—namely, economic rationality, equality, and 
private proprietorship (1989: 49−53)—mirrors Macpherson’s description of possessive 
individualism. In joining value theory with a theory of the subject, Amariglio and Callari 
re-read the first chapter of the first volume of Capital with a focus on the question of 
equality. By “equality,” they mean the conception of exchange-value, or “equal 
exchange,” in neo-classical political economy. Marx argues that exchange-value renders 
all labour abstract, not allowing for differentiation between forms and amounts of 
labour (1990: 125). In Amariglio and Callari’s reading, the upshot of Marx’s critique of 
this process of abstraction is that the exchange of commodities is in fact an exchange of 
“labour times.” As such, equal exchange does not exist; the exchange of commodities is 
always unequal in that “unequal magnitudes of actual labour times” are being 
exchanged (1989: 45). Moreover, they contend that because equal exchange is derived 
from the assumption of possessive individualism, and possessive individualism enables 
equal exchange, in disposing of possessive individualism we dispose of equal exchange 
(1989: 44−45, 57).  
Disposing of possessive individualism and equal exchange only joins value theory 
with a theory of the subject in the realm of bourgeois political economy, although this 
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has implications for the realm of Marxist political economy. It establishes that the social 
constitution of the individual is both a precondition for the exchange of commodities, as 
much as an effect of this exchange. In other words, the individual does not simply exist 
and enter into exchange relationships naturally: the individual is constituted historically, 
and entering into exchange relationships only further constitutes them as an individual 
(Amariglio and Callari, 1989: 44−45). Yet the most important implication of this joining 
in the realm of Marxist political economy can be found in the role of commodity 
fetishism. Amariglio and Callari contend that Marx introduces commodity fetishism in 
order to resolve the contradiction between equal exchange and unequal magnitudes of 
labour time (1989: 48). In their words,  
Marx employed the concept of commodity fetishism to introduce questions 
about the “social constitution of the individual” with the aim of urging his 
readers to locate the manifold forces that give rise to the particular form of 
subjectivity involved in the “exchange of equivalents” under conditions of 
generalized commodity trade (1989: 34). 
 
Marx employed the concept of commodity fetishism to introduce questions about the 
“social constitution of the individual” with the aim of urging his readers to locate the 
manifold forces that give rise to the particular form of subjectivity involved in the 
“exchange of equivalents” under conditions of generalized commodity trade (1989: 34).  
 For Amariglio and Callari, these “manifold forces” are not entirely economic. As 
such, commodity fetishism is a form of subjectivity not entirely determined by the 
economic (1989: 52). Although they start with larger theoretical concerns and end with 
a particular argument, their article can be summarized by starting with the particular: 
commodity fetishism not only resolves the contradiction between equal exchange and 
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unequal magnitudes of labour time, it joins value theory with a theory of the subject 
and therefore contributes to overcoming this schism between economic determinism 
and autonomism. Amariglio and Callari make a critical intervention that moves an 
understanding of Marx’s conception of subjectivity from the essentialism of species-
being to the anti-essentialism of commodity fetishism.  
Yet despite the importance of their intervention, Amariglio and Callari’s 
understanding of subjectivity remains problematic in that it is abstracted entirely from 
gender and race. This is most evident in their discussion of equality. They argue that 
possessive individualism is a subjectivity constituted by entering into exchange 
relationships inscribed as equal; however, they also suggest “that the cultural and 
political construction of equality is partially constituted prior to and outside of 
exchange” (1989: 53). Although this claim about equality is critical to their non-
deterministic, anti-essentialist conception of subjectivity, they do not expand upon it. 
This raises questions of where this partial constitution of equality is located, and what 
the political ramifications of critiquing equality entirely through the lens of equal 
exchange would involve. While liberal discourses of equality and rights have clearly 
served as the justifying ideology of capitalism, they have also been used with a certain 
degree of effectiveness by feminist, anti-racist, and other social justice movements. This 
effectiveness has, however, been limited in part by the linkage of equality with 
sameness (Brown, 1995: 153−154). In critiquing the collapsing of equality with equal 
exchange without also critiquing the related collapsing of equality with sameness, 
Amariglio and Callari re-obstruct what they claim is being obstructed. Or to put it 
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another way, in ignoring gender and race, they make one (possessive individual) 
subjectivity stand in for another and thus replicate the very exchange of equivalents 
they critique. They obscure the fact that there are different subjectivities in capitalist 
societies, and indeed, even different possessive individual subjectivities.  
The anti-essentialist Marxist theorists who have taken up the work of Amariglio 
and Callari, primarily but not exclusively in the pages of Rethinking Marxism and 
Historical Materialism, have continued the tradition of discussing subjectivity in 
abstraction from gender and race. When race and gender are mentioned, they tend to 
be simply mentioned rather than theorized. For example, Richard McIntyre’s only 
mention of either are references to women who emulate Madonna, dancing “girls” in 
advertisements, and the “white guilt” associated with consumption in our society177 
(1992: 52, 57). Yet such cursory references do not constitute theorizing. McIntyre does 
not theorize how the subjectivities of women who emulate Madonna, or the 
subjectivities of women who dance (or watch other women dance) in advertisements 
relate to his discussion of commodity fetishism as subjectivity. Moreover, he does not 
even mention women who do not participate in these activities, or any women or men 
of colour residing in the Global North. Based on his discussion of the “white guilt” of 
consumption, the latter group must be assumed not to consume. Another example can 
be found in Robert Tanner’s argument that the subjectivities created by fetishism are an 
“equal” problem to those created by “gender inequality, discrimination based on race 
and sexual preference, nationalism, and so forth” (2001: 64). Perhaps because he 
                                                          
177 By “our society,” McIntyre presumably means the Global North, as he suggests “our society” is 
something different from the “third world” (1992: 57).  
 217 
understands “the list is long” (2001: 64), he cannot do any further theorizing on the 
relationship between these categories of identity and the subjectivities created by 
commodity fetishism. Dimitri Dimoulis and John Milios contend that commodity 
fetishism not only creates subjects but also subordinates those subjects to the market 
(2004: 40). Yet they separate out the subordinated subjectivities created by commodity 
fetishism from the “other social constructs,” which for them constitute “gender, 
national identity, stigmatization of certain individuals as criminals” (2004: 32), as if the 
identities in the latter group have no bearing upon the former. Mike Wayne suggests 
that in its most “general form,” subjectivity grounded in fetishism can be related to the 
(vaguely defined) “socially differentiated field occupied by different ‘players’” (2005: 
194). Yet at the same time, he states that commodity fetishism simply “cannot explain 
the specific content and development of, for example, sexist and racist ideologies” 
(Wayne, 2005: 217). While undoubtedly commodity fetishism cannot explain sexism or 
racism, Wayne (like many of his anti-essentialist Marxist counterparts) uses this to 
ignore how commodity fetishism not only constitutes a process of abstract subject 
formation but also a gendered and racialized process in need of theorization.  
Some anti-essentialist Marxist theorists writing on subjectivity attempt to do 
more than merely mention gender and race; however, these limited efforts remain 
unsatisfactory. For example, Bruce Pietrykowski (2007) carefully discusses the gendered 
nature of consumption and feminist approaches to political economy. At the same time, 
however, feminist theory does not factor into his analysis of the “multiple and 
conflicting subject positions” created by commodity fetishism. These subject positions 
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remain for him workers and consumers, or the producers of commodities and the 
purchasers of commodities (2007: 265). Another example is Yahya Madra, who issues a 
call to incorporate conceptions of sexual difference (from Lacanian psychoanalysis) into 
Marxist subjectivity (2006: 222). He does no more than issue a call, however, and does 
not attempt to theorize the gendered subject positions in capitalism. Nor does he 
acknowledge the question of race or racialized subject positions. It is difficult to 
understand how these anti-essentialist Marxist theorists writing on subjectivity can 
discuss gender and race in such an uncritical (McIntyre) or cursory manner (Tanner, 
Dimoulis and Milios, Wayne), as if the entire bodies of literature on feminist theory and 
identity politics were never written. Ultimately, more work in the spirit of Pietrykowski 
and Madra needs to be done on theorizing Marxist subjectivity.  
This tradition of discussing subjectivity in abstraction from gender and race 
among the anti-essentialist Marxist theorists might have been less of a problem had the 
interventions of Spivak not been so consistently ignored. This problem dates back to 
Amariglio and Callari themselves: as previously mentioned, other than a footnote 
crediting Spivak for her “kindred reading,” they do not engage with her remarkably 
similar arguments whatsoever. Although Madra cites the Amariglio and Callari piece in 
his article, he appears not have read that particular footnote. He contends that the 
doctoral dissertation of Amariglio from 1984, in combination with the piece co-authored 
with Callari in 1989, constitute the “first discussion of the question of subjectivity within 
the context of class analysis” (2006: 212). Yet Spivak’s earliest publication on this topic is 
from 1983, which pre-dates Amariglio’s dissertation by one year and the original 
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publication of the Amariglio and Callari article by six years. This problem is not limited to 
Madra: not one of the anti-essentialist Marxist theorists I have discussed mentions 
Spivak. Nor is this problem limited to the anti-essentialist Marxist theorists who use the 
work of Amariglio and Callari. The reception of Spivak by contemporary Marxist 
theorists in general has been described as “ambivalent” at best and completely erased 
at worst (Kaplan and Grewal, 1999: 350, 353). In a rare discussion of Spivak in the pages 
of Rethinking Marxism, Noel Castree finds it “surprising” that so few of his 
contemporaries have engaged with her work (1996/97: 49). He contends that “we await 
a thorough-going elucidation of Spivak’s scattered speculations on Marx and the 
question of value” (1996/97: 49). Kaplan and Grewal offer an explanation as to why we 
are still waiting: they describe the community of Marxist theorists as a “male agon.” This 
agon is not merely a historical phenomenon but “continues almost without 
interruption” to the present day. Spivak cannot be included in the agon, as it would 
change too radically its character and intensity (1999: 354).178  
In the past two sections, I have considered competing conceptions of Marx’s 
theory of subjectivity: the previous section rejected species-being for its essentialism, 
and this section explored commodity fetishism as anti-essentialist subjectivity. Originally 
theorized by Amariglio and Callari, commodity fetishism provides a useful theoretical 
framework for understanding the relationship between the commodity form and the 
                                                          
178 Although Kaplan and Grewal are discussing the general reception of Spivak’s body of work by Marxist 
theorists, their comments translate into the reception of “Scattered Speculations” and other work in the 
pages of Historical Materialism and Rethinking Marxism. Yet Kaplan and Grewal do not lay the blame 
exclusively on masculinist Marxist theorists. They argue that “Anglo-American feminism has displayed an, 
at best, ambivalent regard toward Spivak” (199: 355). This is evidenced by the continual misreading of one 
of Spivak’s few articles that is taken up by Anglo-American feminists, “Can the Subaltern Speak.” This 
misreading is a result of their “complicity in colonial and neocolonial discursive formations” (1999: 355).  
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constitution of (possessive individual) subjectivity in capitalist social formations. Yet this 
framework is problematic in that it treats subjectivity in abstraction from gender and 
race. In the history of Western thought, discussions of abstract subjects have tended to 
allow men to stand in for people, and whiteness to stand in for civilization. Given that 
Marx himself upheld the sexism of Western thought and offered limited and ambiguous 
comments about racialized subjects,179 it is important to have a healthy scepticism 
about contemporary theorists who use Marx to theorize subjectivity in such abstract 
terms. In the absence of any theorization of gender or race, the possessive individual 
subjectivity described by Amariglio and Callari and their interlocutors is not abstract at 
all, but a particular form of white male subjectivity typical of capitalist social formations. 
It is important, therefore, to theorize subject formation as a gendered and racialized 
process. The next section will contend that if commodity fetishism constitutes particular 
forms of white masculine subjectivity then commodity feminism constitutes particular 
forms of feminine/feminist subjectivities located in both the Global South and North. 
This will be theorized by examining with more depth the commodity feminism enacted 
by the Unilever Corporation and returning to the work of Spivak. 
4.5 Commodity Feminism as (Feminized and Racialized) Subjectivity 
Georg Lukács once suggested that all problems of consciousness (including subjectivity) 
ultimately lead back to the commodity. Terry Eagleton has argued that this claim is “a 
trifle overweening” and questions “in what important sense […] can the doctrine that 
men are superior to women, or whites to blacks, be traced back to some secret source 
                                                          
179 See subsection 1.2.1. 
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in commodity production” (1991: 87).180 Thus far in this chapter, I have vacillated 
between both positions to contend that commodity fetishism can explain subject 
formation in capitalist societies, but only partially as it is abstracted from processes of 
gendering and racialization. In this section, I concretize this discussion by examining 
both Unilever’s imperialist past and multinational present, and consider how both can 
be implicated in subject formation. Spivak’s critique of use-value offers a useful inroad 
to theorizing commodity feminism as subject formation, particularly when applied to 
the use-value of Fair & Lovely skin lightening cream in contemporary post-colonial India. 
In other words, I theorize subjectivity through Unilever’s historical commodification of 
the British imperial project and its contemporary commodification of feminism.  
 Unilever has a long history of supporting the British imperial project and the 
privileging of lighter-coloured people involved in that project. A colonial example of this 
privileging can be found in the development of evolutionary racism. Over the course of 
the nineteenth century, the emphasis and attention given by the British to racialized 
difference grew. By the 1820s and 1830s, the British understood themselves to 
constitute a race apart and thus in a privileged position to observe others (Arnold, 2004: 
261, 273). Evolutionary racism was the science that claimed that proof of the evolution 
of men from their ape ancestors to the present could be traced through the 
contemporary races of man. Unsurprisingly, the most evolved race was thought to be 
middle-class and aristocratic British men. Working-class British men and Irish men were 
                                                          
180 Interestingly, Kaplan and Grewal include Eagleton in a list of theorists who despite their “supposedly 
oppositional practices” leave unchallenged masculinist “constructions of culture and recuperate another 
form of patriarchy […] deployed by the status and prestige of the U.S. academic left” (1999: 352). 
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thought to be less evolved and closer to Africans (Dyer, 1997: 52−57; McClintock, 1995, 
36−39).181 Such narratives linked bodies to culture and considered (white) British bodies 
and British culture to be the most evolved (Nakano Glenn, 2008: 289; Arnold, 2004: 
263). The evolutionary racism of the nineteenth-century was also applied to the 
inhabitants of India.182  
There were thought to be different races within India: the Aryans of the north 
were considered more evolved than the aborigines or Dravidians of the south.183 The 
former generally had lighter-coloured skin (and skulls allegedly shaped similar to those 
of Europeans), while the latter had darker-coloured skin (and skulls allegedly shaped 
differently to those of Europeans) (Arnold, 2004: 270−272). Lighter-coloured Indian 
bodies were not only considered to be more evolved, but they were also thought to be 
more beautiful. For example, Indian men whose skin colour was characterized by the 
British as “light copper” or, even better, as “wheaten”  
were allowed to be “handsome” as well as “manly,” especially when […] they 
came from northern India […] But in a situation in which ideas of race and 
gender were often mutually reinforcing […] it was often women […] who were 
singled out as having a near-European face or form, at least to the extent of 
resembling southern Europeans: even the most attractive [sic] of Indian 
                                                          
181 My use of the term men here is intentional. Women only tended to enter the narrative when evolution 
was linked to beauty (McClintock, 1995: 39).  
182 Indeed, as Edward Said notes, the long European tradition of treating the “Orient” as an object of 
fascination and study can be witnessed in the British treatment of Indians (Said, 1979: 228).  
183 Although evolutionary racism was clearly introduced in India by the British, it is important to note that 
these categories existed prior to British colonialism. Indeed, the first colour-based hierarchies within India 
are often blamed on the caste system. This system is generally thought to have been introduced by the 
nomadic, Caucasian Aryan group when they arrived in India around 1500 B.C.E. Social historians have 
suggested that in order to keep the native population (which consisted of darker-skinned Dravidians) 
suppressed, the Aryans differentiated people into various social strata based on skin tone (Glenn, 2008: 
289; Shevde, 2008). At the same time, the origins of these categories and colour-based hierarchies in India 
are somewhat beside the point: the British clearly exploited these categories and hierarchies for their own 
purposes, and they invested these categories and hierarchies with “scientific” authority using evolutionary 
racism.  
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women were seldom, in this cartography of colour, allowed to penetrate far 
into northern Europe. Thus, according to Captain Herbert in 1830 the 
“Hindustani beauty” was, “in all that regards form and feature, […] a Greek; 
only with a darker skin” (Arnold, 2004: 264).  
 
Although the “Hindustani beauty” could be thought to resemble the Greek beauty, this 
was a dubious distinction in that southern Europeans were considered less evolved than 
the British. Moreover, the “Hindustani beauty” was too dark to even properly pass as a 
southern European. As Arnold remarks, in setting themselves up as the ideal body type, 
the British “adjudicated among Indians on the basis of their appearance as if at some 
eternal beauty contest” (2004: 263). It is important to note that while certain Indians 
might have been regarded by the British as fellow Caucasians or Aryans, the British 
remained the sole adjudicators.184 Yet these adjudicators were not any British people 
but those of a particular class. Up until the middle of the nineteenth century, 
evolutionary racism and other narratives of imperial progress185 were only available to 
the literate, propertied elite of British society (McClintock, 1995: 209).  
The British masses were taught narratives of imperial progress through 
commodity racism. The term commodity racism was coined by Anne McClintock in 
Imperial Leather to capture how the “decidedly fetishistic faith in the magical powers of 
the commodity underpinned much of the colonial civilizing mission” (1995: 227). She 
examines the commodity racism enacted by a variety of advertisements from late 
                                                          
184 Interestingly, even the adjudicators had to maintain their whiteness. Since at least the mid-eighteenth 
century, white British women in the colonies used cashew nuts to lighten their skin. Given that this oil can 
be caustic, it was somewhat painful to use (Coleman, 2003: 171). 
185 I have focused on evolutionary racism in my discussion of the construction of a relationship between 
lighter-coloured skin and civilization in nineteenth-century Britain. However, such a relationship was also 
set up in poetry, philosophy, travelogues, novels, political theory, economics, and the writings of imperial 
administrators (Said, 1979; McClintock, 1995: 209).  
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nineteenth-century Britain, focusing particularly on soap and other personal hygiene 
and cleaning products. In these ads, these products became not only a symbol of British 
superiority but offered the promise of civilization to both the British working class and 
the colonized. Soap itself was invested with the magical power to wash “from the skin 
the very stigma of racial and class degeneration” (McClintock, 1995: 214). Many of the 
advertisements featured “before and after” bodies of the British working class (such as 
coalminers) and racialized bodies from the colonies turning significantly lighter from 
commodity consumption. One ad portrayed a crate of soap washing up onto shore to 
the wondering eyes of awestruck natives; another featured a group of Sudanese men 
falling to their knees to worship a large rock into which the words “PEARS SOAP IS THE 
BEST” were carved (McClintock, 1995: 211−227). Interestingly, the second ad makes the 
same analogy as Marx in his characterization of commodity fetishism, namely between 
the European commodity worshipper and the African fetish worshipper. Yet Marx and 
Pears make this analogy for opposite purposes. Marx suggests the European commodity 
worshipper is as bad as, or at least, no better than the African fetish worshipper;186 
Pears suggests the African can be as good as the European (or almost as good) through 
commodity worship. McClintock argues that commodity racism not only brought 
narratives of imperial progress to the masses, but “no preexisting form of organized 
racism had ever before been able to reach so large and so differentiated a mass of the 
populace” (1995: 209, emphasis mine). Unilever was one of several companies to 
                                                          
186 See section C of the Conclusion for further discussion. 
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connect their product to the so-called civilizing mission of British imperialism in the 
nineteenth-century,187 and it continues to enact commodity racism today.  
There are differences between historical and contemporary commodity racism. 
The first difference is that the racism is more implicit in the latter. An 1899 ad for Pears’ 
soap explicitly linked the “white man’s burden” of Rudyard Kipling poem to their 
product: 
The first step towards lightening THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN is through 
teaching the virtues of cleanliness. PEARS’ SOAP is a potent factor in 
brightening the dark corners of the earth as civilization advances, while 
amongst the cultured of all nations it holds the highest place—it is the ideal 
toilet soap (reproduced by McClintock, 1995: 33). 
 
Language of white and light from Victorian England have been replaced with the 
euphemism fairness. In Fair & Lovely’s commercials, print ads, website, and packaging—
despite the many images of women’s skin becoming whiter and women’s faces bathed 
in light—the words white or light never appear.  
A second important difference between the commodity racism of the Lever 
Brothers of Victorian England and HUL of contemporary India is that the former sold 
their product to the colonizing nation while the latter is selling theirs to the formerly 
colonized. This shift in the target consumer of commodity racism is important. British 
colonizers found the natives of their colonies uncivilized in part because they were not 
impressed by European commodities (McClintock, 1995: 229−231). Indeed, colonizers 
were prone to “murderous temper” when commodities such as clocks, guns, and soap 
were not given their due respect (McClintock, 1995: 230). Given this equating of 
                                                          
187 Originally called the Lever Brothers, the corporation that is now Unilever started as a soap 
manufacturer in Britain in 1884. Their company slogan was “Soap is Civilization” (McClintock, 1995: 207).  
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commodities with civilization in imperial capitalism, the use of commodities (especially 
those produced by a western corporation such as Unilever) indicates India’s progress 
toward civilization. While Indian women who use Fair & Lovely do not take on the white 
man’s burden—the marketers appeal to their identity as South Asian women—they 
should have lighter coloured skin.188 This shift in the consumer of commodity racism, 
therefore, does not mean the commodity is no longer doing (in McClintock’s words) the 
“civilizing work of empire” (1995: 222). Indeed, the putative superiority of whiteness is 
suggested in the marketing of both the Lever Brothers of Victorian England and HUL of 
contemporary India.  
Following a conventional Marxian understanding of use-value, the actual use-
value of the historical and contemporary products discussed in this section are 
somewhat unclear. McClintock notes that toward the end of the nineteenth century, the 
commodity itself disappeared from many ads (1995: 225). Even when the commodity 
did appear, ads enacting commodity racism focused on the exchange-value rather than 
the use-value of the commodity: in the case of soap, it represented the civilizing mission 
of colonialism rather than facilitating sanitary living conditions. As such, commodity 
racism (like commodity fetishism) does not concern the use-value of an object. Without 
                                                          
188 In 2007, Ashok Venkatramani, who was in charge of the skin care category at the Indian subsidiary of 
Unilever, was quoted as saying that taking offense at Fair & Lovely is “a very Western way of looking at 
the world.” He contended that the definition of beauty in Asia differs from the west: in the former, it is 
“all about being two shades lighter,” whereas in the latter, beauty “is linked to anti-aging” (Timmons, 
2007). Venkatramani’s claim serves to deflect critiques of Fair & Lovely’s racism in two ways. First, in 
claiming this standard of beauty emerges from Asia alone, any critiques of this standard must stem from a 
“Western way of thinking” and possibly neo-colonial thought. This claim erases the existence of Asian 
feminists who critique this standard, or at best, it writes them off as internalizing neo-colonial thought. 
Second, even if this standard is racist, then Fair & Lovely cannot be implicated. It is simply responding to a 
standard that already exists, rather than being actively engaged in its production.  
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the transformation of use-value into exchange-value—indeed, without the fetishization 
of soap—nineteenth-century commodity racism would not have existed. In less abstract 
terms, simply linking the use of soap in hand washing to reducing the spread of 
infectious diseases would not be racist. However, linking hand washing to the British 
imperial project is racist. Although commodity racism at the end of the nineteenth 
century was based on the disappearance of use-value, at this time use-value existed and 
was made to disappear. Commodity racism at the beginning of the twenty-first century 
differs in that there seems to be no use-value to disappear. Fair & Lovely does not 
facilitate sanitary living conditions or reduce the spread of infectious diseases or 
accomplish any other health-related social good; it simply lightens skin tone. A similar 
argument can be made with reference to the commodity feminism of Dove products. 
Without the transfer of use-value to exchange-value, without the fetishization of soap 
(and body wash and deodorant and moisturizer), twenty-first century commodity 
feminism would not exist. In less abstract terms, simply linking the use of body wash to 
reducing the spread of infectious diseases would not be feminist.189 However, linking 
body wash to feminist empowerment is feminist. Thus, commodity feminism at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, in a similar manner to commodity racism, seems 
to possess no use-value.  
Fair & Lovely not only seems to have no use-value but may in fact be harmful to 
users. Although it is sometimes marketed as a health product—some products are 
suggested to give women’s skin multivitamins or protect skin from sun damage—it is 
                                                          
189 While health would certainly be considered a feminist issue, body wash has nothing to do with the 
feminist issues with which Dove is concerned—that is, women’s body image and self-esteem.  
 228 
actually toxic. Like many skin lightening creams, Fair & Lovely contains mercury, which 
can be absorbed through the skin with adverse health effects. In a study of Fair & Lovely 
on mice, Al-Salah et al. contend that repeated applications could have toxic effects on 
different organs, particularly the kidneys (2004: 172−173). Moreover, other studies have 
demonstrated that mercury absorbed through the pregnant women’s skin can be 
transmitted to the fetus. Mercury can remain in the bodies of babies’ months after their 
birth (Al-Salah et al., 2004: 173). This is even more troubling in that Fair & Lovely sells a 
product directed at pregnant women called Anti-Marks, which is supposed to both 
lighten skin in the abdomen area while reducing the appearance of stretch marks.190  
The use-value of Fair & Lovely, especially when used by the very poor, is 
questionable. In her discussion of the immense popularity of the twenty rupee sachets 
of Fair & Lovely, Shevde questions “why, in many Indian villages today, [do] young girls 
spend their few pennies not on food but rather on Fair & Lovely sachets?” She contends 
that this is perplexing because skin lightening cream “does not fill any vital human need” 
(2008). An explanation using a conventional Marxian understanding of commodity 
fetishism would understand this as a process through which the social (for example, the 
racist association of female beauty with lighter skin) is transformed into the natural (for 
example, ancient Ayurvedic ingredients), but also a process through which the social is 
transformed into the supernatural (for example, a magical process through which 
                                                          
190 On the topic of babies and skin lightening products, transmission from the mother is not the only way 
babies might be impacted. The baby massage oil Healthy and Fair (a product sold by the Indian 
corporation Emami Ltd., which is not associated with Unilever) stresses the importance of lightening skin 
from a very young age.  
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twenty rupees can buy one a husband and lifelong economic security).191 Yet at the 
same time, it is important not to fall into the habit (as has been done in the Global North 
for generations of people on the left) of critiquing working-class or poor women who 
embrace hegemonic codes of femininity and the commodities these codes 
necessitate.192 In other words, it is important not to dismiss women who purchase the 
twenty rupee sachets as mere dupes. Indeed, economic security for women, especially 
poor women, is often dependent on adhering to the norms of femininity. Shevde’s 
question is problematic in that she assumes Fair & Lovely has a use-value that is 
knowable. 
Indeed, underlying my discussion of use-value thus far in this section is the 
implicit assumption that use-value is something obvious and knowable. For Spivak, use-
value is neither, and it can and ought to be critiqued. In a Spivakian vein, David Levine 
asks:  
Why restrict the social character of the commodity to the exchange-value? 
Why devote so much time and energy to value and so little to use, making the 
former a part of political economy, the latter a “work of history”? Why treat 
the usefulness of things in satisfying want as if it were something obvious, or 
of purely historical interest? (Levine, 1998: vi) 
 
For Spivak, the use-value/exchange-value dichotomy renders use-value natural and 
exchange-value social, and as such, it essentializes use-value. To apply Spivak to Fair & 
Lovely, it is not the use-value of Fair & Lovely that is problematic, but rather, the very 
conception of use-value itself. Use-value (in the conventional Marxian understanding) is 
supposed to have utility, to possess something that people want or need. In her critique 
                                                          
191 See section 1.2.2 for a discussion of how commodity fetishism transforms a thing that is sensuous and 
ordinary into a thing that transcends sensuousness and is extraordinary.  
192 See section 2.4.  
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of Fair & Lovely as not providing a “vital human need,” Shevde does not bother to 
question the conception of need. Levine notes that there is a tendency to take “what is 
most problematic for granted, as if saying the words want, need, preference, choice 
were enough” (1998: 2−3). Nakano Glenn contends that Fair & Lovely advertisements 
are not “simply responding to a preexisting need but actually creating a need by 
depicting having dark skin as a painful and depressing experience” (2008: 298, my 
emphasis). In creating a need, Fair & Lovely (in a similar manner to historical commodity 
racism and contemporary Dove products) is creating a particular gendered and 
racialized subject. Wants and needs do not exist on their own; rather, they have “roots 
in a concept of the subject, whose want expresses those attributes we associate with 
being a subject” (Levine, 1998: 39). Or in other words, the process of creating wants and 
needs cannot be separated from the process of subject formation.  
Spivak’s argument that use-value puts the entire chain of value into question can 
be read against Amariglio and Callari. Indeed, the latter read commodity fetishism as 
subjectivity entirely through exchange-value: that is, they examine the contradiction 
between equal exchange and unequal magnitudes of labour time to contend that 
possessive individualism is a subjectivity constituted by entering into exchange 
relationships. Following Spivak, if use-value puts the entire chain of value into question 
then use-value can be employed to critique commodity fetishism as subjectivity. Use-
value is firmly material; exchange-value is firmly not-material. If exchange-value is not 
material, then commodity fetishism (which concerns exchange-value) is a de-
materialized, disembodied form of subjectivity. As such, commodity fetishism is 
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ostensibly gender-neutral; however, in a similar manner to many concepts that claim to 
be gender-neutral, it is masculinist and white. In bringing materiality back into the 
equation with her discussion of use-value, Spivak is bringing back a conception of 
subjectivity that is firmly embodied and therefore gendered and racialized.  
In sum, following from Spivak (and to a lesser extent Levine), I am making two 
separate claims about use-value: first, it is neither obvious nor immediately knowable; 
and second, it is firmly material and embodied.193 On the former, I have proposed that 
the actual use-value many of the Unilever products discussed in this section is either 
unclear (in the case of Fair & Lovely in contemporary India) or disappears into exchange-
value (in the case of Pears soap in Victorian England or Dove body wash in 
contemporary Canada). On the latter, I have suggested that the materiality of use-value 
allows for an embodied, gendered and racialized understanding of subjectivity. In 
creating wants and needs through which women come to see commodities (Dove or Fair 
& Lovely) as having use-value, the corporation (Unilever) participates in the production 
of feminized and racialized subject formation. In Scattered Speculations, Spivak briefly 
critiques what she calls “feminist individualist consumerism” and suggests that this is a 
form of subjectivity (1988: 169, 294−295). She does not, however, elaborate further.194 
In this section—and indeed, the chapter as a whole—I read commodity feminism as 
                                                          
193 These are not contradictory claims: to be material and embodied is not necessarily to be natural or 
immediately knowable. Indeed, most feminist and anti-racist thought has long understood gender and 
race as not stable, ahistorical, or natural phenomenon, but rather as processes that must be continually 
produced and reproduced to be given meaning. 
194 Spivak simply states (in footnote 15): “the relationship between feminist individualism and the military-
industrial complex on the one hand, and the problem of anti-sexism on the other, is too overdetermined 
for me to deal with it in more than a footnote” (1988: 295). 
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subjectivity. Indeed, the ascendance of commodity feminism today might be explained 
by how caught up it is in subjectivity.  
4.6 Conclusion  
Nancy Fraser has questioned whether there is a “subterranean elective affinity” 
between feminism and contemporary neoliberalism.195 If there is such an affinity, she 
suggests that it resides in the shared critique of traditional forms of authority (2009: 
108, 115). Indeed, capitalism has effectively broken down traditional hierarchical social 
structures and ways of life.196 For example, although queer desire and queer 
relationships have always existed, capitalism played a fundamental role in the 
development of queer identities, as individual waged labour came to replace the 
heterosexual family unit in production (D’Emilio, 1983; Hennessy, 2000: 30, 98−110). 
Fraser suggests that neoliberalism does not have a problem with identity politics as 
such—be it queer, feminist, diversity, or otherwise—as long as nothing is demanded of 
the state. In her words, neoliberalism “would much prefer to confront claims for 
recognition over claims for redistribution” (2009: 113; emphasis mine).197 This is because 
neoliberalism builds a “new regime of accumulation on the cornerstone of women’s 
                                                          
195 Fraser is discussing second wave feminism specifically (not commodity feminism). She characterizes 
second wave feminism as a whole as “an epochal social phenomenon,” rather than “this or that activist 
current, […] this or that strand of feminist theorizing; not this or that geographical slice of the movement, 
nor this or that sociological stratum of women” (2009: 97).  
196 For Marx and Engels, there is no social structure specific to or necessary for capitalism to operate 
(Marx and Engels, 1985: 83; Hennessy, 2000: 29−30). This is quite unlike past modes of production such as 
feudalism. Hennessy notes that “whereas feudal production was essentially conservative, the technical 
basis of modern capitalism is revolutionary because it never takes any existing aspect of social life to be 
definitive” (2000: 29). 
197 Fraser has long contended that justice requires both recognition and redistribution: recognition seeks 
to redress cultural injustice and redistribution seeks to redress socioeconomic injustice (1995: 69−74).  
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waged labour, and seeks to disembed markets from social regulation in order to operate 
all the more freely on a global scale” (Fraser, 2009: 113). In other words, recognition of 
women’s individualized identities—that are separate from the role of wife and/or 
mother but linked to participation in the capitalist economy—is an important part of 
both feminism and neoliberalism.  
 Although Fraser is not concerned with commodity feminism per se, her 
discussion of the relationship between feminism and neoliberalism relates to my 
example of Unilever in India. Fraser contends that an important part of the neoliberal 
search for new markets (and expansion of existing markets) is harnessing identity 
politics (2009: 108−109). This was made explicit by Harish Manwani, Unilever’s Chief 
Operating Officer and HUL’s Chairman [sic], in a 2011 talk in Mumbai. Manwani is 
considered to be an expert (in international marketing circles at least) on building 
markets in contemporary India (Tiltman, 2011). In other words, he is an expert on 
connecting poor rural Indians to commodities (previously seen as unnecessary) sold by 
multinational corporations. For Manwani, the key to building markets is understanding 
that there is not “one India”: “the country covers different consumer segments, 
different price points, not to mention a huge cultural diversity” (Manwani cited in 
Tiltman, 2011).198 Within the logic of neoliberal capitalism, therefore, diversity becomes 
“market segmentation” and identity politics becomes a useful differentiation between 
                                                          
198 A similar point has been made by marketing scholar Falguni Vasavada-Oza and marketing practitioners 
Aparna Nagraj and Yamini Krishna, who contend that a common mistake by marketers is “dividing India 
into two uniform groups: the urban India and the rural India, the assumption being that these two are 
very different from each other but are uniform in themselves.” They go on to describe how “rural India 
has several ‘Indias’ in itself” (Vasavada-Oza et al., 2012: 8).  
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potential consumer groups. Additionally, Fraser contends that the subjection of women 
under neoliberalism is seen as “an obstacle to capitalist expansion” that confines 
“economic rationality within a limited sphere” (Fraser, 2009: 115). In other words, 
conventional neoliberal wisdom suggests that economic development requires women 
being incorporated into market economies, both as workers and consumers.199 
Hindustan Unilever’s “Project Shakti” is a good example of incorporating poor rural 
women200 into the market economy. The program, which started in 2000, ostensibly 
empowers women across India by giving them microcredit loans and training to become 
direct-to-consumer sales distributors selling Unilever’s products on commission (Kopper, 
2010; Tiltman, 2011; WARC, 2011; Vasavada-Oza et al., 2012: 10). In 2010, there were 
45,000 Shakti “entrepreneurs” reaching three million homes in 135,000 villages 
(Tiltman, 2011).  
 Unilever (and its subsidiaries including Dove and HUL) is a good example of the 
relationship between commodity feminism and neoliberalism. Unilever (like 
multinational corporations more broadly) is assumed to be a rightful agent of social 
change under neoliberalism. This cannot be disassociated from the corporation’s role in 
subject formation. For example, through Project Shakti, HUL has been credited with 
giving “rise to the financially active woman in rural India.” This has inspired other 
multinational corporations to follow their lead (Vasavada-Oza et al., 2012: 10). In this 
chapter, I have contended that in selling subjectivity through feminized and racialized 
                                                          
199 Hester Eisenstein also makes this point in her discussion of the “dangerous liaison” between feminism 
and corporate globalization (2005: 503).  
200 80% of the participants in Project Shakti are women (WARC, 2011).  
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commodities, corporations themselves play a crucial role in subject formation. Although 
the association of feminism (and other forms of activism) with consumption is 
problematic in and of itself, the role of the corporation in subject formation is 
particularly troubling. 
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CONCLUSION 
Making Sense of the Relationship Between Commodity Feminism,  
Femininity, and Subjectivity 
 
If we don’t want to know how a woman “comes into being” let’s leave Freud’s science 
alone […] [for] to ignore Freud is like ignoring Marx. 
—Juliet Mitchell (1973: 168) 
 
In the early nineties, many of us who were young at the time saw ourselves as victims of 
a predatory marketing machine that co-opted our identities, our styles and our ideas 
and turned them into brand food. Nothing was immune: […] not even […] campus 
feminism or multiculturalism. Few of us asked, at least not right away, why it was that 
these scenes and ideas were proving so packageable, so unthreatening—and so 
profitable. Many of us had been certain we were doing something subversive and 
rebellious but… what was it again?  
—Naomi Klein (2002: 81−82) 
 
Growing up in the 1980s and 1990s, I was always tall for my age. I had a growth spurt 
around the age of eleven or twelve that rendered me considerably taller than all of the 
other girls and boys in my class. Having internalized the norms of hegemonic femininity, 
including the idea that girls are supposed to take up less space than boys, I became 
extremely self-conscious, shy, and withdrawn. If I had to take up more physical space, 
then I could at least take up less metaphorical space. Although some of the boys, and 
even one or two girls, reached my height in high school, I had already developed an 
extremely problematic relationship with both my body and food. The summer after my 
first year of university, having heard about Naomi Wolf in my introductory Women’s 
Studies course, I read The Beauty Myth. I had barely read a few pages of her then-new 
(1997) introduction when I had my first of many beauty myth eureka! moments. By the 
time I reached the chapter entitled “Hunger,” I was convinced that Wolf was speaking 
directly to me. As a young, white, middle-class woman living in Anglo-America, I was 
certainly part of her intended audience. When I re-read The Beauty Myth for this 
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dissertation in my early thirties, I used the same copy from my original read at age 
nineteen. I felt a real fondness for my nineteen-year-old self, who spoke to me through 
the marginal notes written over a decade earlier. The appearance of the pages was 
bright and eye-catching. Passages I was particularly excited about were underlined and 
starred with sparkly silver and gold. Although I read the book with a far more critical eye 
than I did at age nineteen, I was amused by the sparkly stars and bright pink and purple 
arrows that dotted the pages of Wolf’s critique of femininity.  
 When I discovered feminism in the late 1990s, I never assumed there was a 
tension between feminism and femininity. Perhaps this was because I came of age 
during the third wave of feminism and read The Beauty Myth at such a formative age. 
Indeed, Wolf herself contended that feminists can wear lipstick without feeling guilty 
(1997: 271).201 I still love bright colours and lipstick and dressing up in clothing 
constructed as feminine. At any given time, I have at least ten different colours of nail 
polish in my bathroom cabinet, many of which contain sparkles. I also love arts and 
crafts activities. I own the entire series of Stitch ‘n Bitch knitting and crocheting pattern 
books by Debbie Stoller. In addition to being a crafter, Stoller is the co-founder of the 
third wave magazine Bust, and proponent of the Girlie strand of third wave feminism.202 
The Stitch ‘n Bitch series, like Girlie feminism more broadly, promotes the idea that 
women’s work is valuable, that reclaiming feminine culture is a feminist act, and that 
crafting is a powerful link both to one’s female ancestors and women’s history more 
                                                          
201 Also see section 2.5. 
202 See section 2.7. 
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broadly.203 In a similar manner to Stoller, I experience crafting as a celebration of my 
female relatives and ancestors: it was my maternal grandmother who taught me how to 
knit, and she was taught by her grandmother; it was my aunt who taught me how to 
crochet, and she was taught by her mother (my long-deceased paternal grandmother). 
Although I share with my maternal grandmother a love of nail polish, lipstick, dressing 
up, and knitting, she was (and continues to idealize) the 1950s happy homemaker204 
while I am a feminist. Yet the question for me has never been how to think through my 
expressions of femininity as a feminist. Instead, my question concerns how my own 
third wave-influenced feminism has been repeatedly bought and sold. I begin the 
concluding chapter in this manner in order to both discuss my personal investment in 
this dissertation and concretize my theoretical concerns. 
 My theoretical concerns are illustrated well by Juliet Mitchell in the epigraph to 
this chapter where she contends that both Marx and Freud are central to understanding 
the subject formation of women in capitalist societies. This chapter completes my 
inquiry into commodity feminism by drawing together some of the primary themes of 
this dissertation. Section A explores the role of origin stories in my understanding of 
commodity feminism, specifically those of Engels and Freud, using Joanne Wright’s 
Origin Stories in Political Thought: Discourses on Gender, Power, and Citizenship (2004). 
Section B concerns the social control underpinning commodity feminism by exploring 
the relationship between hysteria, femininity, and group psychology. In doing so, I link 
                                                          
203 For example, in Stitch ‘n Bitch Crochet: The Happy Hooker, Stoller discusses how sewing, embroidering, 
knitting and crocheting “inextricably [bind] me to my female relatives. With each stitch, I follow in the 
footsteps (handsteps?) of my ancestors, carrying on centuries-old traditions and paying respect to their 
wide and varied crafting skills” (2006: 3).  
204 See section 3.5. 
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Freud’s conservatism and misogynist understandings of femininity to reactionary work 
on group psychology, particularly Gustave Le Bon (1895) and Ann Coulter (2011), to 
examine how commodity feminism sells feminism to direct and control the supposedly 
hysterical, feminine masses. Section C reads commodity feminism as a civilizing mission 
which brings so-called civilization—that is, commodity culture informed by feminism—
to the anti-feminist, often racialized masses. I return to the question of how Marx’s 
original conception of commodity fetishism was tied up in racist discourses of civilization 
and link this to Naomi Klein’s critique of commodity culture in No Logo (1999). In 
addition to drawing together the primary themes of this dissertation, this concluding 
chapter aims to suggest a way of resisting—both theoretically and politically—the 
commodified politics Klein is discussing in the epigraph to this chapter.  
A. Commodity Feminism, Origin Stories, and Origin Questions 
This exploration of commodity feminism has involved several stories of origin. I have 
discussed Engels’ story of the advent of private property as involving the “world historic 
defeat of the female sex” (section 1.3), Freud’s story of the dawn of civilization as 
involving guilt about the Oedipal killing of the father (section 3.4), and my own story of 
the origins of commodity feminism being rooted in the femininity question in popular 
Anglo-American feminism (Chapter Two). In this section, I further explore the theme of 
origin stories, using Joanne Wright’s Origin Stories in Political Thought: Discourses on 
Gender, Power, and Citizenship (2004) as a starting point. In her book, Wright explores 
the “origins imperative” in political theory: origins not only play a significant role within 
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(historical and contemporary) political theory, but they might also be essential insofar as 
they fulfill a basic human need to reflect upon our beginnings and make sense of the 
world (2004: 3−23, 163). Although this dissertation does not examine the same origin 
stories as Wright,205 in thinking through the origin stories associated with commodity 
feminism, I heed her call to become “more critically aware and reflective about the 
function of origin stories and their more pernicious falsehoods and uses” in order to 
“advance our search for an equitable politics” (2004: 164). Following from this, this 
section will contend that the origin stories associated with commodity feminism should 
not be understood as either actual historical events or as foundational to social and 
political life. Instead, I suggest that these origin stories ought to be read as illuminating 
the power relations from which commodity feminism emerged and within which it 
continues to operate. I thus open up (rather than close off) possibilities of resisting 
commodity feminism and working toward decommodification.  
The origin stories of Engels and Freud share several crucial points. In the usual 
manner of political origin storytellers, both begin with a primordial state of nature and 
move on to discuss the formation of a social contract between men. Neither Engels nor 
Freud use the language of “state of nature” or “social contract;” nevertheless, their 
narratives follow the basic trajectory established by social contract theorists (including 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau).206 What makes them stand 
                                                          
205 Wright examines both the masculinist origin stories concerning the beginnings of politics and power 
(Plato and Thomas Hobbes) as well as feminist origin stories about the beginnings of patriarchy (Carole 
Pateman and various 1960s and 1970s radical feminists). 
206 Seventeenth and eighteenth century social contract theorists postulated a state of nature as the 
supposedly natural condition of men and women before the advent of society, politics, or economics. For 
example, Locke, theorist of the English bourgeoisie and early agrarian capitalism, understood the so-called 
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out from the standard social contract origin story, however, is the importance placed on 
gender and sexuality in both their narratives.207 In The Origin of the Family, Private 
Property and the State, Engels proposes that “group marriage” (that is, unrestricted sex 
between all members of the group) was the original state of humanity.208 Similarly, in 
Totem and Taboo, Freud contends that “the oldest and most powerful of human 
desires” is to have sex with all other members of the primordial (totemic) group (1989c: 
41). In both origin stories, therefore, the primordial stage involves no restrictions on 
who can have sex with whom.209 For Engels, this restriction comes with the invention of 
incest (Engels, 1972: 63). For Freud, this restriction comes with the development of the 
taboo (Freud, 1989c: 41). Moreover, Freud suggests that the earliest taboos—that is, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Indians running around improperly clothed in the woods of North and South America to be a perfect 
example of the state of nature. Indeed, in The Second Treatise of Government (1690) he famously 
declared: “in the beginning all the world was America” (Locke, 1980: §49). Locke, therefore, made the 
Aboriginal societies of the Americas (or rather, an inaccurate and romanticized version of these societies) 
an integral part of his justification of the emerging liberal capitalist state. 
207 Gender and sexuality are largely absent in the origin stories of Hobbes, Locke, and other social contract 
theorists. At the same time, I would be remiss not to mention Carole Pateman’s now classic book The 
Sexual Contract. According to Pateman, implicit within social contract theory is a sexual contract. Pateman 
argues that contract theorists tell only half the story: in dealing with the transition between the state of 
nature and political society, these theorists discuss the social contract but ignore the sexual contract 
(1988: 1). She takes up the task of writing the sexual contract back into their stories. In short, the sexual 
contract explains a silence in the narrative. In the state of nature, women and men are equal. However, in 
political society, in a similar way in which men have subordinated their natural freedom to monarchical 
power, women have subordinated their natural equality to what Locke refers to as paternal power 
(Pateman, 1988: 91, 218). Men choose to subordinate themselves (to the monarch) to protect their 
property, yet the reason women choose to subordinate themselves (to patriarchy) is never explained. 
Pateman proposes that the sexual contract is not a contract at all: women join political society because 
they were raped. Indeed, on this point it should be noted that Pateman is specifically referring to Hobbes. 
According to Pateman, Hobbes was the only social contract theorist to hint at a reason for women’s so-
called choice to subordinate themselves to patriarchy. In her reading, Hobbes was more honest than 
Locke, who left the reason unstated (Pateman, 1988: 49). Her radical feminist appropriation of the 
language and method of masculinist origin stories effectively demonstrates the partiality of these stories. 
At the same time, Pateman is offering an interpretation of what is unsaid, or at best implicit, within these 
stories; as such, her book does not dispute my claim that gender and sexuality are largely absent from 
most social contract theory. 
208 See section 1.3. 
209 Both Engels and Freud, however, assume that all sexual activity in the primordial stage is heterosexual.  
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not killing the totemic animal and restricting sexual relations—represents the “oldest 
human unwritten code of laws” (1989c: 25). As such, the subsequent development of 
both religious and human laws can be traced back to this taboo (Freud, 1989c: 26).  
In both Engels and Freud, the transition out of the primordial stage (or state of 
nature in the terminology of contract theorists) involves the establishment of a 
masculinist social contract. For Engels, of course, this transition occurs with the 
simultaneous development of monogamous marriage and commodity production (1972: 
85). With this development, women become commodities to be exchanged between 
men.210 For Freud, this transition involves the rise of father-rule followed by the primal 
horde (or band of brothers) killing and eating their father.211 This transition also involves 
the renunciation of the incestuously desired women within their horde, and the 
brothers of the horde exchanging their women with the women belonging to the 
brothers of another horde (Freud, 1961: 53−61; Paul, 1996: 22−23). Thus for both 
Engels and Freud, the social contract is made between men for the possession and 
exchange of women.  
In addition to the crucial points of commonality shared in the origin narratives of 
Engels and Freud, they both (at times) treat their stories as actual historical events. 
Engels believed he was writing history, while Freud was more unclear. Engels’ abilities as 
a historian are crude at best. His evidence has been described by Gayle Rubin as “quaint 
to a reader familiar with the more recent developments in anthropology” (1997: 31). 
Seccombe argues that Engels’ belief that the origin of women’s subordination lies in the 
                                                          
210 See section 1.3. 
211 See section 3.4. 
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advent of private property is not sustained by modern studies. Referencing 
contemporary work in anthropology, historical sociology and social history, he contends 
that support is not lent to “the orthodox Marxist position, stemming from Engels, nor to 
its opposite, which posits a universal pattern of male dominance” (1992: 36). As such, 
the historical origins problem Engels claims to have solved remains in question.212 Freud 
relies even less on historical and anthropological evidence than Engels, which might 
explain his ambiguity concerning whether or not he is writing history. Freud has the 
tendency of presenting the Oedipal narrative as history, while including the occasional 
caveat that acknowledges he is not equipped to handle questions of historical or 
anthropological accuracy. For example, in Moses and Monotheism, Freud states 
unequivocally: “the events I am about to describe occurred to all primitive men—that is, 
to all our ancestors” (2001: 81; emphasis mine). Yet elsewhere in this book, Freud 
responds to critiques of his use of ethnography in his earlier work (Totem and Taboo) by 
stating: “I am not an ethnologist but a psycho-analyst” (2001: 131). Engels and Freud are 
not alone in their (mis)use of history: as Wright notes, origin story theorists commonly 
distort history for their own purposes (2004: 24).  
For Wright, beyond the distortion of history, what is particularly problematic is 
the treatment of origin stories as foundational to social and political life. Both Engels 
                                                          
212 In addition to “quaint,” Engels’ evidence is perhaps better described as highly Eurocentric. Engels is 
reliant almost exclusively on Greece, Rome, and early Germany to discuss the transition from kin-based to 
class-based society (Leacock, 1981: 25). Almost all the non-European and non-Asian world is placed in the 
(itself heterogeneous) category of kin-based societies. As Leacock points out, this leaves in “a very 
unsatisfactory state the colonial peoples who were in various stages of transition to class and state 
organization when their autonomous development was interrupted” (1981: 25). Engels did very little of 
the anthropological work himself and relied almost exclusively on Morgan. Yet the anthropological 
material he added relates to early Germanic and Celtic societies (Leacock, 1972: 14). 
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and Freud treat their origin stories in this manner. In addition, Freud’s (Oedipal) story is 
treated as foundational to not only social and political life but to individual psychological 
life as well. Wright contends that this emphasis on foundations has “a way of limiting 
our thinking, [and] of narrowing our perspectives, precisely because [origin stories] 
presuppose a belief in essences, original orders, and primordial truths” (2004: 162). 
Moreover, she suggests that origin stories “deny the complexity and messiness of 
politics” (2004: 162). I would add that reading origin stories as foundational denies the 
possibility of resistance. Indeed, if civilization began with guilt about the murder of the 
father (Freud), if the development of private property and capitalism can be linked to 
the re-establishment of masculinist rule (Engels), if the rule by an authoritarian father-
substitute is a fundamental aspect of both individual and group psychology (Freud), and 
if the exchange of women is central to capitalism (Engels), then how does one engage in 
feminist and anti-capitalist resistance? A better understanding—one that is less 
totalizing and allows for resistance213—will reject the idea that origin stories represent 
actual historical events or are foundational to social and political life.  
 Origin stories are better understood as highlighting certain aspects of the 
complexity and messiness of social and political life. In this dissertation, I have used the 
origin stories of Engels and Freud to make sense of certain aspects of commodity 
feminism. Engels’ origin story concerning women being reduced to commodities to be 
exchanged between men—developed from his work with Marx—has been highly 
influential in feminist understandings of the relationship between women and 
                                                          
213 See section 1.5 for more discussion of the problem of resistance in Engels. 
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commodities.214 In Chapter One, I suggested that the commodification of women is a 
necessary precursor to understanding the commodification of feminism. Indeed, not 
only are women exchanged between men, but women are also exchangers and 
fetishizers of commodities in their own right.215 As such, I have used Engels’ origin story 
on the “world historic defeat of the female sex”—along with Gayle Rubin’s use of this 
story for understanding the exchange and commodification of women216—in developing 
my theoretical framework for understanding the commodification of feminism. Freud’s 
origin story concerning the guilt about the Oedipal killing of the father, and subsequent 
desire among the band of brothers for an authoritative father-substitute, is central to 
his social and political thought. By extension, Freud’s origin story is also important to the 
social and political thought of Freud’s nephew Edward Bernays. In Chapter Three, I 
suggested that Bernays—originator of the first commodity feminist marketing 
campaigns and lifetime promoter of Freud’s image and writings—was strongly 
influenced by Freud’s masculinist, elitist, and anti-democratic politics. Overall, the origin 
stories of Engels and Freud have helped to illuminate aspects of the relationship 
between women and commodities, and the conservatism underpinning commodity 
feminism.  
 In this dissertation, I have explored the origins of commodity feminism while 
intentionally avoiding writing another (to use Wright’s term) foundational origin story. I 
have not posited a primordial state of nature, nor have I invented a prehistory based on 
                                                          
214 See sections 1.3 and 1.4. 
215 See section 1.5. 
216 See section 1.4. 
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incomplete speculations. Instead, I have heeded Wright’s call for “increased historical 
sensitivity” in feminist political theory (2004: 16). This sensitivity is evident in my 
examination of the treatment of the femininity question within popular Anglo-American 
feminist texts,217 my discussion of historical shifts in marketing to women from the 
happy homemaker onwards,218 and finally, my discussion of 1970s and 1980s marketing 
debates on the changing roles of women.219 I have not treated the origins of commodity 
feminism as essential or fundamental or unchanging; as already established, such 
treatments of origins are limiting and simplistic (Wright, 2004: 161−162). Instead, I have 
explored origins as a way of understanding the popularity of commodity feminism 
today—that is, its ascendancy as a form of feminism—and as a way of exploring the 
underlying power relations within which commodity feminism operates. More 
specifically, I have situated the origins of commodity feminism through the femininity 
question in Chapter Two and capitalism under conservatism in Chapter Three. I have 
argued that commodity feminism resolves the feminism/femininity tension in two ways: 
first, through revaluing feminized commodities and the women who use them (in their 
production of femininity); and second, through a Bernaysian-conservative 
understanding of society in which commodity consumption is treated as a necessary 
form of social control. 
In transitioning between the first theme (origin stories) and the second (social 
control), it is useful to briefly consider Juliet Mitchell’s reading of Freud’s Oedipal 
                                                          
217 See Chapter Two. 
218 See section 3.5. 
219 See section 3.6. 
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narrative. Mitchell contends that the narrative should be read as “the story of the 
origins of patriarchy” (1974: 403). She contends that within both the Oedipal narrative 
(the origin story) and the Oedipus complex (the stage of child psychosexual 
development), “the little boy learns his place as heir to the law of the father and the 
little girl learns her place within it” (Mitchell, 1974: 203). Although my use of Freud in 
this dissertation has focused on the Oedipal narrative (and to a lesser extent the 
Oedipus complex), it is important to note that before the complex or narrative, Freud’s 
earliest work was on hysteria. The next theme (and section) concerns social control, and 
more specifically, how that control relates to both hysteria and femininity.  
B. Commodity Feminism as Controlling the Hysterical, Feminine Masses  
In exploring the theme of social control, I use Freud’s work on hysteria as a starting 
point, particularly focusing on his case study of Dora. I return to my earlier comparison 
of individual and group psychology220 to relate Freud’s understanding of the psychology 
of Dora (an individual, supposedly hysterical woman) to other work on the psychology 
of the masses (which are understood as both hysterical and feminine), while drawing 
attention to the misogyny underpinning the characterization of both Dora and the 
masses. In doing so, I use the work of feminists (particularly Hélène Cixous) who have 
read hysteria as a form of proto-feminism to link Freud and Bernays’ conservative, 
misogynist understandings of femininity, and conservative/reactionary work on group 
psychology (particularly Gustave Le Bon’s 1895 The Crowd: A Study in the Popular Mind 
and Ann Coulter’s 2011 Demonic: How the Liberal Mob is Endangering America). This 
                                                          
220 See section 3.4. 
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section will contend that if the hysteria of individual women, particularly Freud’s Dora, is 
a feminine/feminist protest against the rule of the father (or father-substitute), 
controlling the hysteric is necessary to maintain that rule. Moreover, the control of Dora 
by the father(-substitute) is similar to the control of the (commodity) feminist by the 
public relations counsel (that is, Bernays’ capitalist version of Plato’s philosopher-
king221).  
The etymology of the word hysteria is hysterikos, the ancient Greek word for 
uterus. Intermittently since ancient Greece, hysterics have been understood to be 
women whose wombs were disturbed, or “wandering” around their bodies in some 
manner (Goldstein, 1991: 134; King, 1993). For example, in Timaeus, Plato described a 
woman’s uterus as such:  
if it remains unproductive long past puberty, it gets irritated and fretful. It 
takes to wandering all around the body and generating all sorts of ailments, 
including potentially fatal problems, if it blocks up the air-channels and makes 
breathing impossible. This goes on until a woman’s appetite for childbearing 
and a man’s yearning for procreation bring the two of them together and they 
strip the fruit from the tree, so to speak (2008: 91c). 
 
In other words, the cure for many of women’s chronic and potentially fatal health 
problems is to have sexual intercourse with a man and conceive a child. For much of its 
history (that is, from ancient Greece to the sixteenth century), the medical and cultural 
understanding of hysteria lacked any real coherence, beyond vague and recurrent ideas 
about women’s wandering uteri. As G. S. Rousseau notes of this time period, there was 
a “protean ability to sustain the existence of a condition called hysteria without a stable 
set of causes and effects or, more glaringly, a category identifiable by a commonly 
                                                          
221 See section 3.3. 
 249 
agreed upon characteristics” (1993: 92). By the mid-nineteenth century, western 
doctors were divided on whether or not hysteria was a disorder of the uterus or a 
disease of the nerves (that is, the neurological system). However, there was consensus 
on hysteria being a “quintessentially feminine” disease rooted somewhere in women’s 
bodies, the symptoms of which were excesses of emotion, fits, and irrational behaviour 
(King, 1993: 13). There was also widespread agreement among the masculinist medical 
establishment that the only certain way to ensure hysterics got better (or at least not 
worsen) was for the woman to conform to hegemonic femininity, primarily through 
marriage and motherhood (King, 1993: 63−64).  
Freud started his work on hysteria in 1885 and broke from conventional 
understandings of the (supposed) disorder/disease in several ways. Most importantly, 
he came to understand hysteria as rooted in psychology, not physiology (that is, neither 
the uterus nor the neurological system) (Freud, 1989a: 7). Following from this 
understanding, he linked the disease to sexuality (Freud, 1989a: 13; 1989b: 173−174, 
193, 197).222 Additionally, Freud broke from conventional understandings in suggesting 
hysteria was not exclusive to women. Despite Freud’s idea that hysteria could occur in 
men, his published case studies on hysteria concerned almost exclusively women 
patients (Link-Heer and Daniel, 1990: 202). Freud’s most famous case study was on Ida 
Bauer or “Dora” (as she was originally called to protect her identity). As Maria Ramas 
noted in 1980, Fragments of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (“Dora”) (1905) represents 
                                                          
222 Indeed, it was his studies on hysteria that led to his interest in sexuality (Freud, 1989a: 14), and it was 
through his interest in sexuality that Freud came to discover the Oedipus complex (Freud, 1989a: 20−23; 
Bergmann, 2001: 346, 351−353). 
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“a classic analysis of the structure and genesis of hysteria and has the first or last word 
in almost every psychoanalytic discussion of hysteria” (1980: 473).  
In Fragments, Freud outlines his treatment and analysis of Dora five years 
previously. The primary people focused upon in Freud’s re-telling are “Herr K.” and 
“Frau K.” (a married couple in their forties and friends of Dora’s family), Dora’s father, 
and of course Dora herself. Dora tells Freud that her father and Frau K. have been lovers 
for many years.223 In 1900, Dora is eighteen and has (supposedly) long been suffering 
from hysteria.224 She is brought to Freud by two men—her father and Herr K.—after 
threatening to commit suicide. Freud links Dora’s symptoms to two so-called 
incidents225 with Herr K. when she was fourteen and sixteen years of age respectively. At 
fourteen, Herr K. deceived and manipulated Dora into a situation in which she would be 
alone with him;226 he then cornered, kissed and rubbed against her, after which she 
managed to escape and run out into the street (Freud, 1989b: 183−184).227 At sixteen, 
Dora was obliged to spend the summer in the Alps with her father and the K. family. 
One day by the lake, Herr K. made “advances” to Dora, saying that he “got nothing from 
[his] wife.” Dora slapped him in the face and again ran away (Freud, 1989b: 228). Dora 
                                                          
223 Dora’s mother is said to suffer from the ill health of housewives and is mentioned only sporadically. 
Juliet Mitchell has commented upon “the patriarchal suppression of Dora’s mother to a marginalized 
position of housewife’s neurosis, of making life more difficult and of being ill-educated and lacking 
culture; she appears not to count in either the life history or the text” (2000: 96).  
224 According to contemporary understandings of mental health, Dora would be understood today as 
suffering from anxiety and depression (French, 2008: 249).  
225 This is the term Freud uses throughout his case study of Dora.  
226 Herr K. lured Dora to his place of work on the pretence that Dora, himself and his wife would have a 
good view of a street festival (Freud, 1989b: 183). Upon arriving at Herr K.’s business, she found him 
alone. All the clerks had been sent home and Frau K. was not present. 
227 Neither Herr K. nor Dora acknowledged this incident afterwards. Dora avoided being alone with Herr K. 
after that and did not tell anyone about the sexual assault until her therapy sessions with Freud four years 
later (Freud, 1989b: 184). 
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told her father about the scene by the lake and begged him to take her home; Dora’s 
father suggested she was merely “overexcited” and the whole scene was a product of 
her imagination (Freud, 1989b: 182, 194). Dora told Freud that she had become an 
“object of barter” between her father and Herr K.; that is, she was “handed over to Herr 
K. as the price of his tolerating the relations between her father and his wife” (Freud, 
1989b: 188). Freud suggested to Dora that she was in love with Herr K., an 
interpretation Dora rejected (1989b: 190, 210−211). Moreover, Freud suggested that 
Dora secretly wished Herr K. would divorce his wife and marry her (1989b: 229−230). 
After this suggestion—and eleven weeks of therapy—Dora leaves and never returns. 
Freud interprets this as “an unmistakable act of vengeance on her part,” presumably 
because Freud pointed out Dora’s supposed love for Herr K. (1989b: 230). 
 Freud’s discussion of Dora’s supposed hysteria is masculinist, heteronormative, 
and misogynist. Freud does not problematize the incidents at age fourteen and sixteen 
as sexual assault. Granted, Freud (unlike Dora’s father) does believe what she tells him 
about Herr K. (Freud, 1989b: 195); Freud is also unclear about the details of the second 
incident.228 At the same time, the first incident involved a man in his forties forcing 
sexual activity upon a fourteen-year-old girl without her consent, which is clearly sexual 
assault. Indeed, as French suggests, “a contemporary assessment of Dora’s situation 
would read Herr K.’s sexual advances as paedophilic and his treatment of Dora as child 
abuse” (2008: 250). Additionally, Freud does not in any way problematize the behaviour 
of Herr K., who was clearly abusing his position of power as an adult and trusted family 
                                                          
228 Freud is unclear on whether these “advances” were verbal or both verbal and physical. Although it is 
impossible to know with certainty, this might reflect Dora’s lack of clarity in therapy. 
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friend. Rather, Freud problematizes Dora’s reaction to his behaviour. He reads Dora’s 
“violent feeling of disgust” during and after her sexual assault at age fourteen as 
indicative of her abnormality and hysteria. Freud suggests that this was “surely just the 
situation to call up a distinct feeling of sexual excitement in a girl of fourteen who had 
never before been approached” (Freud, 1989b: 184). In Freud’s view, Dora’s disgust 
renders her “entirely and completely hysterical” (Freud, 1989b: 184). Freud describes 
Herr K. as “still quite young and of prepossessing appearance” (Freud, 1989b: 184). In 
doing so, Freud is following a long line of misogynist thought that blames the victim 
(rather than the perpetrator) in cases of sexual assault, and assumes women ought to 
enjoy it once it is underway (particularly where the assaulter conforms to hegemonic 
notions of masculine attractiveness). For these and other reasons, it is not surprising 
that Freud’s masculinist and heteronormative assumptions about Dora have been 
critiqued extensively by feminists.229 
 In addition to critiquing Freud’s problematic assumptions, feminists have read 
Dora (and to a lesser degree Freud’s other cases of hysteria) as enacting a form of 
feminism or proto-feminism. This has been quite common in feminist theory, 
particularly feminist theory influenced by Freudian (or Lacanian) psychoanalysis since 
                                                          
229 For example, in her play, Portrait of Dora, Hélène Cixous challenges Freud’s heteronormative reading 
of Dora as being in love with Herr K. Instead, she proposes that Dora is actually in love with Frau K. 
(Cixous, 2004: 41−43). In Freud’s original work, there are hints of Dora’s attraction to Frau K. For example, 
Freud notes that “when Dora talked about Frau K., she used to praise her ‘adorable white body’ in accents 
more appropriate to a lover” (1989b: 205). However, at no point during his treatment of Dora do any of 
these hints appear to register as significant to Freud. He persists in his understanding that Dora is secretly 
in love with her father(-substitute) and assaulter, Herr K. Freud does note in a footnote, five years after 
treating Dora, that “the longer the interval of time that separates me from the end of this analysis, the 
more probable it seems to me that the fault in my technique lay in this omission: I failed to discover in 
time and to inform the patient that her homosexual [sic] (gynaecophilic) love for Frau K. was the strong 
unconscious current of her mental life” (1989b: 237). 
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the late 1960s (Price Herndl, 1988: 52−54; Kahane, 1990: 31; Showalter, 1993: 286−288; 
Benjamin, 2001: 33; Dimen and Harris, 2001: 26). Discussions of Dora have been so 
commonplace that Juliet Mitchell has suggested that “with the second wave feminist 
movement, ‘Dora’ became a household name” (2000: 82). Mitchell herself links Freud’s 
earlier work on hysteria to his later work on Oedipus, contending that within “the body 
of the hysteric lies the feminine protest against the law of the father” (1974: 404; 
emphasis mine). Hélène Cixous, who has always been “fascinated” by Dora, famously 
questioned: “what woman is not Dora?” (Cixous and Clément, 1986: 147, 150). For 
Cixous, Dora is the  
one who resists the system, the one who cannot stand that the family and 
society are founded on the body of women, on bodies despised, rejected, 
bodies that are humiliating once they have been used. And this girl—like all 
hysterics, deprived of the possibility of saying directly what she perceived, […] 
still had strength to make it known. It is the nuclear example of women’s 
power to protest. […] Yet the hysteric is, to [Cixous’] eyes, the typical woman in 
all her force. It is a force that was turned back against Dora, but, if the scene 
changes and if woman begins to speak in other ways, it would be a force 
capable of demolishing these structures (Cixous and Clément, 1986: 154; 
emphasis mine).  
 
For Cixous, therefore, Dora’s hysteria is a form of protest against the masculinist order: 
Dora may not be able make her protest explicit, but she makes it known nonetheless. 
Cixous reads Dora as having an “incredible strength” by making her (family) system 
break down to the point that “the men drop like flies” (Cixous and Clément, 1986: 150).  
Whether or not the men in Dora’s life are dropping like flies, Dora certainly 
subverts the masculinist (family) order in which she is enmeshed. Dora rejects Herr K.’s 
so-called advances twice; she is disgusted by Herr K.’s violation of her trust and bodily 
integrity; she names Herr K.’s behaviour as wrong; she critiques her status as an object 
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to be exchanged between her father and Herr K.; and finally, she quits seeing Freud 
after he replicates the masculinism of her family. In other words, Dora refuses to submit 
to the authority of both her father and her two father-substitutes—namely, Herr K. and 
Freud himself. Freud regarded his psychoanalytic treatment of Dora as incomplete and 
relatively unsuccessful (1989b: 231−239). Ultimately, Freud failed in directing and 
controlling the (supposedly hysterical) Dora. His nephew, Edward Bernays, was much 
more successful in directing and controlling the (supposedly feminine and hysterical) 
masses. Before returning to Bernays, however, it is first important to briefly explore the 
construction of the masses as both hysterical and feminine (to the conservative 
mindset) and the misogyny underpinning this construction.  
 The relationship between hysteria, femininity, and the masses is evident in a 
variety of historical and contemporary conservative texts, including nineteenth-century 
French social psychologist Gustave Le Bon and contemporary American conservative 
pundit Ann Coulter. Le Bon’s 1895 Psychologie des foules (generally translated into 
English as simply The Crowd) has been highly influential in group psychology230 as well 
as conservative and reactionary231 thought and politics. In The Crowd, Le Bon proposed 
that individuals in a crowd effectively lose their personality: the crowd takes control of, 
transforms, and makes the individual behave in ways they would not otherwise behave 
                                                          
230 Leach describes The Crowd as “the most imaginative and widely-read exposition of crowd psychology” 
(1992: 12). Indeed, Freud himself devoted over one-third of his classic text on group psychology, Mass 
Psychology and the Analysis of the ‘I’ (1921), to a synopsis and discussion of Le Bon. See section 3.4 for a 
discussion of Mass Psychology.  
231 Le Bon was influential among fascists. For example, Benito Mussolini in his autobiography singled out 
Psychologie des foules as a text that had particularly influenced him (Hayes, 1992: 64). Additionally, Le 
Bon’s terminology and principles were repeatedly taken up by Adolf Hitler in Mein Kampf, and the 
architects of the Third Reich employed Le Bonian principles (Hayes, 1992: 64−65; Leach, 1992: 25). 
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(1968: 33−34). He understood the crowd to be highly suggestible, completely irrational, 
to have no ability to comprehend logic, as often hysterical, and sometimes violent (Le 
Bon, 1968: 37, 51, 52, 59, 107−110, 125−126). In other words, in a similar manner to his 
successors Freud and Bernays, Le Bon is both anti-democratic and fears the masses.232 
In addition to hysteria and irrationality, Le Bon also repeatedly associated crowds with 
women and femininity. For example, he suggested that  
among the special characteristics of crowds there are several—such as 
impulsiveness, irrationality, incapacity to reason, the absence of judgement 
and of the critical spirit, the exaggeration of sentiments […] which are almost 
always observed in beings belonging to inferior forms of evolution—in women 
[…] for instance (Le Bon cited in Hayes, 1992: 65).  
 
Le Bon’s misogynist associations have been picked up by others, including fascists233 and 
more recently, conservative American journalist Ann Coulter.  
Coulter, often considered a leading voice of contemporary American 
conservatism,234 is known for her hyperbolic and incendiary writing and speaking style, 
and unapologetic misogynist and racist language. Coulter begins Demonic by suggesting 
that “the demon is a mob, and the mob is demonic” (2011: 4). She suggests that her 
book explores the “root cause” of a (supposedly) “widely recognized” fact, which is that 
the left in America is “hysterical, unreasonable and clueless” (2011: 5). She situates Le 
                                                          
232 For example, Le Bon describes the ideals of the French Revolution (and democratic thought more 
generally) as a “grave delusion” (1968: 75−76). Le Bon sees the nobility who lost their privileges as the 
real heroes of the French Revolution (1968: 206). He also complains about the suggestibility and 
irrationality of parliamentarians when in a group (1968: 195−196, 205). 
233 For example, Mussolini contended that: “The crowd loves strong men. The crowd is like a woman” 
(Mussolini cited in Hayes, 1992: 65). Hitler suggested that just as a woman “would rather bow to a strong 
man than to dominate a weakling, […] the masses would love a commander more than a petitioner and 
feel inwardly more satisfied by a doctrine, tolerating no other beside itself, than by the granting of 
liberalistic freedom” (Hitler cited in Hayes, 1992: 65).  
234 Coulter has written multiple books (most of which have appeared on the New York Times Best Sellers 
list), hundreds of articles, and she has made frequent appearances on television, talk radio, and the 
lecture circuit. 
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Bon’s work as central to her explorations, because in her view, contemporary American 
“liberals could have been Le Bon’s study subjects” (2011: 5). Throughout Demonic, 
Coulter repeatedly associates the masses with so-called “primitives,” irrationality, 
women, and (what she understands to be) “The Left.”235 For example, Coulter argues 
that: 
The Left’s passionate adoration of President Obama—and Clinton, FDR, JFK, 
Hillary, Teddy Kennedy, and on and on—are the primitive emotions of a mob. 
These are sentiments generally associated with women, children, and savages, 
according to Le Bon. It’s not an accident that when Republicans of all stripes 
[…] choose an epithet for Democrats, it’s to call them women (Coulter, 2011: 
27; emphasis mine).  
 
Although Coulter identifies as a woman, it is to be assumed that she is exempt from 
those weak-willed, Democratic Party-voting, primitive, emotional, irrational, woman-like 
masses. Another interesting aspect of this quote (and the book as a whole) is Coulter’s 
use of Le Bon to give her views scholarly justification. Coulter is not unique in this 
regard: Le Bon is regularly used to “explain behaviour that is unacceptable to the person 
using the explanation” (McPhail, 1992: 13). Overall, Le Bon’s work has been said to owe 
“less to psychology than to conservative politics” (Leach, 1992: 13). In other words, 
although The Crowd has been embraced by conservatives (and reactionaries) for over a 
century, Le Bon’s scholarship has long been discredited by academics in psychology and 
other disciplines.236  
                                                          
235 Coulter’s use of the “The Left” is unclear; at times it seems to be self-identified American liberals and 
members of the Democratic Party, at other times it seems to include all Americans who are not staunch 
Republicans.  
236 For example, in The Myth of the Maddening Crowd, Clark McPhail contends that Le Bon was 
instrumental in creating myths about crowd behaviour (1991: 1−20, 25). He criticizes Le Bon (and those 
who have taken up his work) as making no attempt whatsoever at the systematic observation or study of 
crowds. He suggests that those who have made this attempt have found that individuals are not driven 
 257 
 Le Bon and Coulter are good examples of conservatives who associate the 
masses with hysteria and femininity in a misogynist manner. In this dissertation, I have 
defined misogyny as a hatred or deep hostility toward women and/or femininity.237 Julia 
Serano (whose work I used extensively in Chapter Two) critiques misogyny in American  
political discourse, where advocates for the environment, gun control, and 
welfare are undermined via “guilt by association” with feminine imagery as 
seen in phrases such as “tree huggers,” “soft on crime,” and pro-
“dependency”—where male politicians who exhibit anything other than a two-
dimensional facade of hypermasculinity are invariably dismissed by cartoonists 
who depict them donning dresses (2007: 340). 
 
Ann Coulter’s language in Demonic is exactly the sort of discourse Serano is critiquing: 
Coulter employs woman as a derogatory term and uses the language associated with 
femininity to denigrate her political opponents. Although Serano’s Whipping Girl was 
published four years before Demonic, Coulter’s use of misogynist language has long 
been part of her rhetorical strategy (Chambers and Finlayson, 2008; Farrar and Klien, 
2009). Thus underpinning the need to control the (hysterical) masses is a misogynist 
understanding of femininity.  
The question remaining concerns how Freud’s work on the hysteria of Dora and 
other conservative work on the hysteria of the masses relates to the theme of social 
control. Edward Bernays is key to this relationship. In 1929, when trying to figure out 
how to sell cigarettes to women for the American Tobacco Company, Bernays asked 
psychoanalyst A. A. Brill for advice.238 Brill confirmed Bernays’ belief that the taboo on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
mad or do not lose cognitive control in crowds; in fact, the crowd behaviour Le Bon and his followers 
describe is “infrequent and virtually never involves more than a few crowd members” (1991: xxii−xxiii). 
237 See section 2.2. 
238 When questioned by an interviewer as to why Bernays consulted with Brill instead of his uncle, Bernays 
replied that Freud was in Vienna (Curtis, 2002). However, it seems unlikely that Freud would be interested 
 258 
women smoking239 was of great psychological significance. Brill, American translator and 
lifelong correspondent of Freud, contended that 
some women regard cigarettes as symbols of freedom […] Smoking is a 
sublimation of oral eroticism; holding a cigarette in the mouth excites the oral 
zone. It is perfectly normal for women to want to smoke cigarettes. Further 
the first women who smoked probably had an excess of masculine 
components and adopted the habit as a masculine act. But today the 
emancipation of women has suppressed many of the feminine desires. More 
women now do the same work as men […]. Cigarettes, which are equated with 
men, become torches of freedom (Brill cited in Ewen, 1976: 160).  
 
Unsurprisingly, it was Brill from whom Bernays took the term torches of freedom. Brill’s 
quote is significant, not only because of Bernays’ adoption of the term, but for two 
other reasons.  
First, the quote can be read as an expression of the importance of containing and 
directing the potentially out-of-control desires and behaviour of women. While Brill saw 
smoking as empowering women while safely containing their oral eroticism, Bernays 
understood commodity (feminist) consumption as simultaneously empowering and 
pacifying the masses. Similarly, Freud read Dora’s disgust of the so-called “incident by 
the lake” with Herr K. as a “symptom of repression in the erotogenic oral zone” (1989b: 
185). The key, therefore, is to avoid repression (thus avoiding hysteria) by allowing 
liberation, as long as it is contained and directed by the wise father-substitute. Second, 
the quote can be related to Freud’s understanding of smoking as both love and 
submission to the rule of the father. Freud told Dora that she was in love with Herr K. as 
a father-substitute. This was because Herr K.—like her father and Freud himself—was a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in helping his nephew in what he considered to be an unsavoury line of work. See section 3.1 for more on 
Bernays and Freud’s relationship.  
239 See section 3.5 for a discussion of Bernays’ role in overcoming this taboo. 
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voracious smoker. After Dora recounted a dream involving smoke, Freud concluded that 
Dora desired to kiss both Herr K. and Freud himself (1989b: 213). For both Freud and his 
nephew, therefore, the wise father-substitute (the therapist or the public relations 
counsel) must direct desire while controlling the potentially hysterical feminine woman 
or masses.  
Overall, hysteria provides a useful lens for thinking through the theme of social 
control, and provides further links between Chapters Two and Three on the origins of 
commodity feminism. This exploration of the workings of social control in commodity 
feminism does not negate agency or resistance. Just as the supposedly hysterical Dora 
rejected the control of both her actual father and father-substitutes (including Freud 
himself), the supposedly hysterical masses of women can reject the social control 
underpinning commodity feminism and reclaim a decommodified feminism.  
C. Commodity Feminism as a Civilizing Mission  
The relationship between commodities and so-called civilization is long-standing. The 
nineteenth-century World Exhibitions (held in Paris, London, and other centres of 
imperial power) were described by Walter Benjamin as “places of pilgrimage to the 
commodity fetish” (2002: 17). The 1851 World’s Fair in London was similarly described 
by Anne McClintock as a monument to mass consumption and imperial progress (1995: 
57). More recently, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on a bastion of 
capitalist power (the World Trade Centre in New York City), then President George W. 
Bush famously urged the American public to combat terror by going shopping. To 
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consume commodities, therefore, is to consume civilization. In order to understand how 
commodity feminism is implicated in the so-called civilizing mission, this section will 
build upon both the discussion of commodity fetishism in Chapter One and of 
commodity racism and Unilever in Chapter Four. Additionally, I will link this analysis to 
Naomi Klein’s No Logo (1999). 
To begin by building upon the discussion of commodity fetishism in Chapter One, 
in the first volume of Capital, Marx theorizes commodity fetishism through an analogy 
between the European commodity worshipper and the African fetish worshipper.240 
Jane Bennett has argued that Marx’s conception of commodity fetishism “seems to 
draw some of its power from an image of the masses in Western Europe as creatures 
who bear the repulsive trace of the African savage” (2001: 118). She contends that this 
trace can be found through a series of associations:  
Its drama aligns the primitive with the negro, the negro with pagan animism, 
animism with delusion and passivity, passivity with commodity culture. And 
this line of equivalences is contrasted with another consisting of the modern, 
the light, the demystified, the debunking critical theorist (Bennett, 2001: 118). 
 
Marx himself does not make all of these associations explicitly; however, in the imperial 
context in which he is writing, the analogy between the European commodity 
worshipper and the African fetish worshipper requires this “repulsive trace.” Moreover, 
in comparing the commodity and fetish worshippers, Marx is taking up an impartial third 
position that is somehow outside this us/them, civilized/primitive dichotomy: that of the 
enlightened theorist who will demystify the mysterious and enigmatic character of 
commodities for us.  
                                                          
240 See section 1.2.2. 
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 If there is a “repulsive trace” underlying Marx’s discussion of commodity 
fetishism, it is picked up in racist readings of Marx’s original text. For example, Arthur 
reads Marx’s analogy as between “the subservience of the producers to the laws of the 
commodity market” and “the superstition of the savage who fashions a fetish with his 
own hand and then falls down and worships it” (1986: 16). In other words, Arthur reads 
Marx as arguing that the European producer is no better than the African savage: both 
are subservient, passive subjects too dim to recall that the object they worship was 
something they created themselves. The Arthur example highlights how difficult (if not 
impossible) it is for a white European such as Marx, at the height of European 
imperialism, to critique the cultural practices of African societies outside of these racist 
discourses.  
McNally has a very different reading from Bennett. He argues that what Marx is 
actually doing is reversing imperial discourses concerning fetish worship in Africa in 
stating that the biggest worshippers of things are Europeans. In his words, Marx is 
launching an “ironic attack on the European ruling classes as idolaters, as people who 
worship things” (2011: 205). In making this argument, McNally draws upon the young 
Marx’s critique of the gold fetish of Spanish colonizers of the Americas, and wood fetish 
of the rulers of the Rhineland (2006: 2). All of the moralizing by colonizers about the 
heathens and pagans in the colonies is brought back on the colonizers themselves: the 
civilizing mission of imperialism is required more for the civilized societies than the 
primitive. If there is a reverse imperialist logic underlying Marx’s discussion of 
commodity fetishism, it is picked up in anti-racist readings of Marx’s original text, such 
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as McClintock’s use of the term “commodity racism” to explore a variety of 
advertisements from late nineteenth-century Britain, in which “Victorian cleaning rituals 
were peddled globally as the God-given sign of Britain’s evolutionary superiority, and 
soap was invested with magical, fetish powers” (1995: 207).241  
While there are racist readings of commodity fetishism to support Bennett’s 
argument and anti-racist readings to support McNally’s argument, I situate myself 
between Bennett and McNally. Marx’s analogy implies denigration for Bennett and 
critique for McNally. I contend that Marx’s analogy implies equivalence. In making the 
analogy between commodity and fetish worshippers, Marx might not be inverting 
colonial discourses so much as equating Western Europe with Western Africa. In making 
both uncivilized, Marx is not necessarily critiquing or taking up discourses concerning the 
uncivilized or primitive. At the same time, lending support to McNally’s argument is 
Marx’s jest concerning “political economists [who] are fond of Robinson Crusoe stories” 
(1990: 169). Of these storytelling political economists, Marx only specifically mentions 
Ricardo, yet clearly his target is the variety of origin storytellers (such as Hobbes and 
Locke) who used caricatures of the original inhabitants of colonized lands as the basis of 
their theorizing. Therefore Marx’s jest could be read as demonstrating his awareness of 
problematic uses of the primitive in Western thought. However, as Paul cautions, there 
is a “widespread […] tendency to transform Marx and Engels into progressives on every 
issue of twentieth-century concern” (1981: 138). McNally’s argument could be read as a 
continuation of that tendency into the twenty-first century. The nature of Marx’s use of 
                                                          
241 See section 4.5. 
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colonial discourses in his commodity fetishism/“misty realm of religion” analogy is 
irresolvable and must remain ambiguous.242 Yet this debate is somewhat beside the 
point. In making an analogy between the European commodity worshipper and the 
African fetish worshipper—whether problematic, critical, or a bit of both—Marx’s 
conception of commodity fetishism is intrinsically tied up in the civilizing mission of 
European imperialism in Africa.  
 In Chapter Four, I explored how the British masses were taught narratives of 
imperial progress through commodity racism.243 In thinking through how commodity 
feminism is implicated in the so-called civilizing mission, it is useful to explore the 
similarities between historical and contemporary commodity racism. First, just as the 
soap of Victorian Britain promised “racial upliftment through historical contact with 
commodity culture” (McClintock, 1995: 220), Fair & Lovely promises racialized 
empowerment through commodity consumption. Heavily-run television commercials244 
and print ads in India have put forth variations on the same narrative: a depressed 
                                                          
242 Indeed, retaining this ambiguity is critical because outside of his discussion of commodity fetishism, 
references to Africans in the work of Marx are quite sparse. Paul has surveyed the references that do 
exist, not only in the collected works of Marx and Engels, but also in their correspondence with each other 
and their commentaries on the work of others. She concludes that they “were not consistent anti-
colonialists, and they were not progressive about race either; they were simply no better or worse than 
most of their contemporaries” (1981: 120, 138). Nimtz has come to similar conclusions: he notes that 
when Marx’s daughter Laura married a man who was one-eighth black, Marx wished to convince his 
daughter and son-in-law that he had progressive ideas about race. At the same time, in his 
correspondence with Engels, Marx displayed at times essentialist views on race typical of his nineteenth-
century context (Nimtz, 2003: 158–161). 
243 See section 4.5. 
244 Fair & Lovely is well known for its major television advertising campaigns in India. For example, in 2002, 
it was among the most advertised brands during the World Cup (Karnani, 2007: 1353). One of India’s 
largest advertisers is Hindustan Unilever Limited. Industry sources claim the corporation has spent $5 
million USD on television advertising for Fair & Lovely alone (Shevde, 2008). In a study of urban women 
under twenty-five in Hyderabad (in the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh), Kavita Karan found that 
most of the women had seen these commercials. Her respondents commented that the commercials are 
hard to miss as “they are on every TV channel” and are particularly aired during prime-time serials that 
are popular with women (2008).  
 264 
woman with few prospects gains a brighter future by attaining a boyfriend or husband 
or well-paying job after she uses Fair & Lovely to lighten her complexion (Karnani, 2007: 
1353).245 These ads consistently link happiness and upward mobility with lighter skin. 
Multiple silhouettes of the same woman lined up from dark to light—reminiscent of the 
before and after images in Victorian ads—are a recurrent image in Fair & Lovely’s 
commercials, print ads, website, and packaging (Timmons, 2007). Both historical and 
contemporary commodity racism, therefore, sell class mobility and freedom by 
promising to remove the taint of darker skin.  
A second similarity between historical and contemporary commodity racism is 
the remaining presence of the racialized beauty contest. Just as evolutionary racism246 
adjudicated among Indians as if they were in an “eternal beauty contest” (Arnold, 2004: 
263), contemporary merchants of commodity racism sponsor actual beauty contests in 
India. These contests, such as the Pantaloons Femina Miss India pageant (or simply Miss 
India), consistently rank lighter-coloured skin as more beautiful. Dove is a regular 
sponsor of the Miss India pageant, and like Fair & Lovely, Dove is both a subsidiary of 
Unilever and a producer of skin lightening cream. These pageants are very influential in 
shaping contemporary notions of female beauty in India.247 Indeed, since the 1970s 
beauty pageants have been a tremendously popular viewer spectacle (Nakano Glenn, 
                                                          
245 Although I focused on Fair & Lovely’s Indian market in this dissertation, Unilever has followed a similar 
advertising strategy in all the countries where it is sold. Unsurprisingly, advertisements containing this 
narrative have faced a great deal of criticism from women’s groups in many countries including India, 
Malaysia, and Egypt (Karnani, 2007: 1353).  
246 See section 4.5. 
247 Another important influence shaping contemporary notions of female beauty in India are Bollywood 
actresses, who tend to have lighter skin and often green eyes (Nakano Glenn, 2008: 290; Shevde, 2008). 
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2008: 296, 297, 289−290).248 The remaining presence of the racialized beauty contest 
demonstrates that the multinational corporation has taken over from the imperialist 
state. Corporations such as Unilever have taken over from British colonial 
representatives in the duty of adjudicating Indian female beauty.  
A third similarity between historical and contemporary commodity racism is that 
both are responses to the needs of globalized capital. In the nineteenth century, cotton 
produced by slave plantations lead to a surplus of cheap cotton goods, while palm oil 
and coconut oil produced by imperial plantations lead to a surplus of cheap ingredients 
ideal for soap making. These developments, along with the growing disposable income 
of the middle class in Britain, lead to a growth in commodities made from cotton and a 
growth in the soap produced to clean cotton products, as well as bodies and homes 
(McClintock, 1995: 210). Moreover, as McClintock documents,  
Economic competition with the United States and Germany created the need 
for a more aggressive promotion of British products and led to the first real 
innovations in advertising. In 1884 […] the first wrapped soap was sold under a 
brand name. This small event signified a major transformation in capitalism, as 
imperial competition gave rise to the creation of monopolies. Henceforth, 
items formerly indistinguishable from each other (soap simply sold as soap) 
would be marketed by their corporate signature […] Soap became one of the 
first commodities to register the historic shift from myriad small businesses to 
the great imperial monopolies (1995: 210−211). 
 
Given the origins of commodity racism in the marketing of British soap, commodity 
racism therefore plays an important role in the early development of globalized capital 
and commodity culture.  
                                                          
248 Nakano Glenn attributes this popularity to Indian nationalism. India has been very successful in 
international pageants such as Miss World (2008: 290). Winners of Miss India, of course, go on to 
compete in Miss World and other international pageants. 
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In the contemporary context, the expansion of the skin lightening market in India 
is a result of the neoliberal economic reforms dating back to 1991 and the changing 
roles of women. With the deregulation of imports, expansion of foreign direct 
investment, and growth of the urban middle class, multinationals such as Unilever 
(through their subsidiaries) have set their sights on India as a prime target for expansion 
(Nakano Glenn, 2008: 290). Women have increasing levels of education and economic 
mobility, and India has both more working women and more professionally qualified 
women than any other country in the world. Indeed, India has more women doctors, 
surgeons, scientists, and professors than the United States. This has rendered Indian 
women a desirable target for a variety of products, including skin lightening cream and 
other cosmetics, but also cars, insurance, travel, and hotel services (Karan, 2008).  
The flourishing of skin lightening products, however, is not entirely due to the 
disposable income of Indian women in higher class positions. Certain products are 
targeted at white collar urban workers and affluent professionals and managers, but 
others are targeted at rural villagers (Thekaekara, 2006: 10; Nakano Glenn, 2008: 290; 
Tiltman, 2011).249 Indeed, in marketing circles, Hindustan Unilever Limited is considered 
“one of the pioneers of marketing to rural consumers” (Tiltman, 2011). This marketing is 
done primarily through television advertisements, as most rural villages have at least 
one community television donated by the government (Thekaekara, 2006: 10). In the 
last decade, Fair & Lovely has been made available in sample sizes or sachets so that 
                                                          
249 Unilever’s strategy for expansion in the Indian market has been to periodically add new products at 
different price ranges, including sunscreens and gels, a premium line available only at select stores in large 
cities, and even a product for men (Timmons, 2007; Nakano Glenn, 2008: 297). 
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even the very poor can afford to purchase them (Shevde, 2008; Tiltman, 2011).250 One 
television commercial featured a woman from a poor family and emphasized her marital 
success; this success only cost her five rupees (approximately twenty cents USD) to 
purchase a sachet of Fair & Lovely (Karan, 2008). The commodity racism of Victorian 
Britain and contemporary India, therefore, are quite similar when viewed as a response 
to the needs of globalized capital.  
 Overall, civilizing discourses play an important role in both commodity fetishism 
and commodity feminism (and provide a link between Chapters One and Four). In 
Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud remarks that using soap as a yardstick of 
civilization is not surprising (1961: 46). For Freud, beauty and cleanliness “occupy a 
special position among the requirements of civilization,” yet at the same time, “their 
vital necessity is not very apparent” (1961: 47, 51). This necessity was not apparent to 
Freud because he failed to appreciate the relationship between commodities and 
civilization. Indeed, since Freud’s time, commodification has expanded and intensified. 
Naomi Klein refers to this expansion and intensification as “corporate transcendence” 
(2002: 21). Multinational corporations have transcended manufacturing (through 
contracting out production). Instead of selling commodities, they sell lifestyles, culture, 
feminism, and, most importantly, they sell civilization.  
                                                          
250 The sachets marketed to the Indian poor are not limited to skin lightening cream; sachets of shampoos 
and soaps are also increasingly common. Mari Thekaekara has noted that traditionally every Indian village 
had local, organic shampoos and soaps (made from various plants including reetha soapnuts and hibiscus 
flowers). As the villages have been brought into an increasingly globalized market, these shampoos and 
soaps have become unaffordable to the locals, as they are in demand by elites (in India and elsewhere) 
who have discovered organics. As such, poor women are forced to purchase expensive, chemical 
substitutes. Moreover, these women are paying a higher price (per gram) than their wealthy urban 
counterparts who can afford to buy the products in high quantities (Thekaekara, 2006: 10).  
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D. Moving Toward a Decommodified Feminism  
In her lengthy introduction to Stitch ‘n Bitch Crochet: The Happy Hooker, Debbie Stoller 
traces the etymology of the word hooker to crochet lace-makers in nineteenth-century 
Western Europe. Due to poor wages in the lace-making industry, these women sidelined 
as sex workers to make a living wage (Stoller, 2006: 6−7). Although The Happy Hooker is 
an unselfconsciously feminist book, in purchasing the book and following its patterns, I 
am hardly engaging in feminist activism for the rights of sex workers or forwarding any 
other feminist cause. The only real disturbance I caused was somewhat offending the 
moral sensibilities of my conservative grandmother as she flipped through the pages of 
my book. My experiences with crocheting and knitting are very different from those of 
my grandmother. Like many women of her generation, she learned to knit in order to 
“help the war effort” (that is, Canadian involvement in the Second World War). She 
takes pride in the fact that she learned to knit on four needles251 so she could 
immediately “do her part.” The circular wristlets that my grandmother (and countless 
other Canadian women) knit were shipped overseas and given to soldiers to keep their 
wrists warm in the gap where their gloves ended and their jackets began. I have always 
enjoyed knitting with my grandmother and listening to her knitting stories, despite my 
critiques of her associations with knitting: that is, the wartime militarization of women, 
happy homemaker domesticity, and tender maternalism.  
 In a similar manner to many feminists of my generation who knit and crochet, I 
have been strongly influenced by Debbie Stoller. Indeed, the contemporary knitting 
                                                          
251 Knitting on four needles is very challenging: most knitters are introduced to knitting through the spool, 
and then work to master two needles before attempting four needles.  
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movement (sometimes called craftivism) has been described as being “defined chiefly 
through Stoller’s lead,” and “often positions itself as subverting the conventional 
associations of knitting” (Bratich and Brush, 2011: 241). Yet at the same time, I am 
uncomfortable with certain aspects of Stoller’s politics. For example, she exhibits a 
seeming complete lack of awareness of the ways in which knitting is inaccessible to 
many women. Mastering the craft of knitting—or even developing a basic proficiency—
involves a great deal of money and free time. Due to the high costs of yarn and other 
necessary supplies, purchasing mass-produced scarves, sweaters, and other knit wear is 
now a more affordable option for many women in Anglo-America. Of course, as Naomi 
Klein notes, “somebody has to get down and dirty and make the products” (2002: 202); 
these somebodies are generally women working under appalling conditions in export 
processing zones. But the privileged Stoller-esque feminists do not have to be implicated 
in what Klein refers to as “globalization’s dirty little secret” (2002: 347): they do not 
have to work multiple minimum-wage jobs to make ends meet, and as such, have more 
free time to make their own scarves and sweaters with beautiful, union-made 
Norwegian wool. In addition to her lack of awareness of the inaccessibility of knitting, 
Stoller’s politics are problematic for another reason. In Bust and elsewhere, Stoller’s 
writing reads very similarly to Baumgardner and Richard’s Manifesta,252 in that no 
critique of consumption is provided whatsoever, and pro-woman pop culture is merrily 
celebrated along with any and all consumption involving edgy, oppositional, and/or 
feminist forms of femininity.    
                                                          
252 See section 2.7. 
 270 
 In thinking through the relationship between commodity feminism, femininity, 
and subjectivity, I have tried to keep the question of resistance at the forefront. The 
three themes discussed in this concluding chapter—origin stories, social control, and the 
civilizing mission—provide clues to decommodifying feminism. Section A of this chapter 
demonstrated that origin stories associated with commodity feminism (that is, those of 
Engels and Freud) illuminate the power relations and conservative politics from which 
commodity feminism emerged and within which it continues to operate. Disrupting the 
view that these origin stories represent actual historical events or are foundational to 
social and political life allows for the disruption of the politics that follow: namely, the 
elitist, and anti-democratic politics of Edward Bernays, as well as the marketing 
professionals that followed in his footsteps. In researching this dissertation, I was struck 
by the similarities in self-presentation among marketers ranging from Bernays253 to the 
those involved in debates about feminism in the 1970s and 1980s to those working on 
the Campaign for Real Beauty. Bernays’ views on the immense importance of marketing 
professionals to society and social change seems to be the norm.254 Understanding 
                                                          
253 In Biography of an Idea: Memoirs of Public Relations Counsel Edward L. Bernays, which runs well over 
eight hundred pages, Bernays seemingly describes every accomplishment and every person with any claim 
to importance he met over the course of his entire career. I wondered on several occasions about 
Bernays’ editor, Merrill Pollack from Simon and Schuster: did Pollack even try to moderate the excessive 
displays of hubris in Biography of an Idea, and if so, how did earlier drafts of the biography read? 
254 While Bernays saw the public relations counsel as a member of the “intelligent few” akin to the 
Platonic philosopher-king, today marketing professionals see themselves as “a playground for the 
talented. [They] think of themselves as members of a profession, chosen without fear or favour as the 
best able to perform as the vanguard of consumer capitalism. They were encouraged in this view by an 
intellectual apparatus that put them among the leaders of the “creative class.” In this context the key 
advertising workers were not the salespeople, account managers or client relations developers, but the 
people who wrote copy, designed layouts or directed and cut television and film promos. These creatives 
were among the key manipulators of symbols in a world in which the manipulation of information was the 
key to the creation of new business” (Blake, 2009: 109). With that being said, it is difficult to say for 
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these politics is the first step of disruption. In other words, a key part of resisting 
commodity feminism is knowing what we are up against. In section B, I demonstrated 
that we are up against the idea that femininity and hysteria go hand-in-hand and must 
be controlled. We are also up against the idea that the feminine, hysterical masses are 
dangerous, or as Ann Coulter phrases it, “demonic.” In section C, I demonstrated that 
we are also up against the idea that feminism, consumption, and so-called civilization 
work together. Challenging commodity feminism means challenging conservative 
discourses about the masses, challenging discourses of civilization, and challenging the 
way those discourses are tied up in commodity consumption.  
 As noted in the epigraph to this concluding chapter, Naomi Klein and her 
university friends in the 1990s had been convinced they were doing something 
“subversive and rebellious” but could not quite remember what (2002: 82). It is 
important to remember that Freud failed in his attempts to control Dora; that is, he 
failed in his attempts to interpret her history and map out her future. For Freud, the 
symptoms of hysteria are an “expression of [the patient’s] most secret and repressed 
wishes” (1989b: 173). He himself acknowledged his failure in reading Dora’s repressed 
wishes. Cixous and others have read Dora’s wishes255 as a proto-feminist wish to be free 
of masculinist structures. In a similar manner to Dora, commodity feminists are 
constrained by masculinist and conservative limitations. Men like Freud and Bernays 
become the saviours of Dora and the hysterical feminine masses—the ones to help curb 
                                                                                                                                                                             
certain how much marketers believe of their own self-presentation: marketers must, after all, market 
commodities, market themselves, and market the marketing profession itself.  
255 We cannot be clear on what Dora’s wishes really were, because “until recently, stories about hysteria 
were told by men, and women were always the victims in these stories rather than the heroines” 
(Showalter, 1993: 287). 
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their out-of-control and irrational ways. In other words, what Freud is to Dora is what 
Bernays is to the feminine masses. As such, if both Dora and the commodity feminist 
represent different forms of feminism—however inadequate both hysteria and 
commodity feminism are as feminism—then both can reject the social control 
underpinning commodity feminism and reclaim a decommodified feminism. Feminism 
can be delinked from consumption and a decommodified future is possible.  
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